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Tue, 07 Jul 2026 03:58:14 -0700 (PDT) Received: from kali ([122.162.146.188]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id a92af1059eb24-13b658a99afsm7862340c88.0.2026.07.07.03.58.11 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Tue, 07 Jul 2026 03:58:14 -0700 (PDT) From: Pavitra Jha To: idryomov@gmail.com, amarkuze@redhat.com, slava@dubeyko.com Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Pavitra Jha Subject: [PATCH v4] ceph: fix OOB read in ceph_osdc_list_watchers via uncapped outdata_len Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 06:57:27 -0400 Message-ID: <20260707105727.43352-1-jhapavitra98@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260702114034.917507-13-amarkuze@redhat.com> References: <20260702114034.917507-13-amarkuze@redhat.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The OSD reply header field op->payload_len is wire-controlled and is copied directly into m->outdata_len[i] without any bounds check: m->outdata_len[i] = le32_to_cpu(op->payload_len); This value propagates unchecked to req->r_ops[0].outdata_len and is then used to set the decode boundary in ceph_osdc_list_watchers(): void *const end = p + req->r_ops[0].outdata_len; The actual data allocation is always exactly one page: ceph_alloc_page_vector(1, GFP_NOIO) ceph_osd_data_pages_init(..., PAGE_SIZE, ...) The messenger caps the copy to PAGE_SIZE bytes, but the decode window end is set from the uncapped wire value. A malicious OSD can send outdata_len=0x10000, causing _safe decoder boundary checks to pass while the physical reads cross the slab allocation boundary. KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled): ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob2_init+0x23d/0xff0 [ceph_oob2_poc] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800a229f9e by task insmod/57 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 57 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy) Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70 print_report+0x170/0x4f3 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 ceph_oob2_init+0x23d/0xff0 [ceph_oob2_poc] do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0 do_init_module+0x27c/0x790 load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350 init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180 idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750 __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120 do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Allocated by task 57: kasan_save_stack+0x30/0x50 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 ceph_oob2_init+0x44/0xff0 [ceph_oob2_poc] do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0 do_init_module+0x27c/0x790 load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350 init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180 idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750 __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120 do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800a229000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096 The buggy address is located 3998 bytes inside of allocated 4000-byte region [ffff88800a229000, ffff88800a229fa0) Memory state around the buggy address: ffff88800a229e80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff88800a229f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff88800a229f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff88800a22a000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff88800a22a080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== val=0xccccaaaa (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone) Fix by introducing buf_len to hold the allocation size, using it in both ceph_osd_data_pages_init() and the min_t() decode boundary cap, so the two are guaranteed to stay in sync if the buffer size changes. buf_len is declared as u32 to match the type of outdata_len used in the min_t() expression. Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph deployment can trigger this against any client issuing CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS without further privileges beyond OSD session establishment. Fixes: a4ed38d7a180 ("libceph: support for CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha --- v4: Rebase against current linux/master and ceph-testing/testing, confirmed clean git am -3 apply against both. No functional changes from Slava's reviewed v3. v3: Change buf_len type from size_t to u32 to match outdata_len type in min_t(), per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review. v2: Introduce buf_len variable instead of hardcoding PAGE_SIZE independently in ceph_osd_data_pages_init() and the min_t() cap, per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review. --- net/ceph/osd_client.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ceph/osd_client.c b/net/ceph/osd_client.c index 2ff00070c..62bec6ad8 100644 --- a/net/ceph/osd_client.c +++ b/net/ceph/osd_client.c @@ -5060,6 +5060,7 @@ int ceph_osdc_list_watchers(struct ceph_osd_client *osdc, struct ceph_osd_request *req; struct page **pages; int ret; + const u32 buf_len = PAGE_SIZE; req = ceph_osdc_alloc_request(osdc, NULL, 1, false, GFP_NOIO); if (!req) @@ -5078,7 +5079,7 @@ int ceph_osdc_list_watchers(struct ceph_osd_client *osdc, osd_req_op_init(req, 0, CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, 0); ceph_osd_data_pages_init(osd_req_op_data(req, 0, list_watchers, response_data), - pages, PAGE_SIZE, 0, false, true); + pages, buf_len, 0, false, true); ret = ceph_osdc_alloc_messages(req, GFP_NOIO); if (ret) @@ -5088,7 +5089,8 @@ int ceph_osdc_list_watchers(struct ceph_osd_client *osdc, ret = ceph_osdc_wait_request(osdc, req); if (ret >= 0) { void *p = page_address(pages[0]); - void *const end = p + req->r_ops[0].outdata_len; + void *const end = p + + min_t(u32, req->r_ops[0].outdata_len, buf_len); ret = decode_watchers(&p, end, watchers, num_watchers); } -- 2.53.0