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[80.230.68.31]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 5b1f17b1804b1-493eb6f3b85sm58465005e9.2.2026.07.08.22.52.02 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Wed, 08 Jul 2026 22:52:03 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 01:52:00 -0400 From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" To: Daniel =?iso-8859-1?Q?P=2E_Berrang=E9?= Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org Subject: Re: [PULL 4/4] docs: outline some guidelines for security classification Message-ID: <20260709014834-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> References: <20260707175027.3029620-1-berrange@redhat.com> <20260707175027.3029620-5-berrange@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <20260707175027.3029620-5-berrange@redhat.com> Received-SPF: pass client-ip=170.10.129.124; envelope-from=mst@redhat.com; helo=us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com X-Spam_score_int: -24 X-Spam_score: -2.5 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.5 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIMWL_WL_HIGH=-0.445, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, SPF_HELO_PASS=-0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: qemu development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org On Tue, Jul 07, 2026 at 06:50:27PM +0100, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote: > Beyond the overall virt/non-virt use case classification, there are > a number of scenarios which we have decided will not be treated as > security issues. Start to document some of these to give consistency > in our treatment of incoming disclosures. > > Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth > Reviewed-by: Cédric Le Goater > Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin > Reviewed-by: Mauro Matteo Cascella > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé > --- > docs/system/security.rst | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/docs/system/security.rst b/docs/system/security.rst > index 53992048e6..52bbf0cc7a 100644 > --- a/docs/system/security.rst > +++ b/docs/system/security.rst > @@ -75,6 +75,69 @@ Bugs affecting the non-virtualization use case are not considered security > bugs at this time. Users with non-virtualization use cases must not rely on > QEMU to provide guest isolation or any security guarantees. > > +Security boundary scope > +''''''''''''''''''''''' > + > +Even where a flaw affects the virtualization use case described above, > +not all scenarios will be considered in scope. The following guidelines > +are used to evaluate whether to apply the full security process, or treat > +an issue as a normal bug. > + > +* **assert** / **abort**. If triggering the code path requires kernel > + privileges (or root account access) in the guest, asserts/aborts in > + QEMU are a self inflicted denial of service. These will **not** be > + treated as security flaws, at most hardening bugs. If triggering the > + code path can be done by an unprivileged guest OS account, this > + **may** justify handling as a security bug. > + > +* **vhost-user/vfio-user backends**. The backend processes have > + shared memory regions co-mapped with the QEMU process. The intent > + of the process separation is operational resilience & flexibility > + and allowing for independent software suppliers. There is not > + considered to be security boundary between QEMU and the vhost-user > + & vfio-user backends. Thus flaws in the backends which can cause > + crashes / undesirable behaviour in QEMU will **not** be treated as > + security flaws, but should be fixed as hardening bugs. > + > +* **memory allocation bounds**. There are many ways in which a QEMU > + process can legitimately consume an amount of memory that is > + significantly larger than the assigned guest RAM. QEMU's worst > + case memory usage should be considered effectively unbounded. As > + such the QEMU deployment on the host should account for the > + possibility of large memory peaks and apply countermeasures to > + provide continuity of host operations. It is typical for the Linux > + OOM killer to reap the process triggering host memory overcommit > + in the case of exccessive usage, offering a degree of protection. It seems to work kinda unreliably here on my laptop. Likes killing firefox for some reason. Using libvirt ... what am I doing wrong? > + As such, bugs which can lead to excessive/unbounded memory allocations > + will usually not be classified as security flaws, but should be > + fixed as hardening bugs.