From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: "Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>,
"Vincent Mailhol" <mailhol@kernel.org>,
"Oleksij Rempel" <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>,
linux-can@vger.kernel.org,
"Marc Kleine-Budde" <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 02/10] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2026 10:44:39 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260709104440.6E8221F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260709-bcm_fixes-v10-2-57fff38e34ce@hartkopp.net>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing RCU protection and memory barriers for `tx_ops` and `rx_ops` list modifications and traversals.
- [High] Lockless modification of CAN frames and filters from process context while they are concurrently read by softirq handlers.
--
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH v10 02/10] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure ---
commit 14fe77d5df361ef7f02ad605d5649032b1cb3565
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure
This commit fixes an unordered read/write race in bcm_sendmsg() between
bo->bound and bo->ifindex by moving the re-check into the locked section.
It also ensures bcm_rx_setup() returns an error if the target device
disappears concurrently instead of silently succeeding.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/CAGp+u1aBK8QVjsvAxM2Ldzep4rEbsP9x_pV3At4g=h1kVEtyhA@mail.gmail.com/
> diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
> index bdf53241bd7b3..b612135b017d1 100644
> --- a/net/can/bcm.c
> +++ b/net/can/bcm.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1436,20 +1463,21 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
> struct net_device *dev;
>
> dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
> - if (!dev)
> - return -ENODEV;
> + if (!dev) {
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + goto out_release;
> + }
>
> if (dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN) {
> dev_put(dev);
> - return -ENODEV;
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + goto out_release;
> }
>
> dev_put(dev);
> }
> }
>
> - lock_sock(sk);
> -
> switch (msg_head.opcode) {
>
> case TX_SETUP:
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this lack of RCU protection and memory
barriers allow a lockless reader to observe uninitialized fields?
Looking at bcm_proc_show(), it traverses bo->tx_ops locklessly under
rcu_read_lock():
list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->tx_ops, list) {
Concurrently, bcm_tx_setup() can add a new operation to this list:
list_add(&op->list, &bo->tx_ops);
Because list_add() lacks the smp_store_release() memory barrier provided
by list_add_rcu(), and the traversal uses the non-RCU
list_for_each_entry() macro, can concurrent readers see torn pointers or
uninitialized bcm_op fields, potentially causing a kernel crash when
reading uninitialized memory?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this lockless modification of CAN
frames allow softirq readers to see partially updated data?
In bcm_tx_setup() and bcm_rx_setup(), op->frames are modified directly
from process context:
bcm_tx_setup():
err = memcpy_from_msg((u8 *)cf, msg, op->cfsiz);
bcm_rx_setup():
err = memcpy_from_msg(op->frames, msg, msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
Concurrently, softirq handlers read these frames locklessly. For example,
bcm_can_tx() reads frames from timer context to transmit:
skb_put_data(skb, cf, op->cfsiz);
And bcm_rx_cmp_to_index() reads filter mask frames from RX softirq context:
if ((get_u64(cf, i) & get_u64(rxdata, i)) != ...
Can this data race result in transmitting torn or functionally corrupted
CAN frames to the network bus, or incorrect evaluation of incoming packets
against partially updated filter masks?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260709-bcm_fixes-v10-0-57fff38e34ce@hartkopp.net?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-09 10:44 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-09 10:24 [PATCH v10 00/10] can: bcm: collected fixes - final5 :-( Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 01/10] can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:38 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 02/10] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:44 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-09 11:58 ` Marc Kleine-Budde
2026-07-09 12:58 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 03/10] can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:52 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 04/10] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 05/10] can: bcm: add missing rcu list annotations and operations Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 06/10] can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 07/10] can: bcm: validate frame length in bcm_rx_setup() for RTR replies Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 08/10] can: bcm: add missing device refcount for CAN filter removal Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 09/10] can: bcm: fix stale rx/tx ops after device removal Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:24 ` [PATCH v10 10/10] can: bcm: fix data race on rx_stamp/rx_ifindex in bcm_rx_handler() Oliver Hartkopp
2026-07-09 10:24 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-09 10:50 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-09 11:49 ` [PATCH v10 00/10] can: bcm: collected fixes - final5 :-( Marc Kleine-Budde
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