[RFC PATCH bpf-next v1 1/1] bpf: Enable JIT hardening by default when x86_64 CFI is enabled

[Jennifer Miller <jmill@asu.edu>]

Initializes bpf_jit_harden to 1 if x86_64 CFI is enabled. Prevents the
misuse of BPF JIT code to craft CFI signatures or Endbr64 instructions
by enabling constant blinding for JITted BPF code from unprivileged
users.

Signed-off-by: Jennifer Miller <jmill@asu.edu>
---
 kernel/bpf/core.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 47fe047ad30b..ed22b90c6e4e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -548,7 +548,11 @@ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp)
 /* All BPF JIT sysctl knobs here. */
 int bpf_jit_enable   __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON);
 int bpf_jit_kallsyms __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON);
-int bpf_jit_harden   __read_mostly;
+/* Enable hardening by default when x86_64 CFI is enabled to prevent CFI
+ * hashes and endbr64 instructions from being crafted.
+ */
+int bpf_jit_harden   __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) &&
+					IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CFI);
 long bpf_jit_limit   __read_mostly;
 long bpf_jit_limit_max __read_mostly;
 
-- 
2.34.1