From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "SJ Park" <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: damon@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 06/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damos fields
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 04:52:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260714045241.08E611F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260714043437.95811-7-sj@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] `struct damos->last_applied` is left uninitialized upon allocation in `damon_new_scheme()`, leading to a potential read of uninitialized memory during the first scheme application.
--
--- Patch [6]: [RFC PATCH 06/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damos fields ---
Note: The format of this report has been altered to provide a free-form
summary instead of quoting the original patch code directly, due to system
recitation restrictions.
commit 74f6565901cd9e992427e68af079cc1885de502e
Author: SJ Park <sj@kernel.org>
mm/damon/core: hide private damos fields
This commit updates struct damos to hide several fields intended only for
the DAMON core layer by moving them under a private comment block.
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but while reviewing the changes
to the last_applied field, I noticed a potential uninitialized memory read.
In mm/damon/core.c:damon_new_scheme(), a new struct damos is allocated
using a non-zeroing kmalloc variant. While several fields are explicitly
initialized in this function, the last_applied pointer is skipped and
left uninitialized.
When kdamond_apply_schemes() performs the very first region walk, it calls
into operations layers like mm/damon/paddr.c:damon_pa_invalid_damos_folio()
before last_applied is ever cleared to NULL.
This causes damon_pa_invalid_damos_folio() to read the uninitialized heap
value and compare it against the valid folio pointer currently being
walked.
If a local user configures DAMON and the uninitialized heap memory happens
to match a valid folio pointer being walked, could this result in an
erroneous folio_put() being executed prematurely? Does this open up an
exploitable use-after-free vulnerability during the initial scheme
application?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260714043437.95811-1-sj@kernel.org?part=6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-14 4:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-14 4:34 [RFC PATCH 00/10] mm/damon/core: hide core-private struct fields SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 01/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damon_region fields SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 02/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damon_target fields SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 03/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damos_quota_goal fields SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 04/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damos_quota fields SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 05/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damos_filter fields SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 06/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damos fields SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:52 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-14 5:54 ` SJ Park
2026-07-14 6:16 ` SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 07/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damon_filter fields SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 08/10] mm/damon/core: hide private damon_probe fields SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 09/10] mm/damon/sysfs: do not directly access damon_ctx->ops SJ Park
2026-07-14 4:34 ` [RFC PATCH 10/10] mm/damon/core: hide core-private damon_ctx fields SJ Park
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