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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2 08/13] crypto: aes - Add ECB support using library
Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2026 15:11:48 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260715221153.246410-9-ebiggers@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260715221153.246410-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

Implement the "ecb(aes)" crypto_skcipher algorithm using the
corresponding library functions.

Among other benefits, this allows the architecture-optimized AES-ECB
code to be migrated into the library while still leaving it accessible
via crypto_skcipher, eliminating lots of boilerplate code.

For now the cra_priority is set to just 110, since the
architecture-optimized implementations of this algorithm haven't yet
been migrated into the library.  It will be boosted once that happens.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
---
 crypto/Kconfig |   5 ++
 crypto/aes.c   | 164 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index b61401bd3ef6..1888ae9d3fa3 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -359,7 +359,12 @@ config CRYPTO_AES
 	select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_AES
 	select CRYPTO_LIB_AES_CBC_MACS if CRYPTO_CMAC != n || CRYPTO_XCBC != n || CRYPTO_CCM != n
+	select CRYPTO_LIB_AES_ECB if CRYPTO_ECB != n
 	select CRYPTO_HASH if CRYPTO_CMAC != n || CRYPTO_XCBC != n || CRYPTO_CCM != n
+	# CRYPTO_SKCIPHER should be selected only if a mode that needs it is
+	# enabled, but that doesn't work due to a recursive dependency caused by
+	# CRYPTO_SKCIPHER selecting CRYPTO_ECB.  So just always select it.
+	select CRYPTO_SKCIPHER
 	help
 	  AES cipher algorithms (Rijndael)(FIPS-197, ISO/IEC 18033-3)
 
diff --git a/crypto/aes.c b/crypto/aes.c
index 6bf23eb0503f..5fc487e584c4 100644
--- a/crypto/aes.c
+++ b/crypto/aes.c
@@ -6,12 +6,16 @@
  */
 
 #include <crypto/aes-cbc-macs.h>
+#include <crypto/aes-ecb.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 
 static_assert(__alignof__(struct aes_key) <= CRYPTO_MINALIGN);
+static_assert(__alignof__(struct aes_enckey) <= CRYPTO_MINALIGN);
 
 static int crypto_aes_setkey(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 			     unsigned int key_len)
@@ -85,7 +89,6 @@ static int __maybe_unused crypto_aes_cmac_digest(struct shash_desc *desc,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static_assert(__alignof__(struct aes_enckey) <= CRYPTO_MINALIGN);
 #define AES_CBCMAC_KEY(tfm) ((struct aes_enckey *)crypto_shash_ctx(tfm))
 #define AES_CBCMAC_CTX(desc) ((struct aes_cbcmac_ctx *)shash_desc_ctx(desc))
 
@@ -200,6 +203,148 @@ static struct shash_alg mac_algs[] = {
 #endif
 };
 
+static __maybe_unused int
+crypto_aes_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			   unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct aes_key *key = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return aes_preparekey(key, in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int
+crypto_aes_skcipher_setenckey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
+			      unsigned int key_len)
+{
+	struct aes_enckey *key = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm);
+
+	return aes_prepareenckey(key, in_key, key_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Call crypt_func() (a function that operates on simple virtual addresses) zero
+ * or more times to en/decrypt 'cryptlen' bytes of data from the source
+ * scatterlist 'src' and write it into the destination scatterlist 'dst',
+ * starting at 'start_pos' bytes into both.
+ *
+ * This always calls crypt_func() with a length that's a multiple of
+ * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, except the last call which includes any remainder.  This is
+ * implemented by using an on-stack bounce buffer when necessary.  The current
+ * implementation also tries to prefer passing at least 4 blocks, so e.g.
+ * scatterlist entries [16,16,16,16] result in a single 64-byte call.
+ *
+ * The scatterlists must describe either entirely different memory
+ * (out-of-place) or entirely the same memory (in-place).  In the latter case,
+ * crypt_func() is always called with the source and dest pointers the same.
+ */
+#define AES_CRYPT_SG(crypt_func, dst, src, cryptlen, start_pos, ...)           \
+	({                                                                     \
+		unsigned int remaining = (cryptlen);                           \
+		unsigned int spos = (start_pos);                               \
+                                                                               \
+		if (remaining != 0) {                                          \
+			struct scatter_walk dst_walk, src_walk;                \
+			u8 tmp[4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(                  \
+				__alignof__(long));                            \
+                                                                               \
+			scatterwalk_start_at_pos(&dst_walk, (dst), spos);      \
+			scatterwalk_start_at_pos(&src_walk, (src), spos);      \
+			do {                                                   \
+				unsigned int dst_avail = scatterwalk_clamp(    \
+					&dst_walk, remaining);                 \
+				unsigned int src_avail = scatterwalk_clamp(    \
+					&src_walk, remaining);                 \
+				unsigned int n = min(dst_avail, src_avail);    \
+				u8 *dst_virt;                                  \
+				const u8 *src_virt;                            \
+                                                                               \
+				if (n < remaining) {                           \
+					if (n < sizeof(tmp)) {                 \
+						n = min(remaining,             \
+							sizeof(tmp));          \
+						memcpy_from_scatterwalk(       \
+							tmp, &src_walk, n);    \
+						crypt_func(tmp, tmp, n,        \
+							   ##__VA_ARGS__);     \
+						memcpy_to_scatterwalk(         \
+							&dst_walk, tmp, n);    \
+						remaining -= n;                \
+						continue;                      \
+					}                                      \
+					n = round_down(n, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);     \
+				}                                              \
+                                                                               \
+				scatterwalk_map(&dst_walk);                    \
+				dst_virt = dst_walk.addr;                      \
+				if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HIGHMEM) &&              \
+				    offset_in_page(src_walk.offset) ==         \
+					    offset_in_page(dst_walk.offset) && \
+				    sg_page(src_walk.sg) + (src_walk.offset /  \
+							    PAGE_SIZE) ==      \
+					    sg_page(dst_walk.sg) +             \
+						    (dst_walk.offset /         \
+						     PAGE_SIZE)) {             \
+					src_virt = dst_virt;                   \
+				} else {                                       \
+					scatterwalk_map(&src_walk);            \
+					src_virt = src_walk.addr;              \
+				}                                              \
+				crypt_func(dst_virt, src_virt, n,              \
+					   ##__VA_ARGS__);                     \
+				if (src_virt != dst_virt)                      \
+					scatterwalk_unmap(&src_walk);          \
+				scatterwalk_advance(&src_walk, n);             \
+				scatterwalk_done_dst(&dst_walk, n);            \
+				remaining -= n;                                \
+			} while (remaining);                                   \
+			memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));                    \
+		}                                                              \
+	})
+
+/* AES-ECB */
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_ecb_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_ecb_encrypt, req->dst, req->src, req->cryptlen, 0,
+		     key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static __maybe_unused int crypto_aes_ecb_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req)
+{
+	const struct aes_key *key =
+		crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req));
+
+	if (unlikely(req->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	AES_CRYPT_SG(aes_ecb_decrypt, req->dst, req->src, req->cryptlen, 0,
+		     key);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct skcipher_alg skcipher_algs[] = {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB)
+	{
+		.base.cra_name = "ecb(aes)",
+		.base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-lib",
+		.base.cra_priority = 110,
+		.base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct aes_key),
+		.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+		.min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
+		.max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+		.setkey = crypto_aes_skcipher_setkey,
+		.encrypt = crypto_aes_ecb_encrypt,
+		.decrypt = crypto_aes_ecb_decrypt,
+	},
+#endif
+};
+
 static int __init crypto_aes_mod_init(void)
 {
 	int err = crypto_register_alg(&alg);
@@ -212,8 +357,18 @@ static int __init crypto_aes_mod_init(void)
 		if (err)
 			goto err_unregister_alg;
 	} /* Else, CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH might not be enabled. */
+
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs) > 0) {
+		err = crypto_register_skciphers(skcipher_algs,
+						ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs));
+		if (err)
+			goto err_unregister_macs;
+	}
 	return 0;
 
+err_unregister_macs:
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs) > 0)
+		crypto_unregister_shashes(mac_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs));
 err_unregister_alg:
 	crypto_unregister_alg(&alg);
 	return err;
@@ -222,6 +377,9 @@ module_init(crypto_aes_mod_init);
 
 static void __exit crypto_aes_mod_exit(void)
 {
+	if (ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs) > 0)
+		crypto_unregister_skciphers(skcipher_algs,
+					    ARRAY_SIZE(skcipher_algs));
 	if (ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs) > 0)
 		crypto_unregister_shashes(mac_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(mac_algs));
 	crypto_unregister_alg(&alg);
@@ -245,3 +403,7 @@ MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("xcbc-aes-lib");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbcmac(aes)");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cbcmac-aes-lib");
 #endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB)
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecb(aes)");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecb-aes-lib");
+#endif
-- 
2.55.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-15 22:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-15 22:11 [PATCH v2 00/13] Library APIs for AES encryption modes Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 01/13] crypto: xts - Split out __xts_verify_key() helper Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 02/13] lib/crypto: aes: Add ECB support Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 03/13] lib/crypto: aes: Add CBC and CBC-CTS support Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 04/13] lib/crypto: aes: Add CTR and XCTR support Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 05/13] lib/crypto: aes: Add XTS support Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 06/13] lib/crypto: aes: Add GCM support Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 07/13] lib/crypto: aes: Add CCM support Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 09/13] crypto: aes - Add CBC and CBC-CTS support using library Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 10/13] crypto: aes - Add CTR and XCTR " Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 11/13] crypto: aes - Add XTS " Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 12/13] crypto: aes - Add GCM " Eric Biggers
2026-07-15 22:11 ` [PATCH v2 13/13] crypto: aes - Add CCM " Eric Biggers

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