From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9086E42BEB0; Thu, 16 Jul 2026 14:31:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784212280; cv=none; b=h72r4U48kKI1RNN008Dn2NX9ubpTIau68mOQfbNwR4wtwcyAC+oUVSfQvH4Mye8WICN/1W7WoSbmQjeP8cQzC+p0msm3VF8g31QGIsuxD66Wz8rhk5G/Ep/b20kNP489sFgpgYRjX6OzrKYXIW0LW/ACuQZt3s5znVXp2iZnOSE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784212280; c=relaxed/simple; bh=qiLG/vxWHTwLstjg2qzmDV7KaTNi4uRGuHUfBp+9OGQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=XxCyvII4e4Xkb63Ls+SyAhq+GjK+xFZPw8pvP6bam/rbgVbhMM2da+8XDPVx6O8NFaQL5iHmx6wosA79lCXh/seakTl4hRiA4gnYY7yARXgm7mzoS8fJkg2hEsutKUKByDu3W0//Vzz1zPULVVnYld34DMGpnfLNUsjZl2XhCAo= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=RmbpDwqm; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="RmbpDwqm" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 015D51F000E9; Thu, 16 Jul 2026 14:31:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784212279; bh=lVUfwjb46H3xMnRgZ0aA1NpRSqXXD4pWgdOIq3X/F+k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=RmbpDwqmjmAKzg6iO7k/KyrWhmtmmXOtDVaMQSN+LBiCsQU1mM/X0BgeR2jfw5uCZ zqJ/7g7Gb05FVPg3H82TwVLwWpATn2UAU6Z762iyCDrH2mAtPiv2ofBOmQ0NPRFQrH f/nZy4ORFaxWTlgFg/yZtXfX7xe71QTBf1rjVWY4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Hannes Reinecke , Tianchu Chen , Keith Busch Subject: [PATCH 6.12 266/349] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 15:33:20 +0200 Message-ID: <20260716133039.297346614@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260716133033.287196923@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260716133033.287196923@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Tianchu Chen commit 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9 upstream. nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes. A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or performs the host response memcmp. With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication. Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before any access to the variable-length fields. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Fixes: db1312dd9548 ("nvmet: implement basic In-Band Authentication") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c @@ -109,13 +109,22 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nv return 0; } -static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) +static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d, u32 tl) { struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl; struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = d; - u16 dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + u16 dhvlen; u8 *response; + if (tl < sizeof(*data)) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + + dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + + /* Validate that hl and dhvlen fit within the transfer length */ + if (sizeof(*data) + 2 * (size_t)data->hl + dhvlen > tl) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: data hl %d cvalid %d dhvlen %u\n", __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid, data->hl, data->cvalid, dhvlen); @@ -287,7 +296,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvme switch (data->auth_id) { case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY: - dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d); + dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d, tl); if (dhchap_status == 0) req->sq->dhchap_step = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1;