From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id ADE053195EF; Thu, 16 Jul 2026 14:13:26 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784211207; cv=none; b=eQkgihiRNmMGrWqiHeTCkmPdg45Pm53QE0S2DhtcLgkR64X0wKbSdwExkeuHTrHeSIWPVXajLn8WUJ74s6mNg9IKG2Nft4wRGVhdtWZBIdgy3TYcG3upkkgff3BKOQ+J1cuxcUJoQ8BzhPA6WD030j8EGRccFs0C6UBNH0s0q4A= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784211207; c=relaxed/simple; bh=tNUnu8RiB1jGyeNhLcGf0w8qm6NIS6jt+CL0bOIdZ4k=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=JEnkIFZMFulX3Pu+W07GefZksR1XLePyCSZJvrR52ZZYuJ7ISeZ46LW8dzdvKMeyKawE4z1AVkYOJFLBW/4WRpKlg0Dynkxg6UtwMXzDnZZImVTMtleWXH7Opi/8FMUtzmB1Ig2ZlZFUoMRM0XiF36TefBnBb/N1poGDRRoXnM8= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=dMQNIFFX; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="dMQNIFFX" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 1F0AF1F000E9; Thu, 16 Jul 2026 14:13:25 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784211206; bh=lEiXzFF6Uah+m9/Bt8E2jcWCDvt1EEBTP1pRddIaYBM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=dMQNIFFXM3XTcg2ln+OE8Bi2hrLSolZdebH/89/1eYpwUULUXyllOaXoDWUliwQUU Hh0z3QP7cXiu2TL8y5foUz5ZJBIFJYW/YEJIcCIuxtGfxfTHGnRLy4cnhPPDXbrN/I 2iLqkKoi0FjXAZdJ+tBvs2N/gt10ILwDaOgS89Is= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Hannes Reinecke , Tianchu Chen , Keith Busch Subject: [PATCH 6.18 341/480] nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2026 15:31:28 +0200 Message-ID: <20260716133052.186175388@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260716133044.672218725@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260716133044.672218725@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Tianchu Chen commit 3a413ece2504c70aa34a20be4dafec04e8c741f9 upstream. nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes. A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or performs the host response memcmp. With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication. Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before any access to the variable-length fields. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Fixes: db1312dd9548 ("nvmet: implement basic In-Band Authentication") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) --- a/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/fabrics-cmd-auth.c @@ -134,13 +134,22 @@ static u8 nvmet_auth_negotiate(struct nv return 0; } -static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d) +static u8 nvmet_auth_reply(struct nvmet_req *req, void *d, u32 tl) { struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl; struct nvmf_auth_dhchap_reply_data *data = d; - u16 dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + u16 dhvlen; u8 *response; + if (tl < sizeof(*data)) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + + dhvlen = le16_to_cpu(data->dhvlen); + + /* Validate that hl and dhvlen fit within the transfer length */ + if (sizeof(*data) + 2 * (size_t)data->hl + dhvlen > tl) + return NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_FAILURE_INCORRECT_PAYLOAD; + pr_debug("%s: ctrl %d qid %d: data hl %d cvalid %d dhvlen %u\n", __func__, ctrl->cntlid, req->sq->qid, data->hl, data->cvalid, dhvlen); @@ -339,7 +348,7 @@ void nvmet_execute_auth_send(struct nvme switch (data->auth_id) { case NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_REPLY: - dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d); + dhchap_status = nvmet_auth_reply(req, d, tl); if (dhchap_status == 0) req->sq->dhchap_step = NVME_AUTH_DHCHAP_MESSAGE_SUCCESS1;