From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C43642A797 for ; Fri, 17 Jul 2026 14:34:54 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784298895; cv=none; b=IfwIx6cqdJHbO8ScEUPsyqPZEE18BgJhO2wdGdc++YQuaoLHXYYySfECk/nwVogcwJo/BnAsLmA2EGNmt7hf9wxN/QBfgnUeigDNkH4YBLmPVfTB2jiYfO7x4NbUAKvpPKv++UNwzkhy0SHfrVOX6/plfZX1eCqe7gFCqDrl5kA= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784298895; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Uq2U0MznJCnN0Yl/lsXbGjxpaEEvYG3rkQS4J3K42P8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=SCrCR9O4io6nonGSlGV8HOw59rYcxi1sQrLvcaYic8yzAmF+lTjLwcvOCOFbK6TM9KjfOh5TkrKwkY4E+vm+T/QLlSUZ1D9ewTdyZBLvRzxMS/ZhNM75c06hoKvKxRE88hq9XDgylfYOb/kqy24sUzUxiUbSnIDONlsE19jdBjc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=bQoxqM9O; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="bQoxqM9O" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8AAD51F00ACF; Fri, 17 Jul 2026 14:34:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1784298894; bh=WtSOZ3G9YVor70RRDgA/UTBpQkMnhfv4f83M4uSJGoE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=bQoxqM9OHHOerKk2XilClSN2qxTbyBH0sIws26/ZHU+gw/bx2JBT+us8DTQbXWjZn Q/c9jjFjWNuSeADErjOnMuY1PkUT13XS4+qxRXfMChDyp8dQWiYooSaPskYGUUKrE2 tciHUVz4IrOv7w2WyLPiYvzRu5B5Itvn+8YJEF+1zYYI77r2tPimXdPUe2WUoaLsrL VwbIUZdmcT1Y3qdiA9AkdUGiRrC1s54CkBKPs1zk8m5qRgIjnCKs8PCFOaVr8x57qL 59rjbmKIJ3ZpRT02HBIElZotiP+px6zLlJuvCcm7s9IPdmjRIqP6hlQe89qhi3J82T 5Yv0qOrvnS35Q== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jann Horn , "Christian Brauner (Amutable)" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.6.y 3/3] proc: protect ptrace_may_access() with exec_update_lock (part 1) Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2026 10:34:50 -0400 Message-ID: <20260717143450.1877881-3-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260717143450.1877881-1-sashal@kernel.org> References: <2026071445-halved-nullify-54b3@gregkh> <20260717143450.1877881-1-sashal@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Jann Horn [ Upstream commit 6650527444dadc63d84aa939d14ecba4fadb2f69 ] Fix the easy cases where procfs currently calls ptrace_may_access() without exec_update_lock protection, where the fix is to simply add the extra lock or use mm_access(): - do_task_stat(): grab exec_update_lock - proc_pid_wchan(): grab exec_update_lock - proc_map_files_lookup(): use mm_access() instead of get_task_mm() - proc_map_files_readdir(): use mm_access() instead of get_task_mm() - proc_ns_get_link(): grab exec_update_lock - proc_ns_readlink(): grab exec_update_lock Fixes: f83ce3e6b02d ("proc: avoid information leaks to non-privileged processes") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260518-procfs-lockfix-part1-v1-1-5c3d20e0ac33@google.com Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/proc/array.c | 6 ++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- fs/proc/namespaces.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c index d5cf316f3eb429..e5001b5fc3f019 100644 --- a/fs/proc/array.c +++ b/fs/proc/array.c @@ -483,6 +483,11 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, unsigned long flags; int exit_code = task->exit_code; struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal; + int ret; + + ret = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (ret) + return ret; state = *get_task_state(task); vsize = eip = esp = 0; @@ -658,6 +663,7 @@ static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, seq_puts(m, " 0"); seq_putc(m, '\n'); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); if (mm) mmput(mm); return 0; diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index d444155581cabc..1a4c2512bbf7c8 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -423,18 +423,24 @@ static int proc_pid_wchan(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, { unsigned long wchan; char symname[KSYM_NAME_LEN]; + int err; + err = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (err) + return err; if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) goto print0; wchan = get_wchan(task); if (wchan && !lookup_symbol_name(wchan, symname)) { seq_puts(m, symname); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); return 0; } print0: seq_putc(m, '0'); + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); return 0; } #endif /* CONFIG_KALLSYMS */ @@ -2358,17 +2364,15 @@ static struct dentry *proc_map_files_lookup(struct inode *dir, if (!task) goto out; - result = ERR_PTR(-EACCES); - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) - goto out_put_task; - result = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); if (dname_to_vma_addr(dentry, &vm_start, &vm_end)) goto out_put_task; - mm = get_task_mm(task); - if (!mm) + mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); + if (IS_ERR(mm)) { + result = ERR_CAST(mm); goto out_put_task; + } result = ERR_PTR(-EINTR); if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm)) @@ -2418,23 +2422,22 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) if (!task) goto out; - ret = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) - goto out_put_task; - ret = 0; if (!dir_emit_dots(file, ctx)) goto out_put_task; - mm = get_task_mm(task); - if (!mm) + mm = mm_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS); + if (IS_ERR(mm)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(mm); + /* if the task has no mm, the directory should just be empty */ + if (ret == -ESRCH) + ret = 0; goto out_put_task; + } ret = mmap_read_lock_killable(mm); - if (ret) { - mmput(mm); - goto out_put_task; - } + if (ret) + goto out_put_mm; nr_files = 0; @@ -2460,8 +2463,7 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) if (!p) { ret = -ENOMEM; mmap_read_unlock(mm); - mmput(mm); - goto out_put_task; + goto out_put_mm; } p->start = vma->vm_start; @@ -2469,7 +2471,6 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) p->mode = vma->vm_file->f_mode; } mmap_read_unlock(mm); - mmput(mm); for (i = 0; i < nr_files; i++) { char buf[4 * sizeof(long) + 2]; /* max: %lx-%lx\0 */ @@ -2486,6 +2487,8 @@ proc_map_files_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos++; } +out_put_mm: + mmput(mm); out_put_task: put_task_struct(task); out: diff --git a/fs/proc/namespaces.c b/fs/proc/namespaces.c index 8e159fc78c0a12..3a824f62dfccd6 100644 --- a/fs/proc/namespaces.c +++ b/fs/proc/namespaces.c @@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, if (!task) return ERR_PTR(-EACCES); + error = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (error) + goto out_put_task; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) goto out; @@ -64,6 +68,8 @@ static const char *proc_ns_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, error = nd_jump_link(&ns_path); out: + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); +out_put_task: put_task_struct(task); return ERR_PTR(error); } @@ -80,11 +86,17 @@ static int proc_ns_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, int bufl if (!task) return res; + res = down_read_killable(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (res) + goto out_put_task; + if (ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS)) { res = ns_get_name(name, sizeof(name), task, ns_ops); if (res >= 0) res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name); } + up_read(&task->signal->exec_update_lock); +out_put_task: put_task_struct(task); return res; } -- 2.53.0