From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Aaron Tomlin" <atomlin@atomlin.com>
Cc: mkoutny@suse.com, tj@kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
hannes@cmpxchg.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook
Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2026 01:54:31 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260720015432.4FA4C1F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260720014156.459386-1-atomlin@atomlin.com>
> At present, the task_setscheduler LSM hook provides security modules
> with the opportunity to mediate changes to a task's scheduling policy by
> inspecting the requested sched_attr. However, when invoked via
> sched_setaffinity(), the hook lacks visibility into the actual CPU
> affinity mask being requested. Consequently, security modules are
> entirely blind to the target CPUs and cannot make granular access
> control decisions based on spatial isolation.
>
> In modern multi-tenant and real-time environments, CPU isolation is a
> critical boundary. The inability to audit or restrict specific CPU
> pinning requests limits the effectiveness of security policies,
> particularly when attempting to shield isolated or cryptographic cores
> from unprivileged or compromised tasks.
>
> This patch expands the security_task_setscheduler() hook signature to
> [ ... ]
> This change updates all in-tree security modules (SELinux and Smack) to
> accommodate the new parameter mechanically, while providing LSMs with
> the necessary context to enforce strict affinity policies.
>
> Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260720014156.459386-1-atomlin@atomlin.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-20 1:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-20 1:41 [PATCH v4] security: Expand task_setscheduler LSM hook Aaron Tomlin
2026-07-20 1:54 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-21 14:45 ` Casey Schaufler
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