From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B7739449B2A; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 22:38:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784673513; cv=none; b=FdZ+n/+Wu1ky6Xc1Q16VSo/2Oy0OPCZmDuce5uyS1ttxIFenpQ5ndbiuiGnPlrs8gJLurWgFeWuUi1a3MGScAYcchipdPRiAlpLKnxM01p7lTY4rTfgCAshsQwxl1ortx2DB3VZvmBWjKbXzpBJ3KDpSr9IZfQbPvXjXMdr7ySM= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784673513; c=relaxed/simple; bh=+wlnChEvSXt2JOhxSB27lq0jUFF9K6PBBDZyuUPjnWg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=YHadf1OtzIZcvOtwxVj3upy8EQ2ys8I3mE3yN0cM8hiWiC3TGTdeC3odVsR38h06zYmsVTL8d+We/G312fGoeA7fELFLo7U9j7MPJWOdyLHj9zZERuIOPMV/FfXsL9a7hTfzE8KSWYLzuvRJT3zHkig6Sh3wKAjjLYbsjDFkw+Y= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=BmaFLC7k; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="BmaFLC7k" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2748A1F00A3A; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 22:38:30 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784673511; bh=9hVyusDbaMWojJuYPkM3p/rF0LlT58okwxKUQqzSDFg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=BmaFLC7kk9DxkEO0kthSqbj51jBk5qXWB3THgei/tiL66z1Kp3XEdfELQ5HJaeX/c OYNTy3iwwh0WHMsm7P2D55pxE0P4hkg1MKzJjeSZuXa79maGfN+pOV6KWd9lC2fIzZ 7u3acWGDGxQesrdEamY3zs/CZ2O21MU4jyONvzEQ= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, "Carlos Bilbao (Lambda)" , Sara Venkatesh , Bart Van Assche , Leon Romanovsky , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.10 191/699] RDMA/srpt: fix integer overflow in immediate data length check Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:19:10 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152400.008364958@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152355.667394603@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152355.667394603@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Sara Venkatesh [ Upstream commit eb4ecdf631fe00e8020bf461503cb9b7017ed796 ] imm_buf->len is a user-controlled uint32_t received from the network. Adding it to imm_data_offset without overflow checking allows a malicious initiator to send len=0xFFFFFFFF, causing req_size to wrap around to a small value, bypassing the bounds check, and subsequently passing a ~4GB length to sg_init_one(). Use check_add_overflow() to detect wrapping before the comparison. Fixes: 5dabcd0456d7 ("RDMA/srpt: Add support for immediate data") Reported-by: Carlos Bilbao (Lambda) Signed-off-by: Sara Venkatesh Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260504080036.3482415-1-sarajvenkatesh@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Carlos Bilbao (Lambda) Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c index 960f870a952a52..5fce4cdb88eb46 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c @@ -1070,9 +1070,10 @@ static int srpt_get_desc_tbl(struct srpt_recv_ioctx *recv_ioctx, struct srp_imm_buf *imm_buf = srpt_get_desc_buf(srp_cmd); void *data = (void *)srp_cmd + imm_data_offset; uint32_t len = be32_to_cpu(imm_buf->len); - uint32_t req_size = imm_data_offset + len; + uint32_t req_size; - if (req_size > srp_max_req_size) { + if (check_add_overflow((uint32_t)imm_data_offset, len, &req_size) || + req_size > srp_max_req_size) { pr_err("Immediate data (length %d + %d) exceeds request size %d\n", imm_data_offset, len, srp_max_req_size); return -EINVAL; -- 2.53.0