From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 84B3444AB9F; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 22:58:23 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784674704; cv=none; b=HY3ohlESMkg4IEcYxq1TzMtVhWm5bm6gPU99D4zP5nUdgJdnGHHMTdsOxNFKovochmumDpOS1cjam5Sv8sljamRiqNRFd6oRw6/n/QURxLKFgQYpkL1ABuIo2kOEYpHwQKl2Lrw4zJo8n5LXiOxcdzdTOC9X/qb51aDRw0MzdUo= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784674704; c=relaxed/simple; bh=cSvmu33AzhkE9WuAqf/LXh4OH2238ibv/i8mk9d+rxg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=l7F/eT4CLpAAFIThVq7IDQxs/Bcj4TbXblXRBNqEH91+svjnrZQmbwcozqp8Q+saCTTEm/DKB1bLnDrH+9BiqyUz3PXYq/e6A5Z4+n/ygrUtzXG3Ej0lXUNqJwVI0E4N4CbQRU4sjRjAgyPq3L2aUErphrrDgCPQOxoH75drdsI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=IkRlCtFb; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="IkRlCtFb" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E32BF1F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 22:58:22 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784674703; bh=4r46L3Zdd1hXLyBYdkrHZrALdVtzKFsFh2wY4BxAJKw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=IkRlCtFbFS6DQsTOFhW2ELIGyGUYFa4d9FMRRT9jN0GOGbQlgsmNzNGXRNyoXfET1 GYnLvzXwdej04tdQDaEUwu5vSnnYzPMXbGT2F+6pjipHe3GjZoOVFTVmt0R48haDZj v4px79i8oEW3e2nxdk4G92ol0kFn+xEyRu4veb78= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Haoxiang Li , Steve French , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.10 642/699] smb: client: Fix next buffer leak in receive_encrypted_standard() Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:26:41 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152410.232972398@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152355.667394603@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152355.667394603@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Haoxiang Li [ Upstream commit 1c6267a1d5cf4c73b656f8181b310cbbb3e4767b ] receive_encrypted_standard() allocates next_buffer before checking whether the number of compound PDUs already reached MAX_COMPOUND. If the limit check fails, the function returns immediately and the newly allocated next_buffer is not assigned to server->smallbuf/server->bigbuf, making it leaked. Move the MAX_COMPOUND check before allocating next_buffer. Fixes: b24df3e30cbf ("cifs: update receive_encrypted_standard to handle compounded responses") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li Signed-off-by: Steve French Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c @@ -4961,6 +4961,12 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Se one_more: shdr = (struct smb2_hdr *)buf; next_cmd = le32_to_cpu(shdr->NextCommand); + + if (*num_mids >= MAX_COMPOUND) { + cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "too many PDUs in compound\n"); + return -1; + } + if (next_cmd) { if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next_cmd > pdu_length)) return -1; @@ -4984,10 +4990,6 @@ one_more: mid_entry->resp_buf_size = server->pdu_size; } - if (*num_mids >= MAX_COMPOUND) { - cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "too many PDUs in compound\n"); - return -1; - } bufs[*num_mids] = buf; mids[(*num_mids)++] = mid_entry;