From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 80E9844AB9E; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 21:20:05 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784668806; cv=none; b=GDzvmE/vd1OlFDhTLyH5nbLBuDBHLvpYTrSqc0ef7EC0B5onQuHmKa/6u4pyxC+asV0OktFz/a/lafMS8Wf85Fedk5uFV1+IwkZi0+PxPzQ3AmAOO5Gc59AvSq8cGX7kgSQJ9roLEo4SccHwzZ1fWRA6OuT+YyNeD+rXooPrhHk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784668806; c=relaxed/simple; bh=DRCyzx/q/KDKf01r02dxR9PYZ0XDHo6D648IzMG2/+o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=E4WpNO7/6AJFKe4YSHD4fZkVWbHxF8Mpr+SHQ2X2uJYJVJwtll9gKlaLx3LyLB4DhDe6XnRu1LTXcrLfoBIg19aUS3aB5tByuZ5IYdmSpR+fgFZOuh18D+nFW1P4ZFluqoYviCly/OuRdA9Lb4UHxrN/ZettGBexkwvlQXNjr+I= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=hBKvrSK+; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="hBKvrSK+" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id CC82C1F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 21:20:04 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784668805; bh=YbYA/LahTmZeQ6chj7Y5V8diL3qiIWaNRQbiS12V4+g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=hBKvrSK+zBPEBfZZazD0kctT94QyigL7UB4nQv5rCQmOCorPqutZ6skwD5fNmiUhk 73Ad6U7Vme+u3pboZLy+LjK+f/AXi6thctxmGZsFzjtLhwtl2MRR86ztG9xcj6bl9K stj2fs/twr3jKCOP+PerBp9Q7mDNrZNfwLy6YlaU= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, "Carlos Bilbao (Lambda)" , Sara Venkatesh , Bart Van Assche , Leon Romanovsky , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1 0314/1067] RDMA/srpt: fix integer overflow in immediate data length check Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:15:15 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152431.617596889@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152424.521567757@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152424.521567757@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Sara Venkatesh [ Upstream commit eb4ecdf631fe00e8020bf461503cb9b7017ed796 ] imm_buf->len is a user-controlled uint32_t received from the network. Adding it to imm_data_offset without overflow checking allows a malicious initiator to send len=0xFFFFFFFF, causing req_size to wrap around to a small value, bypassing the bounds check, and subsequently passing a ~4GB length to sg_init_one(). Use check_add_overflow() to detect wrapping before the comparison. Fixes: 5dabcd0456d7 ("RDMA/srpt: Add support for immediate data") Reported-by: Carlos Bilbao (Lambda) Signed-off-by: Sara Venkatesh Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260504080036.3482415-1-sarajvenkatesh@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Carlos Bilbao (Lambda) Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c index 33c099e5efc5ec..e9ce57a730c023 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c @@ -1129,9 +1129,10 @@ static int srpt_get_desc_tbl(struct srpt_recv_ioctx *recv_ioctx, struct srp_imm_buf *imm_buf = srpt_get_desc_buf(srp_cmd); void *data = (void *)srp_cmd + imm_data_offset; uint32_t len = be32_to_cpu(imm_buf->len); - uint32_t req_size = imm_data_offset + len; + uint32_t req_size; - if (req_size > srp_max_req_size) { + if (check_add_overflow((uint32_t)imm_data_offset, len, &req_size) || + req_size > srp_max_req_size) { pr_err("Immediate data (length %d + %d) exceeds request size %d\n", imm_data_offset, len, srp_max_req_size); return -EINVAL; -- 2.53.0