From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B5C60427A10; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 19:19:52 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784661593; cv=none; b=U0jI1rzU7WD+a6VrCTe1ILGscp3nuEEh7WX5zT0YRsiYrCkcjg5Qu84363gplXApMVsPLqvIRd8eh9parhVjs/qTLvIY4tZTx3OaMLc2lq6wBfkvWe6eMU9wIU9lqqjsjM/VArR4QLg7n/IhY7a0CEt1nP4Im1FnbTrK01Z6DN4= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784661593; c=relaxed/simple; bh=VjAb3leMb7QCRFzmQckBprgYkFy/su/cToeIJZNqEtg=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=pu6gvF9fzL0FznvKmBsw8ukP+AHUYxPxslgAEks/G74qWPBmEJn897m3V9tICbAcqK0NG9U1/NNTYNeYbmynzZNHLbZluTMvxXjeKK9JRHFSY+R8nlnVDN4nB6SfTh33I3qSir5m9RYWxNZw3e6xCoSg13ea5Yk7/sUx2EFVQBs= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=hwMq86fv; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="hwMq86fv" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 27A641F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 19:19:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784661592; bh=PgYfxnXAZg8AjVhn1sl/JdGnqTqivDoMmUHeS9knZ+Q=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=hwMq86fv2rohz/fnDTMa8j67WzA7WhZ+EKqsqGVmTUMA5UyeTePxORxpPAhcwEV0e hO32ftt4GXwCQlq+f6YV43J7XA4Up0qY7WhyZ1k8eVPOPLSdD8hjw2FbiT7As4UM3a Bu4KLF57PKw2TgBxziSF9XUoj1Mb0y/jvWA0XRTc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, "Carlos Bilbao (Lambda)" , Sara Venkatesh , Bart Van Assche , Leon Romanovsky , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.12 0124/1276] RDMA/srpt: fix integer overflow in immediate data length check Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:09:27 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152448.880227945@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152446.065700225@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152446.065700225@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Sara Venkatesh [ Upstream commit eb4ecdf631fe00e8020bf461503cb9b7017ed796 ] imm_buf->len is a user-controlled uint32_t received from the network. Adding it to imm_data_offset without overflow checking allows a malicious initiator to send len=0xFFFFFFFF, causing req_size to wrap around to a small value, bypassing the bounds check, and subsequently passing a ~4GB length to sg_init_one(). Use check_add_overflow() to detect wrapping before the comparison. Fixes: 5dabcd0456d7 ("RDMA/srpt: Add support for immediate data") Reported-by: Carlos Bilbao (Lambda) Signed-off-by: Sara Venkatesh Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260504080036.3482415-1-sarajvenkatesh@gmail.com Reviewed-by: Carlos Bilbao (Lambda) Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c index 5dfb4644446ba8..128e4e836470c8 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c @@ -1129,9 +1129,10 @@ static int srpt_get_desc_tbl(struct srpt_recv_ioctx *recv_ioctx, struct srp_imm_buf *imm_buf = srpt_get_desc_buf(srp_cmd); void *data = (void *)srp_cmd + imm_data_offset; uint32_t len = be32_to_cpu(imm_buf->len); - uint32_t req_size = imm_data_offset + len; + uint32_t req_size; - if (req_size > srp_max_req_size) { + if (check_add_overflow((uint32_t)imm_data_offset, len, &req_size) || + req_size > srp_max_req_size) { pr_err("Immediate data (length %d + %d) exceeds request size %d\n", imm_data_offset, len, srp_max_req_size); return -EINVAL; -- 2.53.0