From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C180638B133; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 18:12:19 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784657540; cv=none; b=nFPG14n+9hf/K0vT7JYo2bWdlJgvhm34JaLlGWiPDXhJi2HR+K+c/BfKVylDQQDbol2pmKXJgUPixhZtN5aQkCZTNpTZNOPsWIDD5L8i6RK3crbdmp+W15XNycyIQQ+nMhguFPndVsov8F1F21OT9P1fmslDgNMda4dgUz2t/H0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1784657540; c=relaxed/simple; bh=GucMc6K3s3x9643FaGCO2N9kNnNk3A/7ruxW9gWlAkw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=SJzC/7WiDutxNMKMlSyh88Hy1mqbPDGoIpIoGrVmlL4X3xmHxjRoeZVMjmgawTX89YZaCzZV49rrmQGm1lxtlF9doPnzpM0ztHpR94khjn6Ygbn+FFW4xLrWdSS6qWF6ITkSEKhA7AA3uTVor8AtbIRxCu9DL57+bQmMdHXf4HA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=toGvXFxm; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="toGvXFxm" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2638A1F000E9; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 18:12:18 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1784657539; bh=sJtA8ZHxw82KwlSD1UBXnL3n1Xipp1ucM3MNJ3ARLrM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=toGvXFxmngd1ne/d/aAdrsjbtevtUsRNX5MaNfThjSXc0bmusK+O0Xovv2xjkcLab 57qA+BY7sklbTYaOUgAO+emmWQ78Rk7HZldOdVCqob9sNq2pkcIHDvjuXgRMwjd3e2 Jwrnek4W4Dz2VXW2v8h/cyA0ZPA+LOFJpQfiIMp0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Alex Deucher , Mario Limonciello , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.18 0804/1611] drm/amdkfd: fix list_del corruption in kfd_criu_resume_svm Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 17:15:20 +0200 Message-ID: <20260721152533.469773916@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260721152514.750365251@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260721152514.750365251@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Mario Limonciello [ Upstream commit 8fa5655da368d0306c03e9dc9cda8ae2a7840926 ] The cleanup tail of kfd_criu_resume_svm() walks svms->criu_svm_metadata_list and kfree()s each struct criu_svm_metadata without removing it from the list. The list head is left pointing at freed kmalloc-96 objects. A second AMDKFD_IOC_CRIU_OP from the same process re-enters: list_empty() reads the dangling ->next (use-after-free), the loop walks freed entries, and each is kfree()'d again (double-free). This is reachable by an unprivileged render-group user via /dev/kfd with no capabilities required. Add list_del() before the kfree() so the list is properly emptied. The list_for_each_entry_safe() iterator already caches the next pointer, so unlinking during the walk is safe. Fixes: 2a909ae71871 ("drm/amdkfd: CRIU resume shared virtual memory ranges") Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher Signed-off-by: Mario Limonciello Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher (cherry picked from commit 6322d278a298e2c1430b9d2697743d3a04b788b1) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_svm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_svm.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_svm.c index 04e4bf41ccf720..202ed1c456320d 100644 --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_svm.c +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_svm.c @@ -4063,6 +4063,7 @@ int kfd_criu_resume_svm(struct kfd_process *p) list_for_each_entry_safe(criu_svm_md, next, &svms->criu_svm_metadata_list, list) { pr_debug("freeing criu_svm_md[]\n\tstart: 0x%llx\n", criu_svm_md->data.start_addr); + list_del(&criu_svm_md->list); kfree(criu_svm_md); } -- 2.53.0