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From: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
To: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>,
	Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] s390/zcrypt: Close speculative mem read possibility
Date: Wed, 22 Jul 2026 20:32:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260722183203.13538Cee-hca@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260722152025.119391-2-freude@linux.ibm.com>

On Wed, Jul 22, 2026 at 05:20:25PM +0200, Harald Freudenberger wrote:
> The domain value is extracted from a given CCA or EP11 ioctl struct
> when a CPRB is about to be sent. Thus this is a user controlled value.
> Under some special conditions (custom device node used, administrative
> load) this value is used as an array index after bounds checking, but
> without speculation barrier.
> 
> Add the missing array_index_nospec() call to prevent speculative
> execution where this domain value is used.
> 
> Fixes: cfd68b33094e ("s390/zcrypt: Filter admin CPRBs on custom devices")
> Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Finn Callies <fcallies@linux.ibm.com>
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org

...

> @@ -1079,6 +1080,7 @@ static long _zcrypt_send_ep11_cprb(u32 xflags, struct ap_perms *perms,
>  
>  	if (perms != &ap_perms && domain < AUTOSEL_DOM) {
>  		if (ap_msg.flags & AP_MSG_FLAG_ADMIN) {
> +			domain = array_index_nospec(domain, AP_DOMAINS);

This hunk doesn't make sense, and it depends on the other patch you sent:
"s390/zcrypt: Fix wrong domain value verification with EP11 CPRBs".
Please send them as a series of two.

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-07-22 18:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-07-22 15:20 [PATCH v2 0/1] Close speculative mem read possibility Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-22 15:20 ` [PATCH v2 1/1] s390/zcrypt: " Harald Freudenberger
2026-07-22 15:34   ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-22 18:32   ` Heiko Carstens [this message]

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