From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Pu Lehui" <pulehui@huaweicloud.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf v2] bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 02:39:04 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260728023904.CCF9A1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260728023259.2813482-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Critical] Lockless, unprotected access to `link->prog` fields allows Use-After-Free and TOCTOU bugs when a link's program is updated concurrently.
--
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH bpf v2] bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog ---
commit afa2c5a0786c29e2f3227e6c9b10cbfcd8407bc9
Author: Pu Lehui <pulehui@huawei.com>
bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog
This commit fixes a potential use-after-free in bpf_netns_link_update_prog
by moving the checks for old_prog and new_prog->type inside the
netns_bpf_mutex critical section. It also uses guard(mutex) to simplify
lock management.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/f87b53c0-8f00-45a6-82db-8242fa9b143f@huaweicloud.com [0]
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
> index 25f30f9edaefd..81006a242618d 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/net_namespace.c
> @@ -171,33 +171,28 @@ static int bpf_netns_link_update_prog(struct bpf_link *link,
> struct net *net;
> int idx, ret;
>
> + guard(mutex)(&netns_bpf_mutex);
> +
> if (old_prog && old_prog != link->prog)
> return -EPERM;
> if (new_prog->type != link->prog->type)
> return -EINVAL;
>
[ ... ]
> old_prog = xchg(&link->prog, new_prog);
> bpf_prog_put(old_prog);
[Severity: Critical]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can this concurrent update race with
lockless readers of link->prog in other parts of the code?
For example, in bpf_link_get_info_by_fd():
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:bpf_link_get_info_by_fd() {
...
if (link->prog)
info.prog_id = link->prog->aux->id;
...
}
Or in bpf_link_show_fdinfo():
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:bpf_link_show_fdinfo() {
...
const struct bpf_prog *prog = link->prog;
...
if (prog) {
bin2hex(prog_tag, prog->tag, sizeof(prog->tag));
...
}
Could these lockless reads lead to a use-after-free if a thread executing
bpf_netns_link_update_prog() swaps link->prog and drops the reference to
old_prog, and the RCU grace period elapses before the reader accesses the
freed program's fields?
Similarly, in bpf_mprog_link() in kernel/bpf/mprog.c:
kernel/bpf/mprog.c:bpf_mprog_link() {
...
if (type && link->prog->type != type) {
bpf_link_put(link);
return -EINVAL;
}
tuple->link = link;
tuple->prog = link->prog;
...
}
Could this lead to a time-of-check to time-of-use error or a dangling
tuple->prog pointer if a link update occurs concurrently?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260728023259.2813482-1-pulehui@huaweicloud.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-28 2:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-28 2:32 [PATCH bpf v2] bpf: Fix potential UAF in bpf_netns_link_update_prog Pu Lehui
2026-07-28 2:39 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-28 3:29 ` Pu Lehui
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