From: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
To: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: guanwentao@uniontech.com, linkinjeon@kernel.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org, stfrench@microsoft.com,
Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>,
ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Subject: [PATCH 6.6.y && 6.12.y && 6.18.y && 7.1.y v3 1/4] ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 03:00:22 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260729190023.46584-2-guanwentao@uniontech.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026072936-equipment-calculate-e753@gregkh>
From: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>
set_ntacl_dacl() copies each ACE from the attacker-controlled stored
security descriptor verbatim into the response DACL without checking
sid.num_subauth. The ACE bytes (including an unchecked num_subauth)
originate from an authenticated SMB2_SET_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) that is
stored raw via ksmbd_vfs_set_sd_xattr(); parse_dacl() rejects a bad ACE
with `break` rather than an error, so parse_sec_desc() still returns
success and the malformed SD reaches the xattr intact.
On a subsequent SMB2_QUERY_INFO(SecInfo=DACL) for an inode carrying a
POSIX access ACL, build_sec_desc() -> set_ntacl_dacl() ->
set_posix_acl_entries_dacl() walks the copied ACEs and reads
ntace->sid.sub_auth[ntace->sid.num_subauth - 1]
with num_subauth taken straight from the stored SD. Since sub_auth[]
is fixed at SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES (15), a crafted num_subauth (e.g.
255) drives an out-of-bounds heap read of ~1 KB with an offset fully
controlled by an authenticated client.
The sibling functions already gate this field:
parse_dacl() -- num_subauth == 0 || > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
parse_sid() -- num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
smb_copy_sid() -- min_t(u8, num_subauth, SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
set_ntacl_dacl() is the lone inconsistent path that omits the check.
Add the same num_subauth validation in set_ntacl_dacl() before copying
the ACE, matching the gate already enforced by parse_dacl().
Signed-off-by: Haofeng Li <lihaofeng@kylinos.cn>
Reviewed-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong@kylinos.cn>
Suggested-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
(cherry picked from commit 47f0b34f6bc98ed85bfdc293e8f3e432ec24958d)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
---
fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
index fc9937cedb012..9c59c8f73b667 100644
--- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
+++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c
@@ -745,12 +745,18 @@ static void set_ntacl_dacl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
if (nt_ace_size > aces_size)
break;
+ if (ntace->sid.num_subauth == 0 ||
+ ntace->sid.num_subauth > SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES)
+ goto next_ace;
+
memcpy((char *)pndace + size, ntace, nt_ace_size);
if (check_add_overflow(size, nt_ace_size, &size))
break;
+ num_aces++;
+
+next_ace:
aces_size -= nt_ace_size;
ntace = (struct smb_ace *)((char *)ntace + nt_ace_size);
- num_aces++;
}
}
--
2.30.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-29 19:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-29 13:55 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid" failed to apply to 6.18-stable tree gregkh
2026-07-29 18:09 ` [PATCH 6.18.y 1/2] ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl Wentao Guan
2026-07-29 18:09 ` [PATCH 6.18.y 2/2] ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL Wentao Guan
2026-07-29 18:25 ` [PATCH 6.18.y v2 1/3] ksmbd: validate num_subauth when copying ACE in set_ntacl_dacl Wentao Guan
2026-07-29 18:25 ` [PATCH 6.18.y v2 2/3] ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL Wentao Guan
2026-07-29 18:25 ` [PATCH 6.18.y v2 3/3] ksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities Wentao Guan
2026-07-29 19:00 ` [PATCH 6.6.y && 6.12.y && 6.18.y && 7.1.y v3 0/4] Backport fixes for ksmbd Wentao Guan
2026-07-30 2:40 ` Sasha Levin
2026-07-29 19:00 ` Wentao Guan [this message]
2026-07-29 19:00 ` [PATCH 6.6.y && 6.12.y && 6.18.y && 7.1.y v3 2/4] ksmbd: restore DACL size on check_add_overflow() to avoid malformed ACL Wentao Guan
2026-07-29 19:00 ` [PATCH 6.6.y && 6.12.y && 6.18.y && 7.1.y v3 3/4] ksmbd: bound DACL dedup walk to copied ACEs Wentao Guan
2026-07-29 19:00 ` [PATCH 6.6.y && 6.12.y && 6.18.y && 7.1.y v3 4/4] ksmbd: validate ACE size against SID sub-authorities Wentao Guan
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