From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 15308413D8F; Thu, 30 Jul 2026 14:30:31 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785421833; cv=none; b=CRgzpu8pcCZORCdvOO7WwQYp5N5T0h7FiAa3mFKIq7zTfRaHoN6loUSHzlkOvnOgpqp+yLjINawnsi6ISaYzFo+PSEUukZUxQeLNVYObKbjByKOgSoQ8VS2boevChB0tMjjBuUuOVkpETN8wWEjoAMx57BcwV5eSCywdV8utFzE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785421833; c=relaxed/simple; bh=roErQdspXCaMJW6Ry4h0umpxKzBA9OmqLsl6enepUOk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=ZofFs/fit9FmwY6sZn1esUcCJbpY2P2+RfBgKY7kn+uh/BptHMobZ19r3BlG5ZRxsNOkTjCk+v/EcMyLbFClJUxSZ5IbR6kvXzZKn/DCaH1eOHeyK7v0Go5T040IXudH3q50edlF640n2MYq9+yz7HYMgdU7VfeklF2yZLu+pVI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=vLwBF3oa; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="vLwBF3oa" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 39D7A1F000E9; Thu, 30 Jul 2026 14:30:31 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1785421831; bh=HTqC7mbyiZiqqDxSGmlnCpdjgJI69ryzZdY5qx0ovyE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=vLwBF3oatYgDvrZfCG8kyNc9XErtYR3jIqFf9P91a71ORCopS5JI55T52QXGcx2mh mrIZChBJmAnHARMZ9XUTfyK+f3ttvaWpLhjKl2f2Jqj/aV14tefhlg5X0i5M7zgvJv M3kUlcoJMBYY6CB2VXJ1dOMs9+Z6rBvSQ8bOONpc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Aldo Ariel Panzardo , Allison Henderson , Paolo Abeni , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 7.1 236/744] rds: drop incoming messages that cross network namespace boundaries Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 16:08:29 +0200 Message-ID: <20260730141449.309882194@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260730141444.267951807@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260730141444.267951807@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Aldo Ariel Panzardo [ Upstream commit 5521ae71e32a8069ed4ca6e792179dc57bc43ab2 ] rds_find_bound() looks up the destination socket using a global rhashtable keyed solely on (addr, port, scope_id). Network namespaces are not part of the key, so a sender in netns A can deliver an incoming message (inc) to a socket that lives in a different netns B. When this happens, inc->i_conn points to an rds_connection whose c_net is netns A, but the receiving rs lives in netns B. Once the child process that created netns A exits, cleanup_net() calls rds_loop_exit_net() -> rds_loop_kill_conns() -> rds_conn_destroy(), freeing that connection. If the survivor socket in netns B still holds the inc, any subsequent dereference of inc->i_conn is a use-after-free. There are two dangerous sites in rds_clear_recv_queue(): 1. inc->i_conn->c_lcong (offset 88 of freed rds_connection, size 200) read via rds_recv_rcvbuf_delta() -- confirmed by KASAN. 2. inc->i_conn->c_trans->inc_free(inc) (function pointer at offset 80) called via rds_inc_put() when the inc refcount reaches zero -- same race window, potential call-through-freed-object primitive. The bug is reachable from unprivileged user namespaces (CLONE_NEWUSER + CLONE_NEWNET), available since Linux 3.8. Fix this by rejecting the delivery in rds_recv_incoming() when the socket returned by rds_find_bound() belongs to a different network namespace than the connection that carried the message. Use the existing rds_conn_net() / sock_net() helpers and net_eq() for the comparison. Fixes: c809195f5523 ("rds: clean up loopback rds_connections on netns deletion") Signed-off-by: Aldo Ariel Panzardo Reviewed-by: Allison Henderson Tested-by: Allison Henderson Signed-off-by: Allison Henderson Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260708024314.601139-1-achender@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/rds/recv.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/rds/recv.c b/net/rds/recv.c index 4b3f9e4a8bfda5..cf3884d8793195 100644 --- a/net/rds/recv.c +++ b/net/rds/recv.c @@ -399,6 +399,21 @@ void rds_recv_incoming(struct rds_connection *conn, struct in6_addr *saddr, goto out; } + /* + * rds_find_bound() uses a global (netns-agnostic) hash table. + * An RDS connection created in netns A can match a socket bound + * in the init netns, delivering inc cross-netns with inc->i_conn + * pointing into netns A. When cleanup_net() then frees that conn, + * any subsequent dereference of inc->i_conn is a use-after-free. + * Drop the inc if the receiving socket lives in a different netns. + */ + if (!net_eq(sock_net(rds_rs_to_sk(rs)), rds_conn_net(conn))) { + rds_stats_inc(s_recv_drop_no_sock); + rds_sock_put(rs); + rs = NULL; + goto out; + } + /* Process extension headers */ rds_recv_incoming_exthdrs(inc, rs); -- 2.53.0