From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 199BD40963F; Thu, 30 Jul 2026 14:34:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785422082; cv=none; b=ulEe6CCnRPfB6JiXPHLMIA2PYKSw8FkSj30V+qD3VO/9I2qFTS3zWjfJZyLdfLGlk1jxELQfYjWXzMpJTKSmGIBmUa1QgiE8/f5dEPen/5UX0mI1b5cTporIJCnyE+wDHzWgyQWWVQjHWa1Hd5eyemtWVcPNOaLsX0ZgIlsfSiw= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785422082; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Y8mOhFuVmtRkkOnPONEn5cGj/0jNfYkvJvxSWvT7Re4=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=TF/6ubs4Rd6whwmASLtfM+Zzud1cKN9xEqx8ZiaVcp0I8ru/cpmc42N4k54Wc/yuUgfn71hnRs3lsV3I8uqvaq6tmxXe7QlEpF2QJuEBls2xox1uT879g1TbC6FwiQ4Zunuz/BbD4f8LxNZMOLjqVErtL4NVNbRNaM3O5rjLl0s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=Zd8ycMx/; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="Zd8ycMx/" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6A8671F00A3E; Thu, 30 Jul 2026 14:34:40 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1785422081; bh=//HZfekeCt1sbBePKr3vT4hai263oJZoMlpPFfDjGtk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=Zd8ycMx/75Jinvn7d/N1Z17GxjZMSez4I/aSboUn0jnWODeSbacBiJG+TLy6iBUXi iccVg3I1ci3IoguwIDwS0as917/jL+CEpAMP6SadEAKLTUlawbuIa1VP1lR93KXpDq TWkWL4cctwVHqVnvPYrnHK6djOk/658PHZee07Eo= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com, Xin Long , "Cen Zhang (Microsoft)" , Jakub Kicinski , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 7.1 274/744] sctp: validate stream count in sctp_process_strreset_inreq() Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 16:09:07 +0200 Message-ID: <20260730141450.115282283@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260730141444.267951807@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260730141444.267951807@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) [ Upstream commit 18ae07691d43183d270de8be9dc8e027906015d9 ] When processing a RESET_IN_REQUEST from a peer, sctp_process_strreset_inreq() derives the stream count from the parameter length but does not check whether the resulting RESET_OUT_REQUEST would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. The OUT request header (sctp_strreset_outreq, 16 bytes) is 8 bytes larger than the IN request header (sctp_strreset_inreq, 8 bytes). Generally, the IP payload is bounded to 65535 bytes, so the stream list cannot be large enough to trigger the overflow. However, on interfaces with MTU > 65535 (e.g., loopback with IPv6 jumbograms), a stream list that fits within the incoming IN parameter can cause a __u16 overflow in sctp_make_strreset_req() when computing the OUT request size, leading to an undersized skb allocation and a kernel BUG: net/core/skbuff.c:207 skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:2625 skb_put net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:1535 sctp_addto_chunk net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:3695 sctp_make_strreset_req net/sctp/stream.c:655 sctp_process_strreset_inreq The local setsockopt path validates the generated reset request size. However, for an incoming-only reset, it accounts for the smaller IN request even though the peer must generate an OUT request with the same stream list. Such a request cannot be completed successfully by the peer. Reject peer IN requests whose corresponding OUT request would exceed SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN. Also tighten the local check so it does not send an IN request that would require an oversized OUT request from the peer. Fixes: 7f9d68ac944e ("sctp: implement sender-side procedures for SSN Reset Request Parameter") Reported-by: AutonomousCodeSecurity@microsoft.com Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260707203215.2752-1-blbllhy@gmail.com/ Suggested-by: Xin Long Signed-off-by: Cen Zhang (Microsoft) Acked-by: Xin Long Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260710010718.20318-1-blbllhy@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/sctp/stream.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/stream.c b/net/sctp/stream.c index 5c2fdedea088ff..34ffe6c945a4bb 100644 --- a/net/sctp/stream.c +++ b/net/sctp/stream.c @@ -308,7 +308,8 @@ int sctp_send_reset_streams(struct sctp_association *asoc, goto out; param_len += str_nums * sizeof(__u16) + - sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_inreq); + (out ? sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_inreq) + : sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_outreq)); } if (param_len > SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN - @@ -639,6 +640,9 @@ struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset_inreq( nums = (ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(*inreq)) / sizeof(__u16); str_p = inreq->list_of_streams; + if (nums * sizeof(__u16) + sizeof(struct sctp_strreset_outreq) > + SCTP_MAX_CHUNK_LEN - sizeof(struct sctp_reconf_chunk)) + goto out; for (i = 0; i < nums; i++) { if (ntohs(str_p[i]) >= stream->outcnt) { result = SCTP_STRRESET_ERR_WRONG_SSN; -- 2.53.0