From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
Cc: Claudiu Manoil <claudiu.manoil@nxp.com>,
Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@lunn.ch>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>,
Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>,
Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>,
Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>,
Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, coreteam@netfilter.org,
syzbot+5a66db916cdde0dbcc1c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
Xiang Mei <xmei5@asu.edu>,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v2] net: flow_offload: serialize driver callback lists
Date: Thu, 30 Jul 2026 17:02:50 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260730160250.GD51943@horms.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260726120338.488658-1-bestswngs@gmail.com>
This is an AI-generated review of your patch. The human sending this
email has considered the AI review valid, or at least plausible.
Full review at: https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260726120338.488658-1-bestswngs@gmail.com?part=1
---
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH net v2] net: flow_offload: serialize driver callback lists ---
commit 93c807b64d24dcddc15896bc3604b3d8341855e1
Author: Weiming Shi <bestswngs@gmail.com>
net: flow_offload: serialize driver callback lists
This adds a global flow-offload callback mutex that is held across direct
and indirect ndo_setup_tc() setup, callback ownership transfer and
rollback, moves indirect-unregister list removal into the flow-offload
core, and makes indirect-device registration transactional on setup
failure.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260719175028.988301-2-bestswngs@gmail.com/
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_qos.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_qos.c
> index 7b17bca24f26..c994f878cacd 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_qos.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/enetc/enetc_qos.c
> @@ -1601,30 +1601,41 @@ int enetc_set_psfp(struct net_device *ndev, bool en)
>
> int enetc_psfp_init(struct enetc_ndev_priv *priv)
> {
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + flow_block_cb_lock();
> if (epsfp.psfp_sfi_bitmap)
> - return 0;
> + goto out;
>
> epsfp.psfp_sfi_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(priv->psfp_cap.max_psfp_filter,
> GFP_KERNEL);
> - if (!epsfp.psfp_sfi_bitmap)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + if (!epsfp.psfp_sfi_bitmap) {
> + err = -ENOMEM;
> + goto out;
> + }
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but since this hunk rewrites
exactly the bitmap allocation site, is the psfp_sfi_bitmap lifecycle
asymmetric here?
The UNBIND path in enetc_setup_tc_psfp() frees the bitmap:
case FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND:
...
clear_bit(port, &epsfp.dev_bitmap);
if (!epsfp.dev_bitmap)
clean_psfp_all();
and clean_psfp_all() -> clean_psfp_sfi_bitmap() does bitmap_free() and
sets epsfp.psfp_sfi_bitmap = NULL.
The BIND path only does set_bit(port, &epsfp.dev_bitmap), it never
reallocates. enetc_psfp_init() is reached only from the inline
enetc_psfp_enable() in enetc.h, called from enetc_pf_set_features() on a
NETIF_F_HW_TC change and once at probe, and it early-returns when the
pointer is non-NULL.
So after "tc qdisc del dev eth0 clsact" followed by "tc qdisc add dev eth0
clsact" (features unchanged, so tc_can_offload() still passes), does the
first flower rule with a PSFP action hit a NULL dereference in
enetc_get_free_index()?
index = find_first_zero_bit(epsfp.psfp_sfi_bitmap, max_size);
There is no NULL guard on any of the psfp_sfi_bitmap users.
>
> spin_lock_init(&epsfp.psfp_lock);
>
> if (list_empty(&enetc_block_cb_list))
> epsfp.dev_bitmap = 0;
>
> - return 0;
> +out:
> + flow_block_cb_unlock();
> + return err;
> }
>
> int enetc_psfp_clean(struct enetc_ndev_priv *priv)
> {
> - if (!list_empty(&enetc_block_cb_list))
> - return -EBUSY;
> + int err = -EBUSY;
>
> - clean_psfp_all();
> + flow_block_cb_lock();
> + if (list_empty(&enetc_block_cb_list)) {
> + clean_psfp_all();
> + err = 0;
> + }
> + flow_block_cb_unlock();
>
> - return 0;
> + return err;
> }
[Severity: Low]
Is exporting the core mutex for drivers to take directly the intended
layering here? The driver now runs bitmap_zalloc() and clean_psfp_all()
while holding a net/core mutex, which inverts the usual "core calls
driver" direction.
The new contract - a driver must hold flow_block_cb_mutex whenever it
touches its own driver_block_list - is expressed only as
lockdep_assert_held() inside flow_block_cb_is_busy() and
flow_block_cb_setup_simple(), and is not documented anywhere in
include/net/flow_offload.h. Only ENETC was converted, so other drivers
that inspect their callback list outside ndo_setup_tc() remain
unprotected.
Would it be preferable to keep the mutex private to
net/core/flow_offload.c and give drivers a purpose-built helper instead?
> diff --git a/include/net/flow_offload.h b/include/net/flow_offload.h
> index 70a02ee14308..96a46ba2769d 100644
> --- a/include/net/flow_offload.h
> +++ b/include/net/flow_offload.h
> @@ -647,6 +647,8 @@ struct flow_block_cb *flow_block_cb_lookup(struct flow_block *block,
> void *flow_block_cb_priv(struct flow_block_cb *block_cb);
> void flow_block_cb_incref(struct flow_block_cb *block_cb);
> unsigned int flow_block_cb_decref(struct flow_block_cb *block_cb);
> +void flow_block_cb_lock(void);
> +void flow_block_cb_unlock(void);
>
> static inline void flow_block_cb_add(struct flow_block_cb *block_cb,
> struct flow_block_offload *offload)
> @@ -741,7 +743,9 @@ void flow_indr_dev_unregister(flow_indr_block_bind_cb_t *cb, void *cb_priv,
> int flow_indr_dev_setup_offload(struct net_device *dev, struct Qdisc *sch,
> enum tc_setup_type type, void *data,
> struct flow_block_offload *bo,
> - void (*cleanup)(struct flow_block_cb *block_cb));
> + void (*cleanup)(struct flow_block_cb *block_cb),
> + bool *indr_dev_added);
> +void flow_indr_dev_setup_abort(void *data);
[Severity: Low]
Could this be split into a series? As it stands one patch with Fixes: +
Cc: stable carries at least five independent changes:
- the new global mutex plus exported lock/unlock API
- INIT_LIST_HEAD() of the block_cb auxiliary list nodes
- moving the indirect-cleanup list_del(&block_cb->driver_list) into the
core
- transactional indirect-device registration, changing the prototype of
the exported flow_indr_dev_setup_offload() and adding the exported
flow_indr_dev_setup_abort()
- a brand new TC rollback path for failed indirect binds
plus the unrelated ENETC change.
The single Fixes: c9626a2cbdb2 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add hardware
offload support") does not cover the TC-side changes (the moved
list_del() in tc_block_indr_cleanup() and the new
tcf_block_indr_bind_rollback()), which are not introduced by the nftables
offload commit.
> bool flow_indr_dev_exists(void);
>
> #endif /* _NET_FLOW_OFFLOAD_H */
> diff --git a/net/core/flow_offload.c b/net/core/flow_offload.c
> index 5071d7fe6ce2..0b4d2a2cbaf8 100644
> --- a/net/core/flow_offload.c
> +++ b/net/core/flow_offload.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -317,11 +319,27 @@ unsigned int flow_block_cb_decref(struct flow_block_cb *block_cb)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_block_cb_decref);
>
> +static DEFINE_MUTEX(flow_block_cb_mutex);
> +
> +void flow_block_cb_lock(void)
> +{
> + mutex_lock(&flow_block_cb_mutex);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_block_cb_lock);
[Severity: Medium]
Should the scalability impact of a single system-wide mutex be discussed
in the commit message?
This mutex becomes the outermost lock on every flow-offload configuration
path (TC block bind/unbind, nftables chain offload, flowtable offload, TC
action offload, indirect device register/unregister, and even
flow_indr_dev_exists()), and it is held across the driver's
ndo_setup_tc().
The two sides acquire it with different outer locks:
nft_chain_offload_cmd() (no RTNL)
flow_block_cb_lock()
dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc()
tcf_block_offload_bind() (under RTNL)
down_write(&block->cb_lock)
flow_block_cb_lock()
So an nftables commit in one netns that stalls inside a driver or
firmware ndo_setup_tc() while holding flow_block_cb_mutex will stall any
RTNL holder waiting for that mutex, i.e. netdev configuration on
completely unrelated devices.
Were cheaper alternatives considered, such as a lock supplied per driver
callback list, taking RTNL in the nft offload path, or scoping the lock
per netdev?
> +
> +void flow_block_cb_unlock(void)
> +{
> + mutex_unlock(&flow_block_cb_mutex);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_block_cb_unlock);
[ ... ]
> @@ -486,6 +512,7 @@ void flow_indr_dev_unregister(flow_indr_block_bind_cb_t *cb, void *cb_priv,
> struct flow_indr_dev *this, *next, *indr_dev = NULL;
> LIST_HEAD(cleanup_list);
>
> + flow_block_cb_lock();
> mutex_lock(&flow_indr_block_lock);
> list_for_each_entry_safe(this, next, &flow_block_indr_dev_list, list) {
> if (this->cb == cb &&
> @@ -499,11 +526,13 @@ void flow_indr_dev_unregister(flow_indr_block_bind_cb_t *cb, void *cb_priv,
>
> if (!indr_dev) {
> mutex_unlock(&flow_indr_block_lock);
> + flow_block_cb_unlock();
> return;
> }
>
> __flow_block_indr_cleanup(release, cb_priv, &cleanup_list);
> mutex_unlock(&flow_indr_block_lock);
> + flow_block_cb_unlock();
>
> tcf_action_reoffload_cb(cb, cb_priv, false);
> flow_block_indr_notify(&cleanup_list);
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does the indirect cleanup
path still leave the very corruption window the patch aims to close?
flow_block_cb_unlock() runs before flow_block_indr_notify(), and
flow_block_indr_notify() calls this->indr.cleanup(this), i.e.
tc_block_indr_cleanup() in net/sched/cls_api.c:
rtnl_lock();
down_write(&block->cb_lock);
list_move(&block_cb->list, &bo.cb_list);
tcf_block_unbind(block, &bo);
so that deletion from block->flow_block.cb_list happens with only RTNL +
cb_lock held.
Meanwhile the register side splices into the same list head with a
disjoint lock set:
net/core/flow_offload.c:existing_qdiscs_register() {
...
cb(cur->dev, cur->sch, cb_priv, cur->type, &bo, cur->data, cur->cleanup);
list_splice(&bo.cb_list, cur->cb_list);
...
}
That runs from flow_indr_dev_register() holding flow_block_cb_mutex +
flow_indr_block_lock, but neither RTNL nor block->cb_lock (cb_list here
is bo->cb_list_head, i.e. &block->flow_block.cb_list, recorded by
indir_dev_add()).
Can two indirect-offload drivers (or repeated load/unload of one) then
run splice and list_del concurrently on one live tcf_block cb_list, and
produce the same "list_del corruption ... next->prev should be" splat?
Note tc_block_indr_cleanup() itself takes RTNL, so it cannot simply be
pulled under the new mutex.
> @@ -603,18 +632,31 @@ static int indir_dev_remove(void *data)
> int flow_indr_dev_setup_offload(struct net_device *dev, struct Qdisc *sch,
> enum tc_setup_type type, void *data,
> struct flow_block_offload *bo,
> - void (*cleanup)(struct flow_block_cb *block_cb))
> + void (*cleanup)(struct flow_block_cb *block_cb),
> + bool *indr_dev_added)
> {
> struct flow_indr_dev *this;
> u32 count = 0;
> int err;
>
> + lockdep_assert_held(&flow_block_cb_mutex);
> +
> + if (indr_dev_added)
> + *indr_dev_added = false;
> +
> mutex_lock(&flow_indr_block_lock);
> if (bo) {
> - if (bo->command == FLOW_BLOCK_BIND)
> - indir_dev_add(data, dev, sch, type, cleanup, bo);
> - else if (bo->command == FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND)
> + if (bo->command == FLOW_BLOCK_BIND) {
> + err = indir_dev_add(data, dev, sch, type, cleanup, bo);
> + if (!err) {
> + if (indr_dev_added)
> + *indr_dev_added = true;
> + } else if (err != -EEXIST) {
> + goto out_unlock;
> + }
> + } else if (bo->command == FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND) {
> indir_dev_remove(data);
> + }
> }
[Severity: Medium]
Does this turn a previously silent degradation into a user-visible
failure?
Before this change the return value of indir_dev_add() was discarded, so
a failed bookkeeping allocation did not affect the outcome. Now an
-ENOMEM from indir_dev_add() aborts the whole setup before any indirect
driver callback runs, and cls_api propagates it:
net/sched/cls_api.c:tcf_block_offload_cmd() {
...
if (err < 0)
return err;
cb_count = list_count_nodes(&bo.cb_list);
err = tcf_block_setup(block, &bo);
if (err)
return err;
...
}
net/sched/cls_api.c:tcf_block_offload_bind() {
...
if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP)
goto no_offload_dev_inc;
if (err)
goto err_unlock;
...
}
Only -EOPNOTSUPP still reaches the software fallback, so "tc qdisc add"
on an indirect device, nft base-chain offload and flowtable offload can
now fail to user space where they previously succeeded with
block->nooffloaddevcnt++. The same applies to a non-EOPNOTSUPP error
from tp->ops->reoffload during filter replay, which tcf_block_setup() now
forwards.
The commit message only says "keep indirect-device registration
transactional on setup failure". Could it state this new failure mode
explicitly, given the Cc: stable tag?
>
> list_for_each_entry(this, &flow_block_indr_dev_list, list) {
> @@ -623,14 +665,35 @@ int flow_indr_dev_setup_offload(struct net_device *dev, struct Qdisc *sch,
> count++;
> }
>
> + err = (bo && list_empty(&bo->cb_list)) ? -EOPNOTSUPP : count;
> +
> +out_unlock:
> mutex_unlock(&flow_indr_block_lock);
>
> - return (bo && list_empty(&bo->cb_list)) ? -EOPNOTSUPP : count;
> + return err;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_indr_dev_setup_offload);
>
> +void flow_indr_dev_setup_abort(void *data)
> +{
> + lockdep_assert_held(&flow_block_cb_mutex);
> +
> + mutex_lock(&flow_indr_block_lock);
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(indir_dev_remove(data));
> + mutex_unlock(&flow_indr_block_lock);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_indr_dev_setup_abort);
[Severity: Low]
Would it be better for the core to undo its own bookkeeping rather than
export partial state plus an abort call?
indir_dev_add()/indir_dev_remove() are internal to
net/core/flow_offload.c, yet callers now receive bool *indr_dev_added and
must remember to call flow_indr_dev_setup_abort() on every later failure.
The same snippet is duplicated in nf_tables_offload.c (twice),
nf_flow_table_offload.c and cls_api.c (twice), with three different
failure semantics for one core operation: nft and flowtable only unwind
the indr_dev bookkeeping, cls_api additionally unwinds installed
callbacks.
Some of the new arms are also dead, since nft_flow_offload_bind() only
does list_splice() and returns 0, and nf_flow_table_block_setup() cannot
fail for BIND.
If a future caller forgets the abort, does the stale struct
flow_indir_dev_info left on flow_indir_dev_list later drive a bogus
replay through existing_qdiscs_register()?
> +
> bool flow_indr_dev_exists(void)
> {
> - return !list_empty(&flow_block_indr_dev_list);
> + bool exists;
> +
> + flow_block_cb_lock();
> + mutex_lock(&flow_indr_block_lock);
> + exists = !list_empty(&flow_block_indr_dev_list);
> + mutex_unlock(&flow_indr_block_lock);
> + flow_block_cb_unlock();
> +
> + return exists;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(flow_indr_dev_exists);
[Severity: Medium]
Is the global mutex needed for this predicate? flow_indr_dev_exists() is
a cheap existence test used by nft_chain_offload_support() in
net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c, and taking flow_block_cb_mutex here
imposes the new outermost-lock ordering constraint on all of its callers.
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c
> index 801a3dd9ceea..2612978b27b4 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_flow_table_offload.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1273,21 +1269,29 @@ int nf_flow_table_offload_setup(struct nf_flowtable *flowtable,
> {
> struct netlink_ext_ack extack = {};
> struct flow_block_offload bo;
> + bool indr_dev_added = false;
> int err;
>
> if (!nf_flowtable_hw_offload(flowtable))
> return nf_flow_offload_xdp_setup(flowtable, dev, cmd);
>
> + flow_block_cb_lock();
> + down_write(&flowtable->flow_block_lock);
> if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_setup_tc)
> err = nf_flow_table_offload_cmd(&bo, flowtable, dev, cmd,
> &extack);
> else
> err = nf_flow_table_indr_offload_cmd(&bo, flowtable, dev, cmd,
> - &extack);
> - if (err < 0)
> - return err;
> + &extack,
> + &indr_dev_added);
> + if (err >= 0)
> + err = nf_flow_table_block_setup(flowtable, &bo, cmd);
> + if (err < 0 && indr_dev_added)
> + flow_indr_dev_setup_abort(flowtable);
> + up_write(&flowtable->flow_block_lock);
> + flow_block_cb_unlock();
>
> - return nf_flow_table_block_setup(flowtable, &bo, cmd);
> + return err;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nf_flow_table_offload_setup);
>
> diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c
> index 8998a24651ff..7189e8c4e5a0 100644
> --- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c
> +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_offload.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -426,19 +425,28 @@ static int nft_indr_block_offload_cmd(struct nft_base_chain *basechain,
> {
> struct netlink_ext_ack extack = {};
> struct flow_block_offload bo;
> + bool indr_dev_added = false;
> int err;
>
> nft_flow_block_offload_init(&bo, dev_net(dev), cmd, basechain, &extack);
>
> err = flow_indr_dev_setup_offload(dev, NULL, TC_SETUP_BLOCK, basechain, &bo,
> - nft_indr_block_cleanup);
> - if (err < 0)
> + nft_indr_block_cleanup,
> + &indr_dev_added);
> + if (err < 0) {
> + if (indr_dev_added)
> + flow_indr_dev_setup_abort(basechain);
> return err;
> + }
>
> if (list_empty(&bo.cb_list))
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
[Severity: Low]
Should this exit also call flow_indr_dev_setup_abort()? It is the only
error return of the restructured function that skips the new cleanup.
The branch is dead today, since flow_indr_dev_setup_offload() already
folds the empty-cb_list case into -EOPNOTSUPP:
net/core/flow_offload.c:flow_indr_dev_setup_offload() {
...
err = (bo && list_empty(&bo->cb_list)) ? -EOPNOTSUPP : count;
...
}
with bo non-NULL here, and its only other negative return is -ENOMEM via
goto out_unlock. Should it become reachable, would this exit leave the
flow_indir_dev_info created by indir_dev_add() on flow_indir_dev_list with
data pointing at a base chain the failing nft transaction is about to
destroy?
>
> - return nft_block_setup(basechain, &bo, cmd);
> + err = nft_block_setup(basechain, &bo, cmd);
> + if (err < 0 && indr_dev_added)
> + flow_indr_dev_setup_abort(basechain);
> +
> + return err;
> }
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/net/sched/cls_api.c b/net/sched/cls_api.c
> index fee4524adc98..1c230e33e1a5 100644
> --- a/net/sched/cls_api.c
> +++ b/net/sched/cls_api.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -845,21 +847,66 @@ static int tcf_block_offload_cmd(struct tcf_block *block,
> return tcf_block_setup(block, &bo);
> }
>
> - flow_indr_dev_setup_offload(dev, sch, TC_SETUP_BLOCK, block, &bo,
> - tc_block_indr_cleanup);
> - tcf_block_setup(block, &bo);
> + err = flow_indr_dev_setup_offload(dev, sch, TC_SETUP_BLOCK, block, &bo,
> + tc_block_indr_cleanup,
> + indr_dev_added);
> + if (err < 0)
> + return err;
> + cb_count = list_count_nodes(&bo.cb_list);
> + err = tcf_block_setup(block, &bo);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> + if (indr_cb_count)
> + *indr_cb_count = cb_count;
> + if (indr_unlocked_driver_cb)
> + *indr_unlocked_driver_cb = bo.unlocked_driver_cb;
>
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
>
> +static void
> +tcf_block_indr_bind_rollback(struct tcf_block *block, struct net_device *dev,
> + struct Qdisc *sch, struct tcf_block_ext_info *ei,
> + unsigned int cb_count, bool unlocked_driver_cb,
> + bool remove_indr_dev)
> +{
> + struct flow_block_offload bo = {};
> + struct flow_block_cb *block_cb;
> +
> + tcf_block_offload_init(&bo, dev, sch, FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND,
> + ei->binder_type, &block->flow_block,
> + tcf_block_shared(block), NULL);
> + bo.unlocked_driver_cb = unlocked_driver_cb;
> +
> + if (remove_indr_dev)
> + flow_indr_dev_setup_abort(block);
> +
> + /* tcf_block_bind() splices this bind's callbacks at the list head. */
> + while (cb_count--) {
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(list_empty(&block->flow_block.cb_list)))
> + break;
> +
> + block_cb = list_first_entry(&block->flow_block.cb_list,
> + struct flow_block_cb, list);
> + list_del_init(&block_cb->driver_list);
> + list_del_init(&block_cb->indr.list);
> + list_move(&block_cb->list, &bo.cb_list);
> + }
> + tcf_block_unbind(block, &bo);
> +}
[Severity: Low]
Is identifying "this bind's callbacks" by popping cb_count entries off the
head of block->flow_block.cb_list robust enough?
The count is taken from bo.cb_list before tcf_block_setup(), and the
recovery relies on tcf_block_bind() using list_splice() (head insertion)
and on nothing else inserting in between. The
WARN_ON_ONCE(list_empty(...)) inside the pop loop suggests the invariant
isn't structurally guaranteed.
If the splice direction in tcf_block_bind() ever changes, or another
writer inserts into that list, would this unbind and free callbacks owned
by a different binder?
Separately, tcf_block_offload_cmd() still returns -EOPNOTSUPP as the
success sentinel for the indirect path while carrying three new
out-parameters, so a caller passing NULL loses the rollback ability
silently. Could the bind's callbacks be tracked explicitly instead, for
example on a local list?
[Severity: Low]
Which lock protects block_cb->indr.list here? This helper does
list_del_init(&block_cb->indr.list) on the file-global
flow_block_indr_list while holding only block->cb_lock and the new
flow_block_cb_mutex.
Every mutator of that list in net/core/flow_offload.c takes
flow_indr_block_lock, e.g.
net/core/flow_offload.c:__flow_block_indr_cleanup() {
...
list_del_init(&this->driver_list);
list_move(&this->indr.list, cleanup_list);
...
}
and flow_indr_dev_setup_abort() itself takes flow_indr_block_lock for the
equivalent bookkeeping. Today the lock sets do intersect on
flow_block_cb_mutex, so there is no race, but the rule becomes implicit.
Could a comment plus lockdep asserts (including on the exported
flow_indr_block_cb_alloc(), which has none) be added?
> +
> static int tcf_block_offload_bind(struct tcf_block *block, struct Qdisc *q,
> struct tcf_block_ext_info *ei,
> struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
> {
> struct net_device *dev = q->dev_queue->dev;
> + bool indr_unlocked_driver_cb = false;
> + bool indr_dev_added = false;
> + unsigned int indr_cb_count = 0;
> int err;
>
> down_write(&block->cb_lock);
> + flow_block_cb_lock();
>
> /* If tc offload feature is disabled and the block we try to bind
> * to already has some offloaded filters, forbid to bind.
[ ... ]
> @@ -888,6 +936,15 @@ static int tcf_block_offload_bind(struct tcf_block *block, struct Qdisc *q,
> err = 0;
> block->nooffloaddevcnt++;
> err_unlock:
> + if (err && indr_cb_count)
> + tcf_block_indr_bind_rollback(block, dev, q, ei,
> + indr_cb_count,
> + indr_unlocked_driver_cb,
> + indr_dev_added);
> + else if (err && indr_dev_added)
> + flow_indr_dev_setup_abort(block);
> +out_unlock:
> + flow_block_cb_unlock();
> up_write(&block->cb_lock);
> return err;
> }
[ ... ]
> @@ -1649,7 +1710,8 @@ static int tcf_block_bind(struct tcf_block *block,
>
> err_unroll:
> list_for_each_entry_safe(block_cb, next, &bo->cb_list, list) {
> - list_del(&block_cb->driver_list);
> + list_del_init(&block_cb->driver_list);
> + list_del_init(&block_cb->indr.list);
[Severity: Low]
Same question as above for this site: the err_unroll path now mutates the
global flow_block_indr_list without flow_indr_block_lock, and
tcf_block_bind()/tcf_block_unbind() only assert block->cb_lock.
> if (i-- > 0) {
> list_del(&block_cb->list);
> tcf_block_playback_offloads(block, block_cb->cb,
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-30 16:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-19 17:50 [PATCH net] netdevsim: tc: serialize access to nsim_block_cb_list Weiming Shi
2026-07-24 14:23 ` Simon Horman
2026-07-26 8:26 ` Weiming Shi
2026-07-26 12:03 ` [PATCH net v2] net: flow_offload: serialize driver callback lists Weiming Shi
2026-07-30 16:02 ` Simon Horman [this message]
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