From: Ning Ding <dingning04@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: memxor@gmail.com, greg@kroah.com,
Ning Ding <dingning04@gmail.com>,
sashiko-bot@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH bpf v3 3/4] bpf: Reject untrusted allocated-object pointers
Date: Mon, 3 Aug 2026 04:22:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260803112218.3361213-4-dingning04@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260803112218.3361213-1-dingning04@gmail.com>
type_is_ptr_alloc_obj() currently treats PTR_UNTRUSTED pointers as valid
allocated objects. This allows a pointer that is no longer protected by
RCU to be passed to bpf_refcount_acquire(). If the object was freed and
its address reused, the verifier may acquire a reference through stale
memory.
Make type_is_ptr_alloc_obj() reject PTR_UNTRUSTED. Add
type_is_untrusted_ptr_alloc_obj() for the read path, where these pointers
are still allowed for BPF_PROBE_MEM reads. This keeps checks strict
without breaking safe reads.
Fixes: 1b12171533a9 ("bpf: Mark direct ld of stashed bpf_{rb,list}_node as non-owning ref")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260726021304.97ED91F000E9@smtp.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5
Signed-off-by: Ning Ding <dingning04@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 11 ++++++++++-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 8 +++++++-
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index 39a851e690ec4..7014d62fe3d1c 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -1307,7 +1307,16 @@ static inline bool bpf_type_has_unsafe_modifiers(u32 type)
static inline bool type_is_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type)
{
- return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID && type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC;
+ return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
+ type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC &&
+ !(type_flag(type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED);
+}
+
+static inline bool type_is_untrusted_ptr_alloc_obj(u32 type)
+{
+ return base_type(type) == PTR_TO_BTF_ID &&
+ type_flag(type) & MEM_ALLOC &&
+ type_flag(type) & PTR_UNTRUSTED;
}
static inline bool type_is_non_owning_ref(u32 type)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index c47328be2505e..8b35c63780798 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -5809,7 +5809,13 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return -EACCES;
}
- if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) && !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) &&
+ /*
+ * Skip this referenced-ID sanity check for untrusted allocated objects;
+ * the access check above already rejects writes through them.
+ */
+ if (type_is_alloc(reg->type) &&
+ !type_is_untrusted_ptr_alloc_obj(reg->type) &&
+ !type_is_non_owning_ref(reg->type) &&
!(reg->type & MEM_RCU) && !reg_is_referenced(env, reg)) {
verifier_bug(env, "allocated object must have a referenced id");
return -EFAULT;
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-03 11:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-03 11:22 [PATCH bpf v3 0/4] bpf: Fix refcount_acquire handling for borrowed kptrs Ning Ding
2026-08-03 11:22 ` [PATCH bpf v3 1/4] bpf: Keep refcount_acquire nullable for borrowed RCU kptrs Ning Ding
2026-08-03 12:53 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-08-03 13:45 ` Amery Hung
2026-08-03 11:22 ` [PATCH bpf v3 2/4] selftests/bpf: Test refcount_acquire return nullability Ning Ding
2026-08-03 13:59 ` Amery Hung
2026-08-03 22:48 ` Ning Ding
2026-08-03 11:22 ` Ning Ding [this message]
2026-08-03 11:22 ` [PATCH bpf v3 4/4] selftests/bpf: Test untrusted allocated-object pointers Ning Ding
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