From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E0099426430; Tue, 4 Aug 2026 04:05:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785816302; cv=none; b=f+uQA4aBddfakLK4lP6cpkHv+zipO0YantSI1QzLXWhU6vnkVr+iObSJgIB+XCvKDFpdP+YLVmzNdZht5Mtr50Nd5wM7kxxT/4FAxE3iTWR/UZv89r544GWQ8CRj+qVRLh7PAoKzKLOyaxHanlZB9PdjaRf6UGcsFhHl6dwLNJI= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1785816302; c=relaxed/simple; bh=sLefSD6AHFuj6s/LNrTT8ZbGwL9xusyNNdH3PTPjtwA=; h=Date:To:From:Subject:Message-Id; b=QVeMpjbZeti76tLLKjJ9hHPUT5YEhvlo3IRbgsC4Akj8Y75DFAcnwgRAmrhl5JnBynWM6Uy6/yAInI16Q1X4882Qcb7qryA/Vtyu0hZVcDgFwjU3QCRRpqeS2UnM5+RIC9L9s8ro+Qgg7XAN4oJijotlT4zpQ6PQs0nWbx9VXTU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b=0vVe65pI; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b="0vVe65pI" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7A84E1F000E9; Tue, 4 Aug 2026 04:05:00 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1785816300; bh=TQBm/Ox2rUiiXp+n8tHIrxQFevf9olXyjWUxvRgSVcY=; h=Date:To:From:Subject; b=0vVe65pIkDYB7SCd3WxckQ3p3S7yOskskKxLTAfpUJJSswPZSiIh5ddYV1f7zmMN/ mRTKiD1hcqI3vWwYBRbyVaOUhOgu04xBAVB+UUu3GW+95omfVJsgq9t/mUXHu9Tj+j ldl2Sdqp2mQS81vluR7GmQRCCCbKbFjZat+VAoj0= Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2026 21:04:59 -0700 To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,stable@vger.kernel.org,piaojun@huawei.com,mark@fasheh.com,junxiao.bi@oracle.com,joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com,jlbec@evilplan.org,heming.zhao@suse.com,gechangwei@live.cn,hexlabsecurity@proton.me,akpm@linux-foundation.org From: Andrew Morton Subject: [merged mm-nonmm-stable] ocfs2-bound-namelen-in-dlm_migrate_request_handler.patch removed from -mm tree Message-Id: <20260804040500.7A84E1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: The quilt patch titled Subject: ocfs2: bound namelen in dlm_migrate_request_handler has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was ocfs2-bound-namelen-in-dlm_migrate_request_handler.patch This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-nonmm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm ------------------------------------------------------ From: Bryam Vargas Subject: ocfs2: bound namelen in dlm_migrate_request_handler Date: Mon, 29 Jun 2026 00:01:43 -0500 Patch series "ocfs2/dlm: bound peer-controlled lengths in the o2dlm". The o2dlm receive handlers trust u8 length and count fields from the wire without bounding them, so a node in a DLM domain can corrupt or panic any other node with a malformed message. Three defects: - dlm_migrate_request_handler() passes migrate->namelen unchecked to dlm_init_mle(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte mname[] of an o2dlm_mle slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~215 attacker-controlled bytes. - dlm_mig_lockres_handler() passes mres->lockname_len unchecked to dlm_init_lockres(), which memcpy()s it into the 32-byte o2dlm_lockname slab object: a heap out-of-bounds write of up to ~223 bytes. - the same handler trusts mres->num_locks without checking that the message is large enough to hold that many entries, so dlm_process_recovery_data() walks mres->ml[] past the kmalloc(data_len) copy and trips a BUG_ON (an out-of-bounds read ending in a panic). The other o2dlm receive handlers already reject an oversized name; the migration and recovery handlers have omitted it since the DLM was added (see the Fixes tags). Patch 1 bounds namelen; patch 2 validates lockname_len, num_locks, and the payload size. Conforming recovery and migration traffic is unaffected. o2net authenticates peers only by the DLM domain key, so any node that has joined the domain -- including a compromised or malicious member -- can send these messages. There is no local trigger; the attacker must already be a member of the cluster. Each sink was confirmed under KASAN with an out-of-tree module mirroring it exactly -- a kmem_cache/kmalloc of the real destination size, then the same unclamped memcpy/loop: slab-out-of-bounds Write for the two writes, Read for the recovery walk, and a panic. A userspace AddressSanitizer build faults identically under -m32 and -m64. Scrubbed logs are available on request. I reported this privately to security@kernel.org and the ocfs2 maintainers on 2026-06-20; with no response after the standard embargo period I am posting the fix publicly. I have no embargo requirement. This patch (of 2): A node receiving a DLM_MIGRATE_REQUEST message trusts the peer-supplied name length (migrate->namelen) without bounding it. dlm_init_mle() then copies that many bytes into the fixed DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX-byte mname[] array of an o2dlm_mle slab object, so a malformed message from a cluster peer overflows the slab object by up to ~215 bytes: a heap out-of-bounds write of attacker-controlled data, reachable by any node in the domain. Reject an oversized name, the way dlm_master_request_handler() and the other o2dlm receive handlers already do; the migration handler omits the check entirely. Conforming messages are unaffected. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-0-6953bcc0421f@proton.me Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260629-b4-disp-94fb6521-v1-1-6953bcc0421f@proton.me Fixes: 6714d8e86bf4 ("[PATCH] OCFS2: The Second Oracle Cluster Filesystem") Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi Cc: Changwei Ge Cc: Heming Zhao Cc: Joel Becker Cc: Jun Piao Cc: Junxiao Bi Cc: Mark Fasheh Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton --- fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c~ocfs2-bound-namelen-in-dlm_migrate_request_handler +++ a/fs/ocfs2/dlm/dlmmaster.c @@ -3099,6 +3099,12 @@ int dlm_migrate_request_handler(struct o name = migrate->name; namelen = migrate->namelen; + if (namelen > DLM_LOCKID_NAME_MAX) { + mlog(ML_ERROR, "%s: invalid name length %u in migrate request\n", + dlm->name, namelen); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto leave; + } hash = dlm_lockid_hash(name, namelen); /* preallocate.. if this fails, abort */ _ Patches currently in -mm which might be from hexlabsecurity@proton.me are