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From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
	"Nikunj A Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
	David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>, <stable@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 18:56:02 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260804235611.4053375-2-kim.phillips@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260804235611.4053375-1-kim.phillips@amd.com>

spectre_v2_select_retpoline() unconditionally emits a pr_err when the
kernel lacks retpoline support before returning SPECTRE_V2_NONE to its
callers.  A caller may then select an alternative mitigation, making the
"no mitigation available!" message alarming and misleading to
administrators on a system that is actually mitigated.

Drop the pr_err from the helper and emit it once from
spectre_v2_update_mitigation().  Guard it on
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) so it only fires when retpoline
truly cannot be built in, and restrict it to the cases where retpoline
was the implied choice: SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, or SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO
when should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) indicates we actually
intended to mitigate.  This avoids the spurious error on a
CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE=n kernel where a caller of
spectre_v2_select_retpoline() selects an alternative mitigation, leaving
the system protected while the old message claimed otherwise.

Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Assisted-by: ClaudeCode:claude-opus-4-7
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ddf0db5326fa..b345f64f4258 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1956,10 +1956,8 @@ early_param("spectre_v2", spectre_v2_parse_cmdline);
 
 static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
 {
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
-		pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE))
 		return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
-	}
 
 	return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
 }
@@ -2247,6 +2245,13 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_update_mitigation(void)
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) &&
+	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE &&
+	    (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE ||
+	     (spectre_v2_cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO &&
+	      should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))))
+		pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
 		pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled]);
 }
-- 
2.43.0


  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-04 23:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-04 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-08-05  0:44   ` [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation Borislav Petkov
2026-08-05 14:51     ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 22:49       ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-06 20:12         ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-07  5:44           ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-10 23:21             ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-11  0:48               ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] KVM: SEV: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL() Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips

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