From: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com>
To: Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/1] perf/x86: Do not read fixed counter control register if there is none
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 16:21:49 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260805162149.55337f22@mordecai> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <7284a598-0799-45d9-85ff-739563ddf226@amd.com>
On Tue, 4 Aug 2026 12:30:36 +0530
Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com> wrote:
> On 03-08-2026 14:27, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> > On Mon, 20 Jul 2026 14:57:25 +0530
> > Sandipan Das <sandipan.das@amd.com> wrote:
> >
> >> On 17-07-2026 20:33, Petr Tesarik wrote:
> >>> [You don't often get email from ptesarik@suse.com. Learn why this is important at https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]
> >>>
> >>> When printing out CPU performance registers for debugging, skip
> >>> MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR_CTRL if fixed counters are not implemented.
> >>>
> >>> Since AMD CPUs with PerMonV2 do not implement this register, attempts to
> >>> read it generate a #GP. In particular, SysRq-P logs something like this:
> >>>
> >>> [ 14.748144] [ T1118] sysrq: Show Regs
> >>> [ 14.748896] [ T1118] unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x38d at rIP: 0xffffffff937154c6 (native_read_msr+0x6/0x40)
> >>> [ 14.750878] [ T1118] Call Trace:
> >>> [ 14.751505] [ T1118] <TASK>
> >>> [ 14.752057] [ T1118] paravirt_read_msr+0x7/0x10
> >>> [ 14.752940] [ T1118] perf_event_print_debug+0x135/0x240
> >>> [ 14.753931] [ T1118] __handle_sysrq.cold+0x9b/0xde
> >>> [ 14.754855] [ T1118] write_sysrq_trigger+0x59/0x80
> >>> [ 14.755779] [ T1118] proc_reg_write+0x5a/0xb0
> >>> [ 14.756631] [ T1118] vfs_write+0xce/0x430
> >>> [ 14.757406] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.758322] [ T1118] ? security_file_fcntl+0x5f/0x120
> >>> [ 14.759083] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.759754] [ T1118] ? __x64_sys_fcntl+0x80/0x110
> >>> [ 14.760334] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.761005] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.761676] [ T1118] ? __ct_user_enter+0x27/0xc0
> >>> [ 14.762270] [ T1118] ksys_write+0x6a/0xe0
> >>> [ 14.762776] [ T1118] do_syscall_64+0xe1/0x610
> >>> [ 14.763324] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.763995] [ T1118] ? __ct_user_enter+0x27/0xc0
> >>> [ 14.764564] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.765233] [ T1118] ? do_syscall_64+0x205/0x610
> >>> [ 14.765806] [ T1118] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xe0
> >>> [ 14.766375] [ T1118] ? __pfx_woken_wake_function+0x10/0x10
> >>> [ 14.767048] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.767717] [ T1118] ? get_close_on_exec+0x34/0x40
> >>> [ 14.768311] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.768985] [ T1118] ? do_fcntl+0x6da/0x8e0
> >>> [ 14.769502] [ T1118] ? do_syscall_64+0x205/0x610
> >>> [ 14.770083] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.772321] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.773166] [ T1118] ? tty_read+0x150/0x220
> >>> [ 14.773722] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.774423] [ T1118] ? filp_flush+0x5b/0x80
> >>> [ 14.774966] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.775660] [ T1118] ? filp_close+0x25/0x40
> >>> [ 14.776214] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.776936] [ T1118] ? do_dup2+0xae/0x140
> >>> [ 14.777486] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.778309] [ T1118] ? ksys_dup3+0x67/0xf0
> >>> [ 14.778870] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.779600] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.780310] [ T1118] ? __ct_user_enter+0x27/0xc0
> >>> [ 14.780917] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.781613] [ T1118] ? do_syscall_64+0x205/0x610
> >>> [ 14.782215] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.782907] [ T1118] ? ksys_read+0x6a/0xe0
> >>> [ 14.783429] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.784120] [ T1118] ? __ct_user_enter+0x27/0xc0
> >>> [ 14.784741] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.785431] [ T1118] ? __ct_user_exit+0x15/0xb0
> >>> [ 14.786014] [ T1118] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
> >>> [ 14.786706] [ T1118] ? do_syscall_64+0x98/0x610
> >>> [ 14.787282] [ T1118] ? exc_page_fault+0x6d/0x180
> >>> [ 14.787873] [ T1118] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> >>> [ 14.788612] [ T1118] RIP: 0033:0x7f70d6497e0a
> >>> [ 14.789186] [ T1118] Code: 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 75 1e 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 16 e8 05 ff ff ff 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 49 89 ca 48 8b 44 24 20 0f 05 <48> 83 c4 18 c3 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f
> >>> [ 14.791587] [ T1118] RSP: 002b:00007ffc36a93580 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
> >>> [ 14.792617] [ T1118] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f70d65f6580 RCX: 00007f70d6497e0a
> >>> [ 14.793594] [ T1118] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000556f34e41c30 RDI: 0000000000000001
> >>> [ 14.794574] [ T1118] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
> >>> [ 14.795563] [ T1118] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000002
> >>> [ 14.796537] [ T1118] R13: 0000556f34e41c30 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
> >>> [ 14.797514] [ T1118] </TASK>
> >>>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.com>
> >>> ---
> >>> arch/x86/events/core.c | 7 +++++--
> >>> 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/events/core.c b/arch/x86/events/core.c
> >>> index d1af33d96d0a3..8310bedfc364f 100644
> >>> --- a/arch/x86/events/core.c
> >>> +++ b/arch/x86/events/core.c
> >>> @@ -1581,13 +1581,16 @@ void perf_event_print_debug(void)
> >>> rdmsrq(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL, ctrl);
> >>> rdmsrq(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS, status);
> >>> rdmsrq(MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL, overflow);
> >>
> >> GLOBAL_{CTRL,STATUS,OVF_CTRL} functionality is also provided via different MSRs
> >> for AMD PMU version 2 and I assume that reading the ones above will also raise
> >> #GPs. If they don't, the reported values will surely be incorrect.
> >
> > They do not raise #GPs on my Ryzen 7 system, but that's about the only
> > system I have tried.
>
> Perhaps it is based on Zen 3 or older where x86_pmu.version is set to 0.
>
> >
> > Honetly, I was very unsure about the availability of the feauture(s)
> > and what the appropriate checks would be; that was the reason to
> > include you as a recipient. What is the AMD-recommended method to check
> > whether a CPU supports global perf control MSRs? Does x86.pmu_version
> > even work? If yes, should I then simply make the actual MSR numbers
> > conditional on AMD/Intel?
> >
> > Any guidance welcome.
> >
>
> AMD processors with X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2 also set x86_pmu.version to 2.
> I think that it is better to move the parts that require the use of
> vendor-specific MSRs to a new callback implemented in
> arch/x86/events/{intel,amd,zhaoxin}/* instead of making additions to
> perf_event_print_debug().
>
> I'm also not sure why MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL is read here because
> this as well as its AMD counterpart, MSR_AMD64_PERF_CNTR_GLOBAL_STATUS_CLR,
> are both write-only MSRs.
>
> Mind if I send a cleanup?
I've absolutely no issue with that. Go ahead and send your better
version! The only thing that has annoyed me is the Oops splat every
time I use SysRq+P on my AMD laptop. ;-)
Cheers
Petr T
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-05 14:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-17 15:03 [PATCH 1/1] perf/x86: Do not read fixed counter control register if there is none Petr Tesarik
2026-07-17 15:18 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-17 15:51 ` Petr Tesarik
2026-08-05 11:39 ` Tony W Wang-oc
2026-07-20 9:27 ` Sandipan Das
2026-08-03 8:57 ` Petr Tesarik
2026-08-04 7:00 ` Sandipan Das
2026-08-05 14:21 ` Petr Tesarik [this message]
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