From: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
To: mark@fasheh.com, jlbec@evilplan.org, joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Cc: ocfs2-devel@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
baijiaju1990@gmail.com, r33s3n6@gmail.com, zzzccc427@gmail.com,
ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2] ocfs2: reject inconsistent local xattr entries
Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2026 16:50:12 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260806085012.2650042-1-gality369@gmail.com> (raw)
[BUG]
A corrupt OCFS2 xattr entry can set OCFS2_XATTR_ENTRY_LOCAL while
keeping xe_value_size larger than OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE. When that
entry reaches namevalue_size_xe(), the filesystem hits its BUG_ON:
kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:namevalue_size_xe fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:231 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_xa_block_wipe_namevalue+0x2e4/0x330 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1638
Call Trace:
ocfs2_xa_wipe_namevalue fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1470 [inline]
ocfs2_xa_remove_entry+0xae/0x1d0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:1941
ocfs2_xa_remove fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2043 [inline]
ocfs2_xa_set+0x11a8/0x30a0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2247
ocfs2_xattr_ibody_set+0x302/0xc50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:2795
__ocfs2_xattr_set_handle+0x7e6/0xdb0 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3416
ocfs2_xattr_set+0x1447/0x2610 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3650
ocfs2_xattr_security_set+0x37/0x50 fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:7241
__vfs_removexattr+0x14d/0x1d0 fs/xattr.c:518
cap_inode_killpriv+0x29/0x50 security/commoncap.c:355
security_inode_killpriv+0x105/0x220 security/security.c:2724
setattr_prepare+0x147/0x8a0 fs/attr.c:219
ocfs2_setattr+0x504/0x1fd0 fs/ocfs2/file.c:1148
notify_change+0x4b5/0x1030 fs/attr.c:546
do_truncate+0x1d2/0x230 fs/open.c:68
handle_truncate fs/namei.c:3596 [inline]
do_open fs/namei.c:3979 [inline]
path_openat+0x260f/0x2ce0 fs/namei.c:4134
do_filp_open+0x1f6/0x430 fs/namei.c:4161
do_sys_openat2+0x117/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1437
...
[CAUSE]
namevalue_size_xe() assumes that local entries contain an inline value
no larger than OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE. Existing xattr metadata
validation only checks whether the value fits the storage region, and
cached entries can reach lookup and bucket maintenance paths without a
semantic check. A corrupt entry can therefore be passed to
namevalue_size_xe().
[FIX]
Validate the local/value-size invariant in the existing flat and bucket
metadata validators and before accepting matched entries or traversing
bucket entries in paths that call namevalue_size_xe(). Return an OCFS2
corruption error instead of firing the assertion.
Signed-off-by: ZhengYuan Huang <gality369@gmail.com>
---
v2:
- Rebase onto the ACL lock-order fix in linux-next.
- Reuse the existing xattr metadata validators.
- Keep validation in cached lookup and bucket maintenance paths.
---
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
index 35bcbb0ff607..e955126e4d7d 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/xattr.c
@@ -237,6 +237,21 @@ static int namevalue_size_xe(struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe)
return namevalue_size(xe->xe_name_len, value_len);
}
+static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno,
+ struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe)
+{
+ u64 value_len = le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size);
+
+ if (value_len > OCFS2_XATTR_INLINE_SIZE &&
+ ocfs2_xattr_is_local(xe))
+ return ocfs2_error(sb,
+ "Invalid local xattr in block %llu: value size %llu\n",
+ (unsigned long long)blkno,
+ (unsigned long long)value_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int ocfs2_xattr_bucket_get_name_value(struct super_block *sb,
struct ocfs2_xattr_header *xh,
@@ -992,7 +1007,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_flat(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno,
size_t entries_limit = region_size;
size_t nv_limit = region_size;
size_t max_entries;
- int i;
+ int i, ret;
if (region_size < sizeof(*xh))
return ocfs2_error(sb,
@@ -1012,6 +1027,11 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_flat(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno,
struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *xe = &xh->xh_entries[i];
size_t name_offset = le16_to_cpu(xe->xe_name_offset);
size_t value_offset;
+ u64 value_len = le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size);
+
+ ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(sb, blkno, xe);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (name_offset > nv_limit ||
xe->xe_name_len > nv_limit - name_offset)
@@ -1026,8 +1046,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_entries_flat(struct super_block *sb, u64 blkno,
(unsigned long long)blkno, i);
if (ocfs2_xattr_is_local(xe)) {
- if (le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size) >
- nv_limit - value_offset)
+ if (value_len > nv_limit - value_offset)
return ocfs2_error(sb,
"Invalid xattr in block %llu: entry %d value is out of bounds\n",
(unsigned long long)blkno,
@@ -1112,7 +1131,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket *bucket,
size_t entries_limit = sb->s_blocksize;
size_t nv_limit = sb->s_blocksize;
size_t max_entries;
- int i;
+ int i, ret;
if (region_size < sizeof(*xh))
return ocfs2_error(sb,
@@ -1140,6 +1159,11 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket *bucket,
size_t block_off = name_offset >> sb->s_blocksize_bits;
size_t block_offset = name_offset % nv_limit;
size_t value_offset;
+ u64 value_len = le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size);
+
+ ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(sb, blkno, xe);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
if (name_offset >= region_size || block_off >= bucket->bu_blocks)
return ocfs2_error(sb,
@@ -1158,8 +1182,7 @@ static int ocfs2_validate_xattr_bucket(struct ocfs2_xattr_bucket *bucket,
(unsigned long long)blkno, i);
if (ocfs2_xattr_is_local(xe)) {
- if (le64_to_cpu(xe->xe_value_size) >
- nv_limit - value_offset)
+ if (value_len > nv_limit - value_offset)
return ocfs2_error(sb,
"Invalid xattr bucket %llu: entry %d value is out of bounds\n",
(unsigned long long)blkno,
@@ -1307,7 +1330,7 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, int name_index,
{
struct ocfs2_xattr_entry *entry;
size_t name_len;
- int i, name_offset, cmp = 1;
+ int i, name_offset, cmp = 1, ret;
if (name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1330,6 +1353,12 @@ static int ocfs2_xattr_find_entry(struct inode *inode, int name_index,
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
cmp = memcmp(name, (xs->base + name_offset), name_len);
+ if (!cmp) {
+ ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(inode->i_sb,
+ OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno, entry);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
}
if (cmp == 0)
break;
@@ -4041,6 +4070,10 @@ static int ocfs2_find_xe_in_bucket(struct inode *inode,
xe_name = bucket_block(bucket, block_off) + new_offset;
if (!memcmp(name, xe_name, name_len)) {
+ ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(inode->i_sb,
+ OCFS2_I(inode)->ip_blkno, xe);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
*xe_index = i;
*found = 1;
ret = 0;
@@ -4681,6 +4714,9 @@ static int ocfs2_defrag_xattr_bucket(struct inode *inode,
xe = xh->xh_entries;
end = OCFS2_XATTR_BUCKET_SIZE;
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(xh->xh_count); i++, xe++) {
+ ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(inode->i_sb, blkno, xe);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
offset = le16_to_cpu(xe->xe_name_offset);
len = namevalue_size_xe(xe);
@@ -4963,6 +4999,9 @@ static int ocfs2_divide_xattr_bucket(struct inode *inode,
name_value_len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < start; i++) {
xe = &xh->xh_entries[i];
+ ret = ocfs2_validate_xattr_entry(inode->i_sb, blk, xe);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
name_value_len += namevalue_size_xe(xe);
if (le16_to_cpu(xe->xe_name_offset) < name_offset)
name_offset = le16_to_cpu(xe->xe_name_offset);
--
2.43.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-08-06 8:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-06 8:50 ZhengYuan Huang [this message]
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-04-16 4:57 [PATCH v2] ocfs2: reject inconsistent local xattr entries gality369
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