From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@lwn.net, jslaby@suse.cz,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 6.12.102
Date: Fri, 7 Aug 2026 08:19:55 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026080754-padded-direness-c6b4@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2026080754-sway-blurt-3855@gregkh>
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 45c45c42694d..115a476fefe8 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 6
PATCHLEVEL = 12
-SUBLEVEL = 101
+SUBLEVEL = 102
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Baby Opossum Posse
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 9c6a110a52d4..5c27bca6a3e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -936,6 +936,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START(paranoid_entry)
IBRS_ENTER save_reg=%r15
UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL
+ HANDLE_INTR_SAFERET 8(%rsp)
+
RET
SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry)
@@ -1038,6 +1040,11 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry)
movl %ecx, %eax /* zero extend */
cmpq %rax, RIP+8(%rsp)
je .Lbstep_iret
+
+ VALIDATE_UNRET_END
+
+ HANDLE_INTR_SAFERET 8(%rsp)
+
cmpq $.Lgs_change, RIP+8(%rsp)
jne .Lerror_entry_done_lfence
@@ -1056,7 +1063,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry)
FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
leaq 8(%rsp), %rax /* return pt_regs pointer */
- VALIDATE_UNRET_END
RET
.Lbstep_iret:
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 2e0812a8ed77..ac6a67914b2d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -177,6 +177,53 @@
add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP; \
lfence;
+/*
+ * Helper for detecting if an interrupt occurred at an unsafe location within
+ * Safe-RET. If Safe-RET is interrupted after the CALL or LEA the RSB may get
+ * poisoned by the interrupt handler.
+ *
+ * The Safe-RET sequence is:
+ *
+ * CALL
+ * LEA 8(%RSP), %RSP
+ * RET
+ *
+ * The two CMPs below check whether RIP points to after the CALL or after the
+ * LEA.
+ *
+ * The LFENCE below is to address this particular speculation case:
+ *
+ * 1. Userspace runs and poisons the BTB around the safe-RET routine
+ *
+ * 2. Userspace triggers some kind of exception
+ *
+ * 3. Kernel executes error_entry() and mis-speculates the branch into thinking
+ * it actually came from kernel space
+ *
+ * 4. The kernel then further mis-speculates that the exception occurred due
+ * to an interrupted safe-RET
+ *
+ * 5. The handle_interrupted_saferet() routine speculatively executes and
+ * speculatively does a safe-RET. But this is unsafe since it was never
+ * untrained.
+ *
+ * The LFENCE fixes this by ensuring step 5 is never reached speculatively.
+ * Note that this LFENCE only occurs if safe-RET was actually interrupted (so
+ * it's outside of the normal path).
+ *
+ * (The 128 below is RIP offset, used as a naked number here for ease of
+ * backporting).
+ */
+#define __HANDLE_INTR_SAFERET(name, pt_regs) \
+ cmpq $(name), 128+pt_regs; \
+ jb 1f; \
+ cmpq $(name)+5, 128+pt_regs; \
+ ja 1f; \
+ lfence; \
+ leaq pt_regs, %rdi; \
+ call handle_interrupted_saferet; \
+ 1:
+
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
/*
@@ -306,6 +353,14 @@
#define UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL \
__UNTRAIN_RET X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB, __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL)
+.macro HANDLE_INTR_SAFERET pt_regs
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \
+ __stringify(__HANDLE_INTR_SAFERET(srso_safe_ret, \pt_regs)), X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
+ __stringify(__HANDLE_INTR_SAFERET(srso_alias_safe_ret, \pt_regs)), X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
+
+#endif
+.endm
.macro CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
@@ -639,6 +694,10 @@ static __always_inline void x86_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
x86_clear_cpu_buffers();
}
+void srso_safe_ret(void);
+void srso_alias_safe_ret(void);
+void handle_interrupted_saferet(struct pt_regs *regs);
+
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 12544fdcadd6..9a0abeaccd6f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -3523,3 +3523,42 @@ void __warn_thunk(void)
{
WARN_ONCE(1, "Unpatched return thunk in use. This should not happen!\n");
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
+/*
+ * Called during exception/interrupt entry if interrupted during the
+ * safe-RET sequence. The safe-RET sequence consists of 3 instructions:
+ *
+ * CALL
+ * LEA 8(%RSP), %RSP
+ * RET
+ *
+ * An interrupt after the CALL or after the LEA could potentially lead
+ * to branch predictor poisoning and results in the sequence not being
+ * able to be safely resumed.
+ *
+ * Therefore, modify the regs state as if the remaining part of the
+ * safe-RET sequence executed so the interrupt returns back to the
+ * desired return target, instead of the to the safe-RET sequence.
+ */
+void noinstr handle_interrupted_saferet(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ unsigned long rip = regs->ip;
+
+ if (rip == (unsigned long) srso_safe_ret ||
+ rip == (unsigned long) srso_alias_safe_ret) {
+ /* Modify stack pointer as if LEA executed: */
+ regs->sp += 8;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Adjust registers as if RET executed:
+ *
+ * 1. Read the return address off the stack and into rIP:
+ */
+ regs->ip = *(unsigned long *)(regs->sp);
+
+ /* 2. Pop rIP off the stack: */
+ regs->sp += 8;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 614fb9aee2ff..bc66ce29ccc8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -168,10 +168,24 @@ __EXPORT_THUNK(srso_alias_untrain_ret)
.pushsection .text..__x86.rethunk_safe
SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(srso_alias_safe_ret)
+
+ /*
+ * Tell objtool that those are not function pointers referenced by
+ * __HANDLE_INTR_SAFERET(). Below too.
+ */
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+
+ /*
+ * Safe-RET sequence. If you need to change it, adjust
+ * handle_interrupted_saferet() too.
+ */
lea 8(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_SP
UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+
+ ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
ret
+ /* End of Safe-RET sequence */
int3
SYM_FUNC_END(srso_alias_safe_ret)
@@ -206,8 +220,14 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(srso_untrain_ret)
* the stack.
*/
SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+ /*
+ * Safe-RET sequence. If you need to change it, adjust
+ * handle_interrupted_saferet() too.
+ */
lea 8(%_ASM_SP), %_ASM_SP
ret
+ /* End of Safe-RET sequence */
+
int3
int3
/* end of movabs */
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-07 6:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-07 6:19 Linux 6.12.102 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-07 6:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
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