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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-68202: ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2026 13:58:39 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026081011-CVE-2026-68202-e7fa@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ALSA: seq: close a re-opened queue timer in the destructor

queue_delete() closes the queue timer, then frees it. snd_seq_timer_close()
clears q->timer->timeri. snd_use_lock_sync() then drains borrowers, and
snd_seq_timer_delete() frees q->timer.

A borrower can re-open the timer inside that window. A SET_QUEUE_CLIENT
that took a queueptr() use_lock reference before the queue was unlinked
runs snd_seq_timer_open() after the close. Open refuses re-open only while
timeri is set, and the close just cleared it, so it re-opens timeri.

snd_seq_timer_delete() does not close that instance. Its snd_seq_timer_stop()
is a no-op, because running was cleared first. So it frees q->timer with the
instance still live. The queue is freed next.

The instance stays on the global timer with callback_data pointing at the
freed queue. A non-owner START on the unlocked queue arms it. The next tick
derefs the freed queue in snd_seq_timer_interrupt().

Reachable by an unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/seq. No CAP and
no queue ownership required.

Close any lingering instance in the destructor. There, ->timeri can no
longer change: the queue is unlinked and all use_lock borrowers have
drained, so no snd_seq_queue_use() can re-open it. Close it before clearing
q->timer. snd_timer_close() waits for any in-flight snd_seq_timer_interrupt()
to finish, and that callback still reads q->timer (via snd_seq_check_queue()),
so q->timer must stay valid until it drains.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-68202 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 2.6.12 with commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and fixed in 6.6.148 with commit fb40d03ed792a8a8bf77aa0ee15df57b0ff78b07
	Issue introduced in 2.6.12 with commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and fixed in 6.12.101 with commit 24f0cabf173539f048946c8fc221131dc221f277
	Issue introduced in 2.6.12 with commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and fixed in 6.18.42 with commit 6a10025c7fd09a7d2af37a3ae1da188569fce470
	Issue introduced in 2.6.12 with commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and fixed in 7.1.6 with commit 31a6163e301d832060f8236f1ed17cbc1ca198df
	Issue introduced in 2.6.12 with commit 1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 and fixed in 7.2-rc5 with commit 2c4dc0ed50b05cd847a4b34b8cebf0775f19aeb9

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-68202
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb40d03ed792a8a8bf77aa0ee15df57b0ff78b07
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24f0cabf173539f048946c8fc221131dc221f277
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a10025c7fd09a7d2af37a3ae1da188569fce470
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31a6163e301d832060f8236f1ed17cbc1ca198df
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2c4dc0ed50b05cd847a4b34b8cebf0775f19aeb9

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-08-10 12:05 UTC|newest]

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