Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] Implement LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS

["Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>]

Thanks Justin, it's now merged in the Landlock next branch.

On Sun, Aug 09, 2026 at 11:45:18AM -0400, Justin Suess wrote:
> Howdy
> 
> This series adds a new landlock_restrict_self(2) flag:
> LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS.
> 
> The flag sets the no_new_privs attribute of the calling thread only
> once the enforcement of the ruleset succeeded: no_new_privs is set if
> and only if the landlock_restrict_self(2) call succeeds.
> 
> Semantics:
> 
> A single call replaces the usual prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) +
> landlock_restrict_self(2) pair.  Because no_new_privs is set by the
> call itself, the no_new_privs/CAP_SYS_ADMIN precondition is fulfilled
> by construction, so the flag is usable by unprivileged processes.  This
> is safe for the same reason the prctl(2) pair is: the executed programs
> can either gain privileges or be restricted, never both.
> 
> The two states cannot diverge.  A failed call (invalid ruleset FD,
> E2BIG, ENOMEM, interrupted TSYNC, ...) leaves no_new_privs unchanged,
> and a successful call never returns without no_new_privs set: the
> attribute is set past the last point of failure, right before
> commit_creds(), which cannot fail.
> 
> Combined with LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC, no_new_privs is set on all
> threads with the same guarantee: each sibling thread sets it in the
> commit phase of the TSYNC protocol, after its all-or-nothing barrier,
> so either every thread gets both the domain and no_new_privs, or none
> does.  This also makes it possible to set no_new_privs process-wide in
> one call, which prctl(2) cannot do.
> 
> The flag requires a ruleset: calls with a ruleset_fd of -1 are
> rejected.  Such a call would be nothing more than a Landlock-flavored
> prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS), and rejecting it keeps the option of giving
> it a meaning later.
> 
> Following Mickaël's feedback on v3 [1], a new preparatory patch first
> moves the no_new_privs/CAP_SYS_ADMIN check after the flags check, in
> the same order as seccomp(2).  Unprivileged callers passing unknown
> flag bits now consistently get EINVAL instead of EPERM, whether or not
> the new flag is involved; the selftests pin this error ordering.
> 
> The Landlock ABI version is bumped to 11.
> 
> Test coverage:
> 
> base_test checks that a successful call sets no_new_privs without a
> prior prctl(2) nor CAP_SYS_ADMIN, that a failed call (invalid ruleset
> FD or layer maximum) leaves it unchanged, that the flag requires a
> ruleset FD, and the flags-before-privileges error ordering.
> tsync_test checks, through variants of a common multi_threaded
> fixture, that TSYNC sets no_new_privs on sibling threads along with
> the domain, and that a TSYNC call failing on the layer maximum leaves
> it unset on every thread.
> 
> Changes since v3:
> 
> - New preparatory patch: check the landlock_restrict_self(2) flags
>   before the no_new_privs/CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement, like seccomp(2),
>   per Mickaël's feedback.  The EINVAL/EPERM visible change now stems
>   from this patch instead of the new flag.
> - Folded the minimal selftest changes (ABI version, last-flag, and
>   checks-ordering updates) into the main patch to keep the series
>   bisectable, following the commit tweaked by Mickaël in his next
>   branch.
> - Dropped the set_no_new_privs local variable; the flag is now checked
>   directly at both use sites.
> - Turned the multi_threaded_{success,no_new_privs,
>   no_new_privs_max_layers} tests into variants of a common
>   multi_threaded fixture.
> - Reworded the documentation: removed the ambiguous "it"s in the
>   tutorial paragraph on CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and used the suggested
>   "call (or CAP_SYS_ADMIN use)" wording in both the compatibility
>   section and the uapi kdoc.
> 
> Per-patch changelogs are below each patch.
> 
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20260803223109.707353-1-utilityemal77@gmail.com/
> 
> Justin Suess (5):
>   landlock: Check landlock_restrict_self(2)'s flags before privileges
>   landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS
>   selftests/landlock: Test LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS
>   landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS
>   samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS to sampler
> 
>  Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst      |  47 +++++++-
>  include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                 |  13 +++
>  samples/landlock/sandboxer.c                  |  16 ++-
>  security/landlock/limits.h                    |   2 +-
>  security/landlock/syscalls.c                  |  35 ++++--
>  security/landlock/tsync.c                     |   8 +-
>  security/landlock/tsync.h                     |   4 +-
>  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c  | 104 +++++++++++++++++-
>  tools/testing/selftests/landlock/tsync_test.c |  96 ++++++++++++++--
>  9 files changed, 283 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
> 
> -- 
> 2.55.0
> 
>