All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@linux.dev>
To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Cc: paul@pbarker.dev
Subject: [OE-core][PATCH v3 2/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3714
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2026 02:28:35 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260812072842.1176341-3-junjie.cao@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260812072842.1176341-1-junjie.cao@linux.dev>

KSM merges identical anonymous pages across processes. An attacker who
can place chosen page-sized content in a victim's memory can detect the
merge through the timing of the resulting copy-on-write fault, and so
leak memory contents.

There is no upstream fix; removing the side channel means removing
deduplication. Distribution trackers describe it the same way - Debian
marks src:linux unfixed with "Inherent design limitation, can be avoided
by not using KSM", Red Hat closed its bug WONTFIX, and Ubuntu records no
upstream fix as of 2024-06-17:

  https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
  https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1931327
  https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2021-3714

Exposure requires two runtime opt-ins: ksmd must be started by the
administrator (ksm_run defaults to KSM_RUN_STOP in mm/ksm.c) and memory
is only eligible when a process asks with madvise(MADV_MERGEABLE) or
prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE). CONFIG_KSM=y is set in yocto-kernel-cache
(bsp/intel-x86 and the paravirt_kvm fragments), so this is not a
configuration exclusion.

CC: Paul Barker <paul@pbarker.dev>
AI-Generated: Uses Claude (claude-opus-5)
Signed-off-by: Junjie Cao <junjie.cao@linux.dev>
---
v3:
- use "unpatched" instead of "upstream-wontfix": the WONTFIX is a
  distribution position, not an upstream one

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/openembedded-core/20260803084827.1348810-1-junjie.cao@linux.dev/

 meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc b/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc
index 5ed4a00..af3576d 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc
+++ b/meta/recipes-kernel/linux/cve-exclusion.inc
@@ -199,3 +199,10 @@ CVE_STATUS[CVE-2025-71145] = "cpe-stable-backport: Fixed from v6.18.3"
 # https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2019-14899
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2019-14899] = "unpatched: consequence of the default weak \
 host model, no upstream kernel fix, mitigated by firewall configuration"
+
+# Timing side channel inherent to KSM page deduplication. Reachable only
+# when ksmd is started (/sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run defaults to 0) and the
+# workload opts in via MADV_MERGEABLE or prctl(PR_SET_MEMORY_MERGE).
+# https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2021-3714
+CVE_STATUS[CVE-2021-3714] = "unpatched: timing side channel inherent to \
+KSM page deduplication, only reachable when KSM is enabled and opted into"
-- 
2.43.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-08-12  5:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-12  7:28 [OE-core][PATCH v3 0/9] cve-exclusions: triage nine kernel CVEs lacking upstream fix data Junjie Cao
2026-08-12  7:28 ` [OE-core][PATCH v3 1/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2019-14899 Junjie Cao
2026-08-12  7:28 ` Junjie Cao [this message]
2026-08-12  7:28 ` [OE-core][PATCH v3 3/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2021-3864 Junjie Cao
2026-08-12  7:28 ` [OE-core][PATCH v3 4/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-0400 Junjie Cao
2026-08-12  7:28 ` [OE-core][PATCH v3 5/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-1247 Junjie Cao
2026-08-12  7:28 ` [OE-core][PATCH v3 6/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2022-4543 Junjie Cao
2026-08-12  7:28 ` [OE-core][PATCH v3 7/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-3397 Junjie Cao
2026-08-12  7:28 ` [OE-core][PATCH v3 8/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6238 Junjie Cao
2026-08-12  7:28 ` [OE-core][PATCH v3 9/9] cve-exclusions: set status for CVE-2023-6240 Junjie Cao

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260812072842.1176341-3-junjie.cao@linux.dev \
    --to=junjie.cao@linux.dev \
    --cc=openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org \
    --cc=paul@pbarker.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.