All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: yaokai34@huawei.com,peterz@infradead.org,tglx@kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash" failed to apply to 7.1-stable tree
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 09:52:52 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026081352-debate-broadband-ab5e@gregkh> (raw)


The patch below does not apply to the 7.1-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.

To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:

git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-7.1.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x 8e7ff730dd96519a333d1570edf1c3fabb6d3629
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026081352-debate-broadband-ab5e@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 7.1.y' 'HEAD^..'

Possible dependencies:



thanks,

greg k-h

------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------

From 8e7ff730dd96519a333d1570edf1c3fabb6d3629 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Yao Kai <yaokai34@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 20:55:30 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash
 resize

A task performing a custom private hash resize can remain blocked in
uninterruptible sleep indefinitely.  The hung-task detector reports:

  INFO: task futex-resizer:314 blocked for more than 10 seconds.
  task:futex-resizer state:D stack:14824 pid:314 tgid:312 ppid:311

  Call Trace:
   __schedule+0x521/0xf30
   schedule+0x22/0xa0
   futex_hash_allocate+0x3db/0x490
   __do_sys_prctl+0x6f5/0xbd0
   do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x530
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

  Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks

futex_pivot_pending() allows the resize request to continue when
either no replacement hash is pending (hash_new == NULL) or the current
hash reference count has reached zero.

After the final-reference wake, another futex task can complete the
pivot between the two observations:

  T1                                  T2

  futex_hash_allocate()
    wait_var_event(mm, ...)
      futex_pivot_pending(mm)
        hash_new != NULL
                                      futex_hash()
                                        futex_ref_get(old) -> false
                                        futex_pivot_hash(mm)
                                          hash_new = NULL
                                          __futex_pivot_hash(mm, new)
                                            rcu_assign_pointer(hash, new)
        fph = rcu_dereference(hash) /* new */
        futex_ref_is_dead(fph) -> false
      schedule()

The pivot changes the state from hash_new != NULL with a dead current
hash to hash_new == NULL with a live current hash.  Because
futex_pivot_pending() reads hash_new and hash without serialization,
the resize task can observe hash_new in the pre-pivot state and hash in
the post-pivot state, causing futex_pivot_pending() to return false even
though the pivot has completed.  The task then goes to sleep after the
wakeup has already been consumed.

Serialize state reads in futex_pivot_pending() using futex_mm_phash::lock.
This guarantees that futex_pivot_pending() observes hash_new and hash
atomically, eliminating the race condition.

Fixes: bd54df5ea7ca ("futex: Allow to resize the private local hash")
Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Yao Kai <yaokai34@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260804125530.3933754-1-yaokai34@huawei.com

diff --git a/kernel/futex/core.c b/kernel/futex/core.c
index 2650d1e52803..128c5752f225 100644
--- a/kernel/futex/core.c
+++ b/kernel/futex/core.c
@@ -1783,14 +1783,15 @@ void futex_hash_free(struct mm_struct *mm)
 
 static bool futex_pivot_pending(struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
+	struct futex_mm_phash *mmph = &mm->futex.phash;
 	struct futex_private_hash *fph;
 
-	guard(rcu)();
+	guard(mutex)(&mmph->lock);
 
-	if (!mm->futex.phash.hash_new)
+	if (!mmph->hash_new)
 		return true;
 
-	fph = rcu_dereference(mm->futex.phash.hash);
+	fph = rcu_dereference_raw(mmph->hash);
 	return futex_ref_is_dead(fph);
 }
 


             reply	other threads:[~2026-08-13  0:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-13  0:52 gregkh [this message]
2026-08-14 12:10 ` FAILED: patch "[PATCH] futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash" failed to apply to 7.1-stable tree Thomas Gleixner

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=2026081352-debate-broadband-ab5e@gregkh \
    --to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@kernel.org \
    --cc=yaokai34@huawei.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.