All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Josh Poimboeuf" <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>
Cc: "Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
	"Nathan Chancellor" <nathan@kernel.org>,
	linux-toolchains@vger.kernel.org, "Song Liu" <song@kernel.org>,
	"Petr Mladek" <pmladek@suse.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	live-patching@vger.kernel.org,
	"Joe Lawrence" <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>, "Miroslav Benes" <mbenes@suse.cz>,
	"Nick Desaulniers" <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 01/12] arm64/bti: Add BTI landing pad to __sdei_asm_handler()
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2026 05:01:45 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260815050146.1C6D91F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <99226432cc316215829655c787f71a70f06d1600.1786768375.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing BTI landing pads (`bti j`) on indirect branch targets in the KPTI trampoline (`__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline` and `tramp_exit`).
- [High] The KPTI entry trampoline mapping at `TRAMP_VALIAS` lacks the BTI Guarded Page (`PTE_GP`) attribute, disabling hardware CFI checks.
--

--- Patch [1]: [PATCH 01/12] arm64/bti: Add BTI landing pad to __sdei_asm_handler() ---
commit 59fadd16326c687a5994c4bec81d9484edcc08f9
Author: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>

arm64/bti: Add BTI landing pad to __sdei_asm_handler()

With CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0, __sdei_asm_entry_trampoline() indirect
jumps to __sdei_asm_handler(). Add "bti j" to prevent a Branch Target
exception.

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> index e0db14e9c843a..16c21fcb41976 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
> @@ -976,6 +976,7 @@ NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline)

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but do we also need bti j landing pads on the
indirect branch targets for the exit paths?

For example, __sdei_asm_exit_trampoline() is called via an indirect branch
(br x5):

arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline() {
    SYM_CODE_START(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline)
        ldr x4, [x4, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_SDEI_TTBR1)]
        ...
}

Similarly, tramp_exit() in the same file lacks a landing pad despite being
called via an indirect branch (br x29) on the EL0 exit path:

arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:tramp_exit() {
    SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(tramp_exit)
        tramp_unmap_kernel x29
        ...
}

Would it be better to add bti j annotations to these functions as well to
prevent Branch Target exceptions?


[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does the KPTI trampoline mapping
need the BTI Guarded Page (PTE_GP) attribute?

Looking at map_entry_trampoline() in arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c, it uses
kernel_exec_prot() to map the trampoline text:

arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c:map_entry_trampoline() {
    pgprot_t prot = kernel_exec_prot();
    ...
    early_create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS,
                             entry_tramp_text_size(), prot,
                             pgd_pgtable_alloc_init_mm, NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS);
}

The prot variable is derived from PAGE_KERNEL_ROX, which does not appear to
contain the PTE_GP bit. Does this inadvertently disable hardware BTI enforcement
for the trampoline pages? If so, could this architectural gap be masking the
missing bti j annotations on the trampoline exit paths mentioned above?

>   * want them.
>   */
>  SYM_CODE_START(__sdei_asm_handler)
> +	bti	j
>  	stp     x2, x3, [x1, #SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_PC]
>  	stp     x4, x5, [x1, #SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + 16 * 2]
>  	stp     x6, x7, [x1, #SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + 16 * 3]

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/cover.1786768375.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org?part=1

  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-15  5:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-15  4:45 [PATCH 00/12] arm64/bti: Fix kernel BTI issues with livepatch, large kernels, toolchains Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 01/12] arm64/bti: Add BTI landing pad to __sdei_asm_handler() Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  5:01   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 02/12] arm64/module: Fix BTI exceptions caused by omitted landing pads in Clang 21 Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  5:00   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-15  9:56   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 03/12] arm64/bti: Fix BTI linker failures with long branches into .idmap.text Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 04/12] arm64/bti: Work around ld crash caused by linker script aliases Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 05/12] arm64/bti: Add link error for large kernels with BTI and unsupported toolchains Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 06/12] arm64/bti: Add link error for large kernels with BTI and livepatch Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 07/12] arm64/bti: Advertise BTI in assembly objects Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  5:03   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 08/12] arm64/bti: Enable BTI in the pi/ startup code Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 09/12] efi/libstub: Preserve the GNU property note Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 10/12] efi/libstub: Remove obsolete .note.gnu.property workaround Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 11/12] arm64/bti: Force-enable BTI linker veneers Josh Poimboeuf
2026-08-15  5:00   ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-15  4:45 ` [PATCH 12/12] arm64/bti: Enable kernel BTI for GCC Josh Poimboeuf

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260815050146.1C6D91F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
    --to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
    --cc=ardb@kernel.org \
    --cc=broonie@kernel.org \
    --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \
    --cc=joe.lawrence@redhat.com \
    --cc=jpoimboe@kernel.org \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-toolchains@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=live-patching@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mbenes@suse.cz \
    --cc=nathan@kernel.org \
    --cc=ndesaulniers@google.com \
    --cc=pmladek@suse.com \
    --cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=song@kernel.org \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.