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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-72441: ieee802154: fix kernel-infoleak in dgram_recvmsg()
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2026 15:08:40 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026081529-CVE-2026-72441-b58c@gregkh> (raw)

From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>

Description
===========

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ieee802154: fix kernel-infoleak in dgram_recvmsg()

KMSAN reported a kernel-infoleak in move_addr_to_user():

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user
include/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _inline_copy_to_user
include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120
lib/usercopy.c:26
 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]
 _inline_copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
 _copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120 lib/usercopy.c:26
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
 move_addr_to_user+0x2e7/0x440 net/socket.c:302
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x232/0x610 net/socket.c:2925
 ...
 Uninit was stored to memory at:
 ieee802154_addr_to_sa include/net/ieee802154_netdev.h:369 [inline]
 dgram_recvmsg+0xa09/0xbe0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:739

The issue occurs because the `pan_id` field of `struct ieee802154_addr`
is left uninitialized when the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`.
The execution flow is as follows:

1. `__ieee802154_rx_handle_packet()` declares a local `struct
ieee802154_hdr hdr` on the stack.
2. `ieee802154_hdr_pull()` calls `ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` to parse
the source and destination addresses into this structure.
3. If the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`,
`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` previously only set the `mode` field,
leaving the `pan_id` field containing uninitialized stack memory.
4. This uninitialized `pan_id` is later copied into a `struct
sockaddr_ieee802154` in `dgram_recvmsg()` via `ieee802154_addr_to_sa()`.
5. Finally, `move_addr_to_user()` copies the socket address structure to
user space, leaking the uninitialized bytes.

Fix this by using `memset` to zero out the address structure in
`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` when the mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`.

The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-72441 to this issue.


Affected and fixed versions
===========================

	Issue introduced in 3.15 with commit 94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d and fixed in 5.10.261 with commit a2ee1a038a16e286d084bc293a7522d010a59ec3
	Issue introduced in 3.15 with commit 94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d and fixed in 5.15.212 with commit 09cfe665f2c5d7a8a5ed4d6b487434a011325368
	Issue introduced in 3.15 with commit 94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d and fixed in 6.1.178 with commit c88e687e44cb9c7690f5039a5a5941dba1f6a204
	Issue introduced in 3.15 with commit 94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d and fixed in 6.6.145 with commit 71b5add66c51d6764325de5f2e300bbf4f39e7a6
	Issue introduced in 3.15 with commit 94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d and fixed in 6.12.97 with commit fc8766467b53335220b4b594ba15bc8f8cee0c76
	Issue introduced in 3.15 with commit 94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d and fixed in 6.18.40 with commit de3bd9809af7555611334cb6a071806744430ef7
	Issue introduced in 3.15 with commit 94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d and fixed in 7.1.5 with commit f14802465f5956baafe5f4b4541eb626b06b41f1
	Issue introduced in 3.15 with commit 94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d and fixed in 7.2-rc1 with commit 4db86f8ab11b5a41bfc36680be837e6ac1375ec6

Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.

Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions.  The official CVE entry at
	https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-72441
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.


Affected files
==============

The file(s) affected by this issue are:
	net/ieee802154/header_ops.c


Mitigation
==========

The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes.  Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release.  Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all.  If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2ee1a038a16e286d084bc293a7522d010a59ec3
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09cfe665f2c5d7a8a5ed4d6b487434a011325368
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c88e687e44cb9c7690f5039a5a5941dba1f6a204
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71b5add66c51d6764325de5f2e300bbf4f39e7a6
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc8766467b53335220b4b594ba15bc8f8cee0c76
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de3bd9809af7555611334cb6a071806744430ef7
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f14802465f5956baafe5f4b4541eb626b06b41f1
	https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4db86f8ab11b5a41bfc36680be837e6ac1375ec6

                 reply	other threads:[~2026-08-15  6:28 UTC|newest]

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