From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-72159: ocfs2: reject non-inline dinodes with i_size and zero i_clusters
Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2026 15:03:58 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026081535-CVE-2026-72159-481a@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: reject non-inline dinodes with i_size and zero i_clusters
On a volume mounted without OCFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SPARSE_ALLOC, a
non-inline regular file with non-zero i_size and zero i_clusters is
structurally malformed: the extent map declares no allocated clusters yet
the size header claims content exists. Keep rejecting that shape, but
express it through a shared predicate so the same invariant is available
to normal inode reads and online filecheck.
The same zero-cluster shape is also malformed for non-inline directories.
ocfs2 directory growth allocates backing storage before advancing i_size,
and ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el() later walks until ctx->pos reaches
i_size_read(inode). A forged directory dinode with a huge i_size and no
clusters would repeatedly fail on holes while advancing through the
claimed size.
Sparse regular files remain exempt: on sparse-alloc volumes, truncate can
legitimately grow i_size without allocating clusters. System inodes and
inline-data dinodes also retain their separate storage rules.
Mirror the check in ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block() as well.
filecheck reports through its own error namespace, so malformed
size/cluster state is logged as a filecheck invalid-inode result rather
than via ocfs2_error(), but it must not proceed into
ocfs2_populate_inode().
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-72159 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 2.6.29 with commit b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12 and fixed in 5.10.261 with commit 416d3e5f8a30ed04fe21ba7dc73c2841c3b56265
Issue introduced in 2.6.29 with commit b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12 and fixed in 5.15.212 with commit ed0f938f946f16b772e99cb8c277ab57828e5be4
Issue introduced in 2.6.29 with commit b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12 and fixed in 6.1.178 with commit 83f6756a7b71adec0a41ae68e079a38906d59c6c
Issue introduced in 2.6.29 with commit b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12 and fixed in 6.6.145 with commit 38c1ef7ce50eb4af0f89038b8aba12396ddb9233
Issue introduced in 2.6.29 with commit b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12 and fixed in 6.12.97 with commit d837068eefbc2651fe5789bf75a0f945710f7b8e
Issue introduced in 2.6.29 with commit b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12 and fixed in 6.18.40 with commit 2174c68f623b74bd8690a4a6a4a52882d8ac3dc3
Issue introduced in 2.6.29 with commit b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12 and fixed in 7.1.5 with commit 3bfeb436d4be6a2beb56cab344770e93e6b07260
Issue introduced in 2.6.29 with commit b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12 and fixed in 7.2-rc1 with commit 7ebc672fab7a76e1e47e0f2fc1ee48118d27fde4
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-72159
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
fs/ocfs2/inode.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/416d3e5f8a30ed04fe21ba7dc73c2841c3b56265
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed0f938f946f16b772e99cb8c277ab57828e5be4
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83f6756a7b71adec0a41ae68e079a38906d59c6c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38c1ef7ce50eb4af0f89038b8aba12396ddb9233
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d837068eefbc2651fe5789bf75a0f945710f7b8e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2174c68f623b74bd8690a4a6a4a52882d8ac3dc3
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bfeb436d4be6a2beb56cab344770e93e6b07260
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ebc672fab7a76e1e47e0f2fc1ee48118d27fde4
reply other threads:[~2026-08-15 6:14 UTC|newest]
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