From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6845912FF69 for ; Sun, 16 Aug 2026 16:07:33 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786896454; cv=none; b=E/994p/gqwQEG06NBip+vt7uzE1O5fwfP6BWEZCoTC5xLJ5qF0U1OcVzq/4xbi39SfTIzVpr43ffBZKyjPZbcsJBLE/K4FUXIRrO0Ly1MmGA1udvM0CMBLq9XrcFPz20k5WbZIE2Ze38CNI51q+joMfWxxeWRMYDKf7D24tMXIc= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786896454; c=relaxed/simple; bh=y9apfKBKHuZX2aKnnK4xJ8f7amO8VAVaexY/s1uhizM=; h=From:Subject:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Date: Message-Id; b=Shnvdo76sL7kmdg0u67AyS+pZI49LBU6uz6t376crs7n52tHE/PzoCjC4gAVDa3kRO4pBcCG07QxGq/MGzF43+Yy+bxcZl+6BPCyZWXfmpwmwezdpMKEc2gDWc8AhR4iJvjlcqiyhjI+BXOKBVWGgRX6GkvZjadQDWNkatLSRrQ= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=VfJ8kIC7; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="VfJ8kIC7" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E93661F000E9; Sun, 16 Aug 2026 16:07:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1786896453; bh=bgyP5Gwux8Jvs8xIiUxw7T3e8FKIh3N5oWFA0SLGgHI=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=VfJ8kIC7bHIgF+FXBGef23uLdVkEEALXsLsEGQb7pSEVBrfPV75A4B02sXIR+SlSa 0vtkwtBUkqEzV6h+pB17oEAnyonBAHQ9zABh8mo6m6uxY0gAKbHQmQsWITL8fterot lov+0Q139XnjAYndfAk6z1fcle8+t7rPhv/SXNrg7V1r2BZf26DOFh6wpITbKjrvE/ Mp3eEXVOlb01QQMS7sZNCpVJHGAh+hJF/c6VsDGM91G4UY7XEksFIX5OwL1xHC6EvS tm+ZPV/NCHps/TiCCxEEfJlBxjyhGcFajnLqa31F9pMXWkGeDTHE9JYxUHZbMj9qv2 RrJzKojp1lo4g== From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH net 2/2] net/iucv: take a private, writable frame before rewriting it in place Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev To: "Bryam Vargas" Cc: "Heiko Carstens" , "Alexander Gordeev" , "Christian Borntraeger" , "Vasily Gorbik" , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20260815-b4-disp-dc82fde4-v1-2-e83b10b22ce9@proton.me> References: <20260815-b4-disp-dc82fde4-v1-0-e83b10b22ce9@proton.me> <20260815-b4-disp-dc82fde4-v1-2-e83b10b22ce9@proton.me> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Sun, 16 Aug 2026 16:07:32 +0000 Message-Id: <20260816160732.E93661F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(= s) to consider: Pre-existing issues: - [High] Unprotected socket state modification from softirq context -- --- Patch [2]: [PATCH net 2/2] net/iucv: take a private, writable frame bef= ore rewriting it in place --- commit 656ba922e59efdf102e7aa3950857e3c0061f9b8 Author: Bryam Vargas net/iucv: take a private, writable frame before rewriting it in place This commit modifies afiucv_hs_rcv() to take a private, writable copy of the socket buffer before rewriting the frame in place. It unshares the skb and uses skb_cow_head() to ensure enough headroom. Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260813-b4-disp-60433a46-v1-1-509e1= 200533e@proton.me?part=3D1 > diff --git a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c > index e3ec965d96ca7..10cfc5e82f047 100644 > --- a/net/iucv/af_iucv.c > +++ b/net/iucv/af_iucv.c > @@ -2069,11 +2069,20 @@ static int afiucv_hs_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb, str= uct net_device *dev, > return NET_RX_SUCCESS; > } > =20 [ ... ] [Severity: High] This is a pre-existing issue, but while reviewing this file I noticed an unprotected socket state modification: net/iucv/af_iucv.c:afiucv_hs_callback_txnotify() { ... if (sk->sk_state =3D=3D IUCV_CONNECTED) { sk->sk_state =3D IUCV_DISCONN; sk->sk_state_change(sk); } ... } Does this modification risk corrupting the socket state? When qeth hardware issues TX completions, qeth_notify_skbs() is called from softirq (NAPI) context and invokes afiucv_hs_callback_txnotify(). This modifies sk->sk_state directly without acquiring the socket lock or checking sock_owned_by_user(). Could this lead to missed state transitions or concurrent execution with process-context operations that assume exclusive access under lock_sock()? --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260815-b4-disp-dc= 82fde4-v1-0-e83b10b22ce9@proton.me?part=3D2