From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0E5543D7D8D; Mon, 17 Aug 2026 14:47:45 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786978066; cv=none; b=RWC1iNs7bODJG8YeTNA5BzZ4UIx1KX/1dL43q6/vj0cuhXNSbncsrMOk2LnGEJOGwGWf0ZQqW9i6Cuvc1lySQpeogcO+Odm0yCssDP3jFx/Yyp8JtFlTGxTh42AT16dGsoVWEmKnbFyZkpcxrZ+hKnqebzKoF0Dikdwe52JWOYE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1786978066; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Q1wUJOXQVC9aqhhgqs/sPW1O74Ye7GOZcUSsyXgsEis=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=D4E8/oLerc0ljTjCh7hEUxRjl2jFN6X1p33/07Gt+AtDwVPjFC8rVF8LQbG5qMQPrNqu/8ReaOIgj3fkS2uYvDck3NfTB+GPJpDWxZC9LuTsCeE2y8rK/39im7MGo9fFtwUoDx5ZJXQmSuZYg024xGi9yLInI0OEvEG8wccnS8A= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=rvGzg3Oi; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="rvGzg3Oi" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 665D61F000E9; Mon, 17 Aug 2026 14:47:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1786978065; bh=9RG1MI8+n+eXRd4WyUcyKaRlEAaWkXQsh724X2SPy7U=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=rvGzg3OiICs+SsuCcO4V8TBzgFotrbWWVZQjwo0jec1GdRbWtvcuhHKQKaMyqpPsM Di5kur2rKNvGGs8A8KB1mu5hMmEkOL8wpdBLaurQlSqcbDPwFDy8vU62C3b8UWuIsp gpyMc49rCXZXeY0SV9//LUM2Q75/2sPuS7qcfGrk= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Qihang Tang , Willem de Bruijn , Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH 6.12 090/181] packet: use consistent hard_header_len in non-ring send paths Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2026 15:33:04 +0200 Message-ID: <20260817132538.989375612@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260817132535.394764707@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260817132535.394764707@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Qihang Tang commit 03390aa32e669cc4ecd7d34108e2e1afc13d689d upstream. packet_snd() reads dev->hard_header_len multiple times while allocating and constructing an skb. Device reconfiguration can change this value concurrently, for example through bonding device type changes. For SOCK_RAW, packet_snd() can save a larger value in reserve and later allocate headroom using a smaller value. Moving skb->data back by reserve then places it before skb->head, and the following copy from userspace can attempt an out-of-bounds write. packet_sendmsg_spkt() has the same issue because it calculates its reservation and header offset from separate reads before dropping the RCU read lock to allocate the skb. Add LL_RESERVED_SPACE_EX() for callers that already saved a header length. Read hard_header_len once in packet_snd() and use it for allocation and construction. In packet_sendmsg_spkt(), preserve the allocation-time value through the device lookup retry. The separate SOCK_DGRAM consistency problem between hard_header_len and header_ops->create is not addressed here. Fixes: b84bbaf7a6c8 ("packet: in packet_snd start writing at link layer allocation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Qihang Tang Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260805125729.19220-3-q.h.hack.winter@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- include/linux/netdevice.h | 6 ++++-- net/packet/af_packet.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/netdevice.h +++ b/include/linux/netdevice.h @@ -297,9 +297,11 @@ struct hh_cache { * We could use other alignment values, but we must maintain the * relationship HH alignment <= LL alignment. */ -#define LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) \ - ((((dev)->hard_header_len + READ_ONCE((dev)->needed_headroom)) \ +#define LL_RESERVED_SPACE_EX(dev, hlen) \ + ((((hlen) + READ_ONCE((dev)->needed_headroom)) \ & ~(HH_DATA_MOD - 1)) + HH_DATA_MOD) +#define LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev) \ + LL_RESERVED_SPACE_EX(dev, (dev)->hard_header_len) #define LL_RESERVED_SPACE_EXTRA(dev,extra) \ ((((dev)->hard_header_len + READ_ONCE((dev)->needed_headroom) + (extra)) \ & ~(HH_DATA_MOD - 1)) + HH_DATA_MOD) --- a/net/packet/af_packet.c +++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c @@ -2005,8 +2005,9 @@ static int packet_sendmsg_spkt(struct so struct net_device *dev; struct sockcm_cookie sockc; __be16 proto = 0; - int err; + int hard_header_len; int extra_len = 0; + int err; /* * Get and verify the address. @@ -2049,14 +2050,18 @@ retry: extra_len = 4; /* We're doing our own CRC */ } + /* Keep the allocation-time header length across retry. */ + if (!skb) + hard_header_len = READ_ONCE(dev->hard_header_len); + err = -EMSGSIZE; - if (len > dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN + extra_len) + if (len > dev->mtu + hard_header_len + VLAN_HLEN + extra_len) goto out_unlock; if (!skb) { - size_t reserved = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); + size_t reserved = LL_RESERVED_SPACE_EX(dev, hard_header_len); int tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; - unsigned int hhlen = dev->header_ops ? dev->hard_header_len : 0; + unsigned int hhlen = dev->header_ops ? hard_header_len : 0; rcu_read_unlock(); skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, len + reserved + tlen, 0, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -2086,7 +2091,7 @@ retry: err = -EINVAL; goto out_unlock; } - if (len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len + extra_len) && + if (len > (dev->mtu + hard_header_len + extra_len) && !packet_extra_vlan_len_allowed(dev, skb)) { err = -EMSGSIZE; goto out_unlock; @@ -3008,7 +3013,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc int offset = 0; struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk); int vnet_hdr_sz = READ_ONCE(po->vnet_hdr_sz); - int hlen, tlen, linear; + int hard_header_len, hlen, tlen, linear; int extra_len = 0; /* @@ -3049,8 +3054,9 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc goto out_unlock; } + hard_header_len = READ_ONCE(dev->hard_header_len); if (sock->type == SOCK_RAW) - reserve = dev->hard_header_len; + reserve = hard_header_len; if (vnet_hdr_sz) { err = packet_snd_vnet_parse(msg, &len, &vnet_hdr, vnet_hdr_sz); if (err) @@ -3071,10 +3077,10 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc goto out_unlock; err = -ENOBUFS; - hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(dev); + hlen = LL_RESERVED_SPACE_EX(dev, hard_header_len); tlen = dev->needed_tailroom; linear = __virtio16_to_cpu(vio_le(), vnet_hdr.hdr_len); - linear = max(linear, min_t(int, len, dev->hard_header_len)); + linear = max(linear, min_t(int, len, hard_header_len)); skb = packet_alloc_skb(sk, hlen + tlen, hlen, len, linear, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err); if (skb == NULL) @@ -3090,7 +3096,7 @@ static int packet_snd(struct socket *soc } else if (reserve) { skb_reserve(skb, -reserve); if (len < reserve + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) && - dev->min_header_len != dev->hard_header_len) + dev->min_header_len != hard_header_len) skb_reset_network_header(skb); }