From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 62AD5356758 for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2026 19:58:44 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787083125; cv=none; b=H+uMKDu03PpZpkpAWpQouuiKaLUEVIvTSgl6sL2p+2RLKcgRQ0fLQkU8PztWpcHWJplSTTPd8MS1gGzFepvmhaVYgG242N0HGGJmdfFckV2RzyohFZw7P2zvkShNgo2PLChpV+s53Az4SzQpSS2HUp8VymC46vvxPV1r3E9QuvQ= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787083125; c=relaxed/simple; bh=XueumaBGTHUqLmHFSNXsdYgTR1Kl+Se4NQouYhs67fM=; h=From:Subject:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Date: Message-Id; b=J0rFTM8BGcA/cU9IOdRlT9kcGjpFuwmmwtw9RFFm3SWWaEstOEXYrDWqf7yqDTXcRpr3TYbxAF0eoNhCmT5hSmjtpABa2lxxxYJv9S21Fd8rt3O9OiBJm+/HWiROnhOXPFFlGiLYCSh3ua7sUKiyVTnZuUqtLcR+RY97TMdVsqI= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Vs+LLolp; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Vs+LLolp" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 3E32E1F000E9 for ; Tue, 18 Aug 2026 19:58:44 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1787083124; bh=AsyCluSs8c6u04TbUcS+67K84BYIw24oX0NJdY3ikkY=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=Vs+LLolpTWQg73rDDczBLeGhIECXnZRrHpq/H3nAdb+IIIc8tbYEtUZhKNeD1ync3 0kxxsHW1o/DXIkeW6sXjYkaMlphC8OQ0YqTPx9JXrOYp3y/iEz5W2rKnk2PZ7Eof40 ZfJsdBz2o726mbDiO0vqRQW3uH+06yf2Z3GbO2t5PKVue8FY2Im/W9dDJrPwpY1Csh t2be8gkwFFxttO2ASH6HKo/8AckIdFv4Cv4nAAjjCBmQW/AbKszx6mGq4kY5ytPr0D S/quR2RSwScy3VJ9fyLu4YWBi3rVv3HlKkEl9hLQEAR450dyoR/FIXJSnrVq0XRGZd W5M+SxiUSVjeg== From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] selinux: require EXECMEM or PTRACE for FOLL_FORCE introspection Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20260818-selinux-pokemem-v1-3-90cd2357ee05@google.com> References: <20260818-selinux-pokemem-v1-0-90cd2357ee05@google.com> <20260818-selinux-pokemem-v1-3-90cd2357ee05@google.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2026 19:58:43 +0000 Message-Id: <20260818195844.3E32E1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: > On systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, ensure that a process c= an > only create anonymous executable memory via /proc/self/mem if it has one > of: >=20 > - EXECMEM (like for other methods of creating anonymous executable pages) > - PTRACE (like when using /proc/$pid/mem of another process) >=20 > This closes a hole in EXECMEM enforcement that Project Zero has used in a > remote Android exploit chain: > It was possible to use a memory corruption bug in a service without EXECM= EM > permission to overwrite executable code via /proc/self/mem, which made it > possible to load and run shellcode with a kernel exploit. >=20 > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great! --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260818-selinux-po= kemem-v1-0-90cd2357ee05@google.com?part=3D3