From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>,
"Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>,
Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>,
Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>, Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.1.y 2/2] xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2026 05:56:50 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260824095650.4068172-2-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260824095650.4068172-1-sashal@kernel.org>
From: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
[ Upstream commit 813f8136a2ce1fee266d02a7df73db6e8a541604 ]
xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a
buffer log item's bitmap into the buffer read for that item:
memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT),
item->ri_buf[i].iov_base,
nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT);
The destination offset (bit/nbits, from the logged dirty bitmap) and the
buffer size (from the logged blf_len) are both attacker-controlled and
otherwise unrelated, yet the only thing bounding the copy is an ASSERT(),
which compiles away on production kernels. A crafted image logging a
small blf_len together with a bitmap bit past the end of that buffer
drives the memcpy() past the buffer's allocation, corrupting adjacent
kernel heap during mount-time log recovery. This is reachable by anyone
who can get a crafted image mounted -- the malicious-filesystem threat
model XFS already guards against elsewhere.
Turn the ASSERT() into a real XFS_IS_CORRUPT() check that aborts recovery
of the buffer with -EFSCORRUPTED, consistent with the validate-and-fail
idiom already used in xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer() and
xfs_dquot_item_recover.c. xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() therefore becomes
STATIC int and its three callers propagate the error.
Found and confirmed with KASAN on a CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=n build: the crafted
image trips a slab-out-of-bounds write before this change and fails
recovery cleanly with -EFSCORRUPTED after it.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov <security@auditcode.ai>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
[ dropped the `xlog_recover_do_primary_sb_buffer()` error-propagation hunk and its primary-SB/rtsb arm since that helper doesn't exist, keeping only the `error = 0;` reset ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c
index e956d7ca68ad9..39ca2c658c10b 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_buf_item_recover.c
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(
* given buffer. The bitmap in the buf log format structure indicates
* where to place the logged data.
*/
-STATIC void
+STATIC int
xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xlog_recover_item *item,
@@ -469,8 +469,24 @@ xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(
ASSERT(nbits > 0);
ASSERT(item->ri_buf[i].iov_base != NULL);
ASSERT(item->ri_buf[i].iov_len % XFS_BLF_CHUNK == 0);
- ASSERT(BBTOB(bp->b_length) >=
- ((uint)bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT) + (nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT));
+ /*
+ * The bitmap is only trustworthy to the extent that it
+ * describes a region that actually fits inside the buffer we
+ * read in based on the (attacker-controlled) blf_len. Do not
+ * rely on an ASSERT() for this -- it compiles away entirely on
+ * non-DEBUG kernels, which is exactly where this matters, so
+ * validate it for real and abort recovery of this buffer rather
+ * than copying past the end of it.
+ */
+ if (XFS_IS_CORRUPT(mp, BBTOB(bp->b_length) <
+ ((uint)bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT) +
+ (nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT))) {
+ xfs_alert(mp,
+ "Bad buffer log item dirty bitmap (bit %d, nbits %d) for %d-byte buffer at daddr 0x%llx.",
+ bit, nbits, BBTOB(bp->b_length),
+ xfs_buf_daddr(bp));
+ return -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ }
/*
* The dirty regions logged in the buffer, even though
@@ -524,6 +540,7 @@ xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(
ASSERT(i == item->ri_total);
xlog_recover_validate_buf_type(mp, bp, buf_f, current_lsn);
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -532,10 +549,10 @@ xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(
* (ie. USR or GRP), then just toss this buffer away; don't recover it.
* Else, treat it as a regular buffer and do recovery.
*
- * Return false if the buffer was tossed and true if we recovered the buffer to
- * indicate to the caller if the buffer needs writing.
+ * Return 0 if the buffer was not recovered (tossed), 1 if it was recovered and
+ * needs writing, or a negative errno if recovery of the buffer failed.
*/
-STATIC bool
+STATIC int
xlog_recover_do_dquot_buffer(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xlog *log,
@@ -544,6 +561,7 @@ xlog_recover_do_dquot_buffer(
struct xfs_buf_log_format *buf_f)
{
uint type;
+ int error;
trace_xfs_log_recover_buf_dquot_buf(log, buf_f);
@@ -551,7 +569,7 @@ xlog_recover_do_dquot_buffer(
* Filesystems are required to send in quota flags at mount time.
*/
if (!mp->m_qflags)
- return false;
+ return 0;
type = 0;
if (buf_f->blf_flags & XFS_BLF_UDQUOT_BUF)
@@ -564,10 +582,12 @@ xlog_recover_do_dquot_buffer(
* This type of quotas was turned off, so ignore this buffer
*/
if (log->l_quotaoffs_flag & type)
- return false;
+ return 0;
- xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(mp, item, bp, buf_f, NULLCOMMITLSN);
- return true;
+ error = xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(mp, item, bp, buf_f, NULLCOMMITLSN);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ return 1;
}
/*
@@ -962,13 +982,16 @@ xlog_recover_buf_commit_pass2(
goto out_release;
} else if (buf_f->blf_flags &
(XFS_BLF_UDQUOT_BUF|XFS_BLF_PDQUOT_BUF|XFS_BLF_GDQUOT_BUF)) {
- bool dirty;
-
- dirty = xlog_recover_do_dquot_buffer(mp, log, item, bp, buf_f);
- if (!dirty)
+ error = xlog_recover_do_dquot_buffer(mp, log, item, bp, buf_f);
+ if (error <= 0)
goto out_release;
+ /* write dirty buffer */
+ error = 0;
} else {
- xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(mp, item, bp, buf_f, current_lsn);
+ error = xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer(mp, item, bp, buf_f,
+ current_lsn);
+ if (error)
+ goto out_release;
}
/*
--
2.53.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-24 9:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-20 11:32 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap" failed to apply to 6.1-stable tree gregkh
2026-08-24 9:56 ` [PATCH 6.1.y 1/2] xfs: don't use a xfs_log_iovec for ri_buf in log recovery Sasha Levin
2026-08-24 9:56 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
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