From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 52BA73AA4F1 for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2026 18:47:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787683643; cv=none; b=GFdduuWrslSmMMwTQinUpS4QCeV+xOGTC5qHz8ZbJ0A8RX5SnRGBQ8QXuJruE9/KynCFIQC4R9Ho+iF7asMBuL00eHhXXG0A04TtfZ7X3PwaHX9vi1bAXY5XUYlgm+8YnrcE4Xh2yWAjN4aHW+5+O2f2dDa4+EybOgcBW9FiL6c= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1787683643; c=relaxed/simple; bh=WUj/giaC4clULbwZxSuXydGUGBznsv7AlBpL/j1l3VA=; h=From:Subject:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Content-Type:Date: Message-Id; b=M8kwbWcXGOdIjDc4B++8timMPByXZLffaNPDgkiPZRODcEP+p6GChyATvKeDCQGY1sQwaPZPTUk/2YYJ6cCCbegsGZ0mVtldVrLV5SIdGNDHDZSwfpFW0vbGc9uex0s4sCALAFpX3QfxwMRfW0DGxdeU3+zfbGX+njNK2yKzSrs= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=gZgXibuf; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="gZgXibuf" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A6A3D1F000E9 for ; Tue, 25 Aug 2026 18:47:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1787683641; bh=WUj/giaC4clULbwZxSuXydGUGBznsv7AlBpL/j1l3VA=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=gZgXibuf4v1sxbofAoc0Rt+R8jc7MDRNM41Gck8gUAcVB8wtB1hyz7HROSxPY111L r8BggC8U77/69/lMeLa3/AJ8cExf3JTjtqmvmtnPPa9P2GRuGsAupzd5bKqngWgxzt 6vnJJm6NYqV9YABtQR8ueFVl/SgawmO5jjl43iq9BfNxcGiWlH8hfxq3V6VRrPTNib 13V99TNxcJG5laNNmbzUMk3/295/j5+fzdgX6A200/wLRYwi59EutVHx/+ViKxTEUv I6Uyao79kRLPl3fiQ2Jba1FDjvyYL6Dq3dys2mJ/vwAF13uXKRu3RAdKtcdob8WxZf a4p6YwAk6gEoQ== From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] selinux: require PROCESS__PTRACE for FOLL_FORCE introspection Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20260825-selinux-pokemem-v2-3-b46bc64916d8@google.com> References: <20260825-selinux-pokemem-v2-0-b46bc64916d8@google.com> <20260825-selinux-pokemem-v2-3-b46bc64916d8@google.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2026 18:47:21 +0000 Message-Id: <20260825184721.A6A3D1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: > On systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, ensure that a process c= an > only create anonymous executable memory via /proc/self/mem if it has > PROCESS__PTRACE (like when using /proc/$pid/mem of another process). >=20 > This closes a hole in code integrity enforcement that Project Zero has us= ed > in a remote Android exploit chain: > It was possible to use a memory corruption bug in a service without > EXECMEM/EXECMOD/PTRACE permission to overwrite executable code via > /proc/self/mem, which made it possible to load and run shellcode containi= ng > a kernel exploit. >=20 > Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great! --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260825-selinux-po= kemem-v2-0-b46bc64916d8@google.com?part=3D3