From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: MoGGuU <Naixumogu@whut.edu.cn>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] accel/rocket: Validate BO handle counts on job submission
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2026 05:25:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260828052520.154E51F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260828050805.38548-2-Naixumogu@whut.edu.cn>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Integer overflow in the rocket_copy_tasks() loop counter leads to an out-of-bounds write in kernel memory.
- [High] The execution fence is not attached to input BOs, allowing concurrent modifications from other execution contexts.
- [High] rocket_job_handle_irq() leaks an IOMMU group reference on every interrupt.
--
commit 47c63098f063d8d22a7ebbc0a4a54fb92597a27b
Author: MoGGuU <Naixumogu@whut.edu.cn>
Date: Fri Aug 28 05:08:03 2026 +0000
accel/rocket: Validate BO handle counts on job submission
The input and output BO handle counts are __u32, while GEM lookup and
reservation helpers take int counts. A count above INT_MAX cannot be
represented safely by the GEM lookup helper.
Reject each count above INT_MAX before looking up the BOs.
rocket_job_push() already uses check_add_overflow() for the combined count,
but stores the result in u32, so it only detects unsigned wraparound. Store
the result in int so sums above INT_MAX are rejected before the count is
passed to the reservation helpers.
> diff --git a/drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_job.c b/drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_job.c
> index bb77b6bf0f231..e6052d1973afa 100644
> --- a/drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_job.c
> +++ b/drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_job.c
> @@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ static int rocket_job_push(struct rocket_job *job)
> struct rocket_device *rdev = job->rdev;
> struct drm_gem_object **bos;
> struct ww_acquire_ctx acquire_ctx;
> - u32 bo_count;
> + int bo_count;
> int ret = 0;
>
> if (check_add_overflow(job->in_bo_count, job->out_bo_count, &bo_count))
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does this function miss attaching
the execution fence to the input BOs?
Later in rocket_job_push(), the inference_done_fence is attached to the output
BOs, but the same is not done for the input BOs:
drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_job.c:rocket_job_push() {
...
rocket_attach_object_fences(job->out_bos, job->out_bo_count, job->inference_done_fence);
...
}
Without attaching a read fence to the input BOs' dma_resv objects, subsequent
jobs that attempt to write to these input BOs will not wait for the NPU to
finish reading. Can this lead to data corruption from concurrent access?
[ ... ]
> @@ -556,6 +556,11 @@ static int rocket_ioctl_submit_job(struct drm_device *dev, struct drm_file *file
> if (job->task_count == 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + /* GEM lookup takes a signed object count. */
> + if (job->in_bo_handle_count > INT_MAX ||
> + job->out_bo_handle_count > INT_MAX)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can the signed loop counter in
rocket_copy_tasks() overflow and cause an out-of-bounds write?
Since job->task_count is a u32 and not validated against INT_MAX like the BO
counts above, if a user submits a job with task_count >= 0x80000001 (assuming a
large enough memory allocation succeeds), the signed integer `i` in the copy loop
will overflow when it reaches 0x7FFFFFFF and becomes -2147483648:
drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_job.c:rocket_copy_tasks() {
...
for (int i = 0; i < rjob->task_count; i++) {
...
rjob->tasks[i].regcmd = task.regcmd;
...
}
Because rjob->task_count is unsigned, the comparison `i < rjob->task_count`
uses unsigned arithmetic. As a result, the negative `i` is treated as a valid
index, causing `rjob->tasks[i].regcmd` to write out-of-bounds at a negative
offset in kernel memory.
[Severity: High]
This is also a pre-existing issue, but does rocket_job_handle_irq() leak an
IOMMU group reference on every interrupt?
In the interrupt handler, an IOMMU group reference is acquired but never
released:
drivers/accel/rocket/rocket_job.c:rocket_job_handle_irq() {
...
iommu_detach_group(NULL, iommu_group_get(core->dev));
...
}
Since iommu_group_get() acquires a reference, and iommu_detach_group() does not
consume it, the reference is leaked. Should there be a matching
iommu_group_put() call here to prevent a permanent memory and reference leak?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260828050805.38548-1-Naixumogu@whut.edu.cn?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-28 5:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-28 5:08 [PATCH v3 0/3] accel/rocket: Fix job submit error handling MoGGuU
2026-08-28 5:08 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] accel/rocket: Validate BO handle counts on job submission MoGGuU
2026-08-28 5:25 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-28 5:44 ` Sidong Yang
2026-08-28 5:08 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] accel/rocket: Collect job dependencies before arming MoGGuU
2026-08-28 5:22 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-28 5:46 ` Sidong Yang
2026-08-28 5:50 ` Sidong Yang
2026-08-28 5:08 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] accel/rocket: Propagate job submission errors MoGGuU
2026-08-28 5:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-28 5:47 ` Sidong Yang
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260828052520.154E51F000E9@smtp.kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=Naixumogu@whut.edu.cn \
--cc=dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.