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([2001:41d0:303:db6b::]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id ffacd0b85a97d-482fbb20713sm17047817f8f.21.2026.08.30.13.11.57 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Sun, 30 Aug 2026 13:11:58 -0700 (PDT) From: Tristan Madani To: Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek , Richard Haines , selinux@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, Tristan Madani Subject: [PATCH v2] selinux: use socket SID for SCTP ASCONF permission checks Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2026 20:11:57 +0000 Message-ID: <20260830201157.2084730-1-tristmd@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Tristan Madani __selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper() call sock_has_perm() which uses current_sid() as the AVC subject. When selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is invoked from the ASCONF processing path (sctp_process_asconf), current refers to whichever task was interrupted, so the permission check evaluates an unrelated subject. Fix by extracting the sock_has_perm() call out of __selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper() into their callers. The process-context wrappers (selinux_socket_bind, selinux_socket_connect) call sock_has_perm() directly. For selinux_sctp_bind_connect(), determine the caller SID based on the optname: SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY and SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP are ASCONF chunk parameter types only passed from the softirq processing path, so use the socket own SID (sksec->sid), consistent with other softirq-context hooks such as selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb() and selinux_sctp_assoc_request(). All other optnames originate from process-context syscalls and use current_sid(). Factor out __sock_has_perm() with an explicit subject SID parameter so that sock_has_perm() remains unchanged for all other callers. Fixes: d452930fd3b9 ("selinux: Add SCTP support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Paul Moore Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani --- Changes in v2: - Do not use sksec->sid unconditionally; determine the caller SID based on the optname so that process-context callers (bind, connect, connectx, sendmsg) still use current_sid() [Paul Moore, Sashiko] - Factor out __sock_has_perm() with an explicit SID parameter and keep sock_has_perm() as a thin wrapper for all other callers - Move the sock_has_perm() call out of __selinux_socket_bind() and selinux_socket_connect_helper() into their respective callers (selinux_socket_bind, selinux_socket_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect) security/selinux/hooks.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 035aaf113d1da..ab9653ae06fc8 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -4918,7 +4918,7 @@ static bool sock_skip_has_perm(u32 sid) } -static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) +static int __sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 sid, u32 perms) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -4929,10 +4929,15 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk); - return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, + return avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); } +static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) +{ + return __sock_has_perm(sk, current_sid(), perms); +} + static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { @@ -5006,11 +5011,7 @@ static int __selinux_socket_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *address, int { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); u16 family; - int err; - - err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND); - if (err) - goto out; + int err = 0; /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */ family = sk->sk_family; @@ -5135,6 +5136,11 @@ static int __selinux_socket_bind(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *address, int static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { + int err; + + err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__BIND); + if (err) + return err; return __selinux_socket_bind(sock->sk, address, addrlen); } @@ -5145,11 +5151,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); - int err; + int err = 0; - err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); - if (err) - return err; if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family)) return -EINVAL; @@ -5232,6 +5235,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, int err; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; + err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); + if (err) + return err; err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sk, address, addrlen); if (err) return err; @@ -5731,13 +5737,25 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0; void *addr_buf; struct sockaddr *addr; + u32 caller_sid; if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; + /* SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY and SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP are ASCONF chunk + * parameter types passed from sctp_process_asconf() in softirq + * context where current is not meaningful. Use the socket own + * SID for permission checks in that case; all other optnames + * originate from process-context syscalls. + */ + caller_sid = (optname == SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY || + optname == SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP) ? + sksec->sid : current_sid(); + /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */ addr_buf = address; @@ -5767,13 +5785,18 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR: case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD: - err = __selinux_socket_bind(sk, addr, len); + err = __sock_has_perm(sk, caller_sid, SOCKET__BIND); + if (!err) + err = __selinux_socket_bind(sk, addr, len); break; /* Connect checks */ case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX: case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY: case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP: case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT: + err = __sock_has_perm(sk, caller_sid, SOCKET__CONNECT); + if (err) + return err; err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr, len); if (err) return err; -- 2.47.3