From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4876547F2F9; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:07:20 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788185241; cv=none; b=flMEHf78tF31sd4F8kaHReMDDl9taHwhTkyAEKbcDAKYwJ7U3G487ZV9TwX0WN5fBBniqVRkMx8WdpCCxMEaVJ923p7o2ZJoZA+IPHc5rXwnlxxHWN+bHH++SaP2CUdS5eIpfP12HCq/fecE0rkMYf4excT0ihdAx+zpTpYn9uE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788185241; c=relaxed/simple; bh=/tsmHEtGq1OmvEAfLn+34A4e36ejqsvn0mIYaAhdsq0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=mog3rCPYjDrHQlRi/7Z9vQ/UjvDX65noSKM8DqXDmIp6MI1VVTTMViRvjwTuoZjp39ruNJHuD3LeM5OPSsCsVWiFIuBe8ramTkByC24TouzoT0rJMWBAJy/cYebhfbvWPfegqlkjGsTRWUlQyXrtpzgQlH+TTA51st0kAwa56ak= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=BE0aXjbz; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="BE0aXjbz" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A26A11F000E9; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:07:19 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788185240; bh=Yi9UpQ3aCNAGdKnheCdtX0UVzw5znYk2NQmDYD6dmkM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=BE0aXjbzJomsECl78Mi1W3yrsZwzzKFK5q7wkeU90CbcCgoatJ+di+HQCheoBjE3c FCgekwnsNlkjzcgMgO5qbxsM5XV35nGLUOiNDDjyWpQWktjWWMkhlV8svBdA6jaaz1 MeNbVegZ9iO6b+ZSnwAqPG8KagQcZg9NichL5GmA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Vega , Zihan Xi , Ren Wei , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 5.10 31/43] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 15:35:39 +0200 Message-ID: <20260831133400.070655414@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260831133358.571886287@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260831133358.571886287@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Zihan Xi commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream. attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo. Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC]))) goto error; - if (!x->props.aalgo) { + if (!x->aalg) { if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH]))) goto error;