From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev,
"Christian Göttsche" <cgzones@googlemail.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Wentao Guan" <guanwentao@uniontech.com>,
"Sasha Levin" <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.12 12/99] selinux: more strict policy parsing
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 15:33:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260831133400.438488653@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260831133359.740409777@linuxfoundation.org>
6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
[ Upstream commit 18fa21f10d008a0fc22565109c7d38f304295912 ]
Be more strict during parsing of policies and reject invalid values.
Add some error messages in the case of policy parse failures, to
enhance debugging, either on a malformed policy or a too strict check.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: fixed checkpatch.pl warnings, style problems]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
(cherry picked from commit 18fa21f10d008a0fc22565109c7d38f304295912)
[WG: drop the AVTAB_XPERMS_NLMSG case, netlink xperm support
(d1d991efaf34 "selinux: Add netlink xperm support") is not present
in this tree]
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 +
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 35 ++++-
security/selinux/ss/avtab.h | 12 ++
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 18 +--
security/selinux/ss/constraint.h | 1 +
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 23 +++-
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 6 +-
8 files changed, 232 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 289bf9233f714..219e3e592564c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len);
int security_read_state_kernel(void **data, size_t *len);
int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
+/* Maximum supported number of permissions per class */
#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
struct av_decision {
u32 allowed;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 23210faaa0465..4553be750f2fc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
int rc;
- unsigned int set, vers = pol->policyvers;
+ unsigned int vers = pol->policyvers;
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
@@ -360,9 +360,12 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
+ /* Read five or more items: source type, target type,
+ * target class, AV type, and at least one datum.
+ */
items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
- if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
- pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+ if (items2 < 5 || items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid item count\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32) * items2);
@@ -391,6 +394,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
@@ -409,6 +419,11 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
if (val & spec_order[i]) {
+ if (items >= items2) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has too many items (%d/%d)\n",
+ items + 1, items2);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
@@ -444,9 +459,13 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
return -EINVAL;
}
- set = hweight16(key.specified & (AVTAB_XPERMS | AVTAB_TYPE | AVTAB_AV));
- if (!set || set > 1) {
- pr_err("SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
+ if (hweight16(key.specified & ~AVTAB_ENABLED) != 1) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: not exactly one specifier\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (key.specified & ~AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid specifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -464,6 +483,10 @@ int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, struct policy_file *fp, struct policydb *po
pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
+ if (!avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(xperms.specified))
+ pr_warn_once_policyload(pol,
+ "SELinux: avtab: unsupported xperm specifier %#x\n",
+ xperms.specified);
rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
if (rc) {
pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 80c4a6064328e..844311d2fe7b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ struct avtab_key {
AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_SPECIFIER_MASK (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE | AVTAB_XPERMS | AVTAB_ENABLED)
u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
};
@@ -67,6 +68,17 @@ struct avtab_extended_perms {
struct extended_perms_data perms;
};
+static inline bool avtab_is_valid_xperm_specified(u8 specified)
+{
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION:
+ case AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
struct avtab_datum {
union {
u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index f8a21d10ff929..c15d914671ddd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -199,19 +199,12 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
return 0;
}
-static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
-{
- if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
{
char *key = NULL;
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
__le32 buf[3];
- u32 len;
+ u32 len, val;
int rc;
booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -223,11 +216,12 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
goto err;
booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
rc = -EINVAL;
- if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+ if (!val_is_boolean(val))
goto err;
+ booldatum->state = (int)val;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
@@ -241,6 +235,7 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp)
return 0;
err:
+ pr_err("SELinux: conditional: failed to read boolean\n");
cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
return rc;
}
@@ -362,7 +357,8 @@ static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
return 0;
}
- if (expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+ if (expr->expr_type == COND_BOOL &&
+ (expr->boolean == 0 || expr->boolean > p->p_bools.nprim)) {
pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
index 203033cfad672..1d75a8a044df9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct constraint_expr {
u32 op; /* operator */
struct ebitmap names; /* names */
+ /* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
struct type_set *type_names;
struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 6271e083c9400..f93b10ce19652 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -627,13 +627,11 @@ static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
levdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!levdatum->isalias) {
- if (!levdatum->level.sens ||
- levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!levdatum->level.sens || levdatum->level.sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!levdatum->isalias)
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level.sens - 1] = key;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -646,12 +644,11 @@ static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
catdatum = datum;
p = datap;
- if (!catdatum->isalias) {
- if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!catdatum->isalias)
p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS][catdatum->value - 1] = key;
- }
return 0;
}
@@ -1148,6 +1145,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (perdatum->value < 1 || perdatum->value > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1182,6 +1182,9 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, nel);
if (rc)
@@ -1333,7 +1336,7 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
char *key = NULL;
struct class_datum *cladatum;
__le32 buf[6];
- u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel;
+ u32 i, len, len2, ncons, nel, val;
int rc;
cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1346,8 +1349,16 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (nel > SEL_VEC_MAX)
+ goto bad;
+
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto bad;
+ cladatum->value = val;
rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, nel);
if (rc)
@@ -1415,16 +1426,59 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
if (rc)
goto bad;
- cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+ cladatum->default_user = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+ cladatum->default_role = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+ case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
+ cladatum->default_range = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
}
if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
if (rc)
goto bad;
- cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ switch (val) {
+ case 0:
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET:
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE:
+ cladatum->default_type = val;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto bad;
+ }
}
rc = symtab_insert(s, key, cladatum);
@@ -1434,6 +1488,8 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *
return 0;
bad:
cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid class\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1625,7 +1681,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
struct level_datum *levdatum;
int rc;
__le32 buf[2];
- u32 len;
+ u32 len, val;
levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!levdatum)
@@ -1636,7 +1692,11 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
goto bad;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+ goto bad;
+ levdatum->isalias = val;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1652,6 +1712,8 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *f
return 0;
bad:
sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid sensitivity\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1661,7 +1723,7 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp
struct cat_datum *catdatum;
int rc;
__le32 buf[3];
- u32 len;
+ u32 len, val;
catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!catdatum)
@@ -1673,7 +1735,11 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!val_is_boolean(val))
+ goto bad;
+ catdatum->isalias = val;
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1685,6 +1751,8 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, struct policy_file *fp
return 0;
bad:
cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid category\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1866,7 +1934,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
struct mls_range *r = NULL;
int rc;
__le32 buf[2];
- u32 i, nel;
+ u32 i, nel, val;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
return 0;
@@ -1897,7 +1965,11 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto out;
- rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ rt->target_class = val;
} else
rt->target_class = p->process_class;
@@ -1934,6 +2006,8 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
out:
kfree(rt);
kfree(r);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid range\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -1942,7 +2016,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, struct policy_f
struct filename_trans_key key, *ft = NULL;
struct filename_trans_datum *last, *datum = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
- u32 len, stype, otype;
+ u32 len, stype, otype, val;
__le32 buf[4];
int rc;
@@ -1961,9 +2035,17 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, struct policy_f
if (rc)
goto out;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, stype))
+ goto out;
key.ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- key.tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, key.ttype))
+ goto out;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+ goto out;
+ key.tclass = val;
key.name = name;
otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
@@ -2019,6 +2101,9 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, struct policy_f
kfree(ft);
kfree(name);
kfree(datum);
+
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid compat filename transition\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -2027,7 +2112,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
struct filename_trans_key *ft = NULL;
struct filename_trans_datum **dst, *datum, *first = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
- u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i;
+ u32 len, ttype, ndatum, i, val;
u16 tclass;
__le32 buf[3];
int rc;
@@ -2047,8 +2132,15 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
if (rc)
goto out;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, ttype))
+ goto out;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (val > U16_MAX || !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val))
+ goto out;
+ tclass = val;
ndatum = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
if (ndatum == 0) {
@@ -2078,6 +2170,10 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
datum->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, datum->otype))
+ goto out;
+
dst = &datum->next;
}
@@ -2109,6 +2205,9 @@ static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp
ebitmap_destroy(&datum->stypes);
kfree(datum);
}
+
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid filename transition\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -2156,7 +2255,7 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
{
int rc;
- u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2;
+ u32 i, j, nel, nel2, len, len2, val;
__le32 buf[1];
struct ocontext *l, *c;
struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
@@ -2226,7 +2325,11 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
if (rc)
goto out;
- newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX || (val != 0 && !policydb_class_isvalid(p, val)))
+ goto out;
+ newc->v.sclass = val;
rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p,
fp);
if (rc)
@@ -2263,6 +2366,9 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
}
ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid genfs\n");
+
return rc;
}
@@ -2271,7 +2377,7 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
{
int rc;
unsigned int i;
- u32 j, nel, len;
+ u32 j, nel, len, val;
__be64 prefixbuf[1];
__le32 buf[3];
struct ocontext *l, *c;
@@ -2335,11 +2441,25 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
if (rc)
goto out;
- c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
- p, fp);
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U8_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.protocol = val;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.low_port = val;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.high_port = val;
+ if (c->u.port.low_port == 0 ||
+ c->u.port.low_port > c->u.port.high_port)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
if (rc)
goto out;
break;
@@ -2457,6 +2577,8 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p,
}
rc = 0;
out:
+ if (rc)
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid ocon\n");
return rc;
}
@@ -2471,7 +2593,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
struct role_trans_datum *rtd = NULL;
int rc;
__le32 buf[4];
- u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm;
+ u32 i, j, len, nprim, nel, perm, val;
char *policydb_str;
const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
@@ -2657,7 +2779,11 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, struct policy_file *fp)
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
goto bad;
- rtk->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (val > U16_MAX)
+ goto bad;
+ rtk->tclass = val;
} else
rtk->tclass = p->process_class;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 06df7da747791..01ad9f7bc3ae6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct class_datum {
/* Role attributes */
struct role_datum {
u32 value; /* internal role value */
- u32 bounds; /* boundary of role */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of role, 0 for none */
struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
};
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ struct role_allow {
/* Type attributes */
struct type_datum {
u32 value; /* internal type value */
- u32 bounds; /* boundary of type */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of type, 0 for none */
+ /* internally unused, only forwarded via policydb_write() */
unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
unsigned char attribute; /* attribute ?*/
};
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ struct type_datum {
/* User attributes */
struct user_datum {
u32 value; /* internal user value */
- u32 bounds; /* bounds of user */
+ u32 bounds; /* bounds of user, 0 for none */
struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
@@ -195,7 +196,7 @@ struct ocontext {
} ibendport;
} u;
union {
- u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
+ u16 sclass; /* security class for genfs (can be 0 for wildcard) */
u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
} v;
struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
@@ -386,9 +387,23 @@ static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num,
return p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num][element_nr];
}
+static inline bool val_is_boolean(u32 value)
+{
+ return value == 0 || value == 1;
+}
+
extern int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, struct policy_file *fp, u32 len);
extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
+#define pr_warn_once_policyload(policy, fmt, ...) \
+ do { \
+ static const void *prev_policy__; \
+ if (prev_policy__ != policy) { \
+ pr_warn(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__); \
+ prev_policy__ = policy; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
#endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8b3c804d231ea..54d121d648042 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -445,8 +445,6 @@ static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
char **permission_names = args;
- BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
-
permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
return 0;
@@ -465,7 +463,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
char *tclass_name;
char *scontext_name = NULL;
char *tcontext_name = NULL;
- char *permission_names[32];
+ char *permission_names[SEL_VEC_MAX];
int index;
u32 length;
bool need_comma = false;
@@ -506,7 +504,7 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
"scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
- for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+ for (index = 0; index < SEL_VEC_MAX; index++) {
u32 mask = (1 << index);
if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 13:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 111+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-31 13:33 [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 01/99] RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 02/99] RDMA/rxe: Fix OOB in free_rd_atomic_resources() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 03/99] KVM: x86/mmu: Check write tracking in all address spaces Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 04/99] ext4: dont enable DAX on new encrypted files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 05/99] io_uring/io-wq: fix worker accounting when canceling creation callbacks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 06/99] nvme-tcp: fix usage of page_frag_cache Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 07/99] HID: uhid: convert to hid_safe_input_report() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 08/99] selinux: use known type instead of void pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 09/99] selinux: avoid unnecessary indirection in struct level_datum Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 10/99] selinux: make more use of str_read() when loading the policy Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 11/99] selinux: use u16 for security classes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 13/99] selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 14/99] selinux: require a classs permission values to cover its " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 15/99] perf: Reject exited events as group leaders Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 16/99] jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 17/99] jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 18/99] ibmvnic: Use kernel helpers for hex dumps Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 19/99] jfs: Fix null-ptr-deref in jfs_ioc_trim Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 20/99] exfat: fix double free in delayed_free Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 21/99] media: platform: exynos4-is: Add hardware sync wait to fimc_is_hw_change_mode() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 22/99] mISDN: hfcpci: Fix warning when deleting uninitialized timer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 23/99] can: j1939: implement NETDEV_UNREGISTER notification handler Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 24/99] can: j1939: add missing calls in " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 25/99] can: j1939: make j1939_sk_bind() fail if device is no longer registered Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 26/99] smc: Fix use-after-free in __pnet_find_base_ndev() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 27/99] KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 28/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in in smc_clc_prfx_set() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 29/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_clc_prfx_match() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:33 ` [PATCH 6.12 30/99] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel delayed work on component remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 31/99] bpf: Fix use-after-free in offloaded map/prog info fill Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 32/99] riscv: Fix register corruption from uninitialized cregs on error Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 33/99] Revert "PM: sleep: Use complete() in device_pm_sleep_init()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 34/99] ASoC: nau8821: Cancel pending work before suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 35/99] smc: Use __sk_dst_get() and dst_dev_rcu() in smc_vlan_by_tcpsk() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 36/99] selinux: switch two allocations to use kzalloc_objs() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 37/99] ring buffer: Propagate __rb_map_vma return value to caller Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 38/99] veth: fix OOB txq access in veth_poll() with asymmetric queue counts Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 39/99] powerpc/hv-gpci: fix preempt count leak in sysfs show paths Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 40/99] ksmbd: harden file lifetime during session teardown Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 41/99] nilfs2: correct return value kernel-doc descriptions for ioctl functions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 42/99] nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 43/99] nfc: nci: add data_len bound checks to activation parameter extractors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 44/99] HID: pidff: Rework pidff_set_time() to fix warnings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 45/99] HID: pidff: Use ARRAY_SIZE macro instead of sizeof Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 46/99] HID: pidff: clang-format pass Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 47/99] HID: pidff: fix OOB write when hid->inputs is empty Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 48/99] HID: asus: simplify RGB init sequence Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 49/99] HID: asus: fix missing hid_is_usb() check Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 50/99] HID: ft260: validate i2c input report length Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 51/99] HID: ft260: fix stack-use-after-return write in I2C read race Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 52/99] HID: uclogic: fix use-after-free of inrange_timer on remove Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 53/99] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Use bt_dev_err() to log error message in hci_update_event_filter_sync() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 54/99] Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix accept list UAF during suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 55/99] HID: magicmouse: prevent unbounded recursion in magicmouse_raw_event() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 56/99] fpga: dfl: fme: add error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 57/99] accessibility: speakup: unregister tty ldisc on later init failures Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 58/99] usb: xhci: Handle USB3 port events when there is one roothub Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 59/99] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_register_driver() failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 60/99] xhci: dbgtty: Fix unregister on tty_alloc_driver() failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 61/99] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 62/99] fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 63/99] usb: usbtest: disable dynamic ID support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 64/99] usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 65/99] tls: device: fix out-of-bounds write in tls_append_frag() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 66/99] gtp: serialize PDP context updates Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 67/99] x86/CPU/AMD: Carve out a Zen5 models range Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 68/99] net/tcp: fix TCP-AO key deletion in VRFs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 69/99] tcp: fix AO info use-after-free in tcp_ao_connect_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 70/99] net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 71/99] xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 72/99] xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 73/99] xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 74/99] xfrm: ah6: validate routing header segments_left Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 75/99] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 76/99] xfrm: bound nat keepalive state collection Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 77/99] net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLANs multicast context Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 78/99] ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 79/99] batman-adv: reject unrepresentable multicast TVLV offsets Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 80/99] vxlan: keep the last remote linked during FDB flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 81/99] netfilter: nf_tables: dont queue packet path object notifications Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 82/99] mm/swap: reject swapon() on filesystem-level encrypted files Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 83/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Enable clock in hwrng case Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 84/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Allow zero as a random number Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 85/99] crypto: qcom-rng - Remove crypto_rng interface Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 86/99] crypto: atmel-tdes - use scatterlist length before DMA mapping Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 87/99] crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 88/99] crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 89/99] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:34 ` [PATCH 6.12 90/99] KVM: s390: vsie: zero stale crypto bits Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 91/99] usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 92/99] usb: core: Strengthen error handling in hub_hub_status() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 93/99] ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_novation_output() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 94/99] ALSA: usb-audio: Complete cleanup after system-resume errors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 95/99] USB: serial: option: fix slab OOB read in interrupt URB callback Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 96/99] USB: serial: spcp8x5: drop broken carrier detect support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 97/99] USB: c67x00: fix use-after-free in c67x00_add_iso_urb() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 98/99] wifi: mt76: mt7925: ensure tx headroom in usb_sdio_tx_prepare_skb Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 13:35 ` [PATCH 6.12 99/99] usb: usbfs: fix use-after-free of usb_device in usbdev_release() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-31 18:15 ` [PATCH 6.12 00/99] 6.12.108-rc1 review Francesco Dolcini
2026-08-31 19:00 ` Florian Fainelli
2026-08-31 19:12 ` Brett A C Sheffield
2026-08-31 22:04 ` Peter Schneider
2026-09-01 1:59 ` Dominique Martinet
2026-09-01 4:56 ` Harshit Mogalapalli
2026-09-01 8:44 ` Pavel Machek
2026-09-01 16:45 ` Shuah Khan
2026-09-01 22:30 ` Miguel Ojeda
2026-09-01 23:10 ` Ron Economos
2026-09-02 2:28 ` Barry K. Nathan
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