From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D4C26515734; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 13:43:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788183798; cv=none; b=PxmbwCQgo5FwwseUlKr6lzkmF2HtZblNNeY+RW69+fm9dUzkoOEGnPaxV/UmlNlNfmxqRStRBzX7l75tAo8BdUeScBhdDyyvlTs8OHNc0Uye+t9FfHUQ0iZWM9CHnIt4qnIJlpSSNMn44JXi48NFFVrhkufxkmzAbMPF1PqkQA8= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788183798; c=relaxed/simple; bh=wfnVvjE0ZR0o7vervsdzVV4/vzZjwDdaNztWZrSG/50=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Kw5Mwv71OGjDP7rH+lKd3K6WhuU2+MVbMCjy9qjSuqJ0MFJ/OYcKa7t9rMhe6HIg8+LXMbmYXYatuGfUv3JJri4SFazpS5i34OExoFPDe1YdCD9QXSLgmt56N7zjI8rTdRJGec+2w6LwY9ZgP1QqQ4HaU1M9gU/nagR3v1Hqez4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=yZsmOcPK; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="yZsmOcPK" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0DAF51F00A3D; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 13:43:15 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788183796; bh=8BYWXHTPPzhJCbmrTjCLkxgsBBZ4WGxOgPrn0nBp5gU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=yZsmOcPKRfCEcSejed9tInRujCDMhyjX4GRnc8aAQ7fhoUpoPLvhiQdHoqhPdqzUz sRfNdFrdBmWUtvseIl9GU+bumL0eX3Zg4IggTJC28qSYDkhJV5xwVg2EmWXjRgyMLI 4IzS3Jm3JVBo7oBuVPGuPtDPdjC3CtLO9+byLtm0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Vega , Zihan Xi , Ren Wei , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 7.1 45/76] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 15:34:17 +0200 Message-ID: <20260831133401.750828830@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260831133359.185608553@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260831133359.185608553@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Zihan Xi commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream. attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo. Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC], extack))) goto error; - if (!x->props.aalgo) { + if (!x->aalg) { if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH], extack))) goto error;