From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 035AD52ED21; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:01:34 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788184896; cv=none; b=K3oJfvaovarEY92ooD1vLNeXy8efFoJZN9adT6gBR4LZmTjGsRDVQgKjDI2SSSSOJaeKo4gmiplAGXQ68GeImxTqS4RvwIGqDUa1+8raaYarNnMAHWmL8dVd2AgKrVwd+TAguso9scDqBJHwjwBZeEx9RlpMT9EnLiLIE4UFrFo= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788184896; c=relaxed/simple; bh=G0RZcQwK6YffEj3eoPA7D7Z74MSMUpDo7aoWPSNhj0E=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=nmFHDuvnITiRnkCGeGL6DoTj0C85rfp5802UeLlTjkrjtfTqT/54nIGU65DDwTGRZumfG7TDRGsKrVo/YugumGaCLzB/Z08YU0kNs//JrI/YGWwnUaSJf4g8vMhYj47HWtaZbJoJCQXu8NxHkZjlRcK4ey5xnvevtodAtWhVB7s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=TRYizyta; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="TRYizyta" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 5F3891F000E9; Mon, 31 Aug 2026 14:01:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1788184893; bh=EsPN1IP66VKLzWarNOA62L72uxbTqStbpNG0y+mTTr8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=TRYizytapzItoAcPKj4aHOQL0oDQzdPWD/89YOpSPV7oHmFk6CQUDGGb4ed5X3xYs hKGH/ZyuMlQPqKbKVYHSMhfc9r1ZkXgdA6ucSx4hCii5GpEpnLoVHNRG0WQko71Zxm dnnUcOqVEagUnGBKpe3dLswZxKj10SL3oWpcsXlY= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Vega , Zihan Xi , Ren Wei , Steffen Klassert Subject: [PATCH 6.1 75/92] xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 15:35:13 +0200 Message-ID: <20260831133403.491543955@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260831133359.482388899@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260831133359.482388899@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Zihan Xi commit c12cbf56320fb633484ee0ca1fb7d68d6b64b213 upstream. attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo. Fixes: 4447bb33f094 ("xfrm: Store aalg in xfrm_state with a user specified truncation length") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Vega Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.4 Signed-off-by: Zihan Xi Signed-off-by: Ren Wei Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con if ((err = attach_auth_trunc(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC], extack))) goto error; - if (!x->props.aalgo) { + if (!x->aalg) { if ((err = attach_auth(&x->aalg, &x->props.aalgo, attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH], extack))) goto error;