From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: jlayton@kernel.org,cel@kernel.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] nfsd: validate sockaddr length per family in listener_set" failed to apply to 6.12-stable tree
Date: Thu, 03 Sep 2026 15:11:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026090327-bully-unsightly-dc1a@gregkh> (raw)
The patch below does not apply to the 6.12-stable tree.
If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm
tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit
id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>.
To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands:
git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-6.12.y
git checkout FETCH_HEAD
git cherry-pick -x bdcc85c2b05a9378d8bd2d65f9fc41440a3cf464
# <resolve conflicts, build, test, etc.>
git commit -s
git send-email --to '<stable@vger.kernel.org>' --in-reply-to '2026090327-bully-unsightly-dc1a@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 6.12.y' 'HEAD^..'
Possible dependencies:
thanks,
greg k-h
------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------
From bdcc85c2b05a9378d8bd2d65f9fc41440a3cf464 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2026 14:31:25 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] nfsd: validate sockaddr length per family in listener_set
nfsd_sock_nl_policy declares NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR as a bare NLA_BINARY
attribute with no minimum length. A CAP_NET_ADMIN caller can send a
16-byte NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR with sa_family=AF_INET6, causing a 12-byte
OOB read across three consumers (rpc_cmp_addr_port, svc_find_listener,
kernel_bind).
nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() also parsed and validated each listener
entry inline in two separate loops, interleaved with mutating the
running listener configuration. The validation was duplicated, used an
open-coded "nla_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr)" check that was too short
for AF_INET6, and handled a malformed entry inconsistently depending on
which loop noticed it.
Add an nfsd_nl_validate_listeners() helper that walks the entire list
once and confirms each entry parses, carries both an address and a
transport name, and is long enough for its address family
(sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) for AF_INET, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)
for AF_INET6, -EAFNOSUPPORT otherwise). Call it before taking
nfsd_mutex or creating the serv, so a malformed request fails cleanly
with no side effects.
Since every entry is known valid by the time the two existing loops
run, drop the redundant presence and per-family length checks from
both, leaving only the nla_parse_nested() call needed to extract the
data.
Fixes: 16a471177496 ("NFSD: add listener-{set,get} netlink command")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260615-nfsd-testing-v5-1-188d75aedda0@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
index f1ecbb13f642..caf59421f8f4 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c
@@ -1971,6 +1971,60 @@ int nfsd_nl_version_get_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
return err;
}
+/**
+ * nfsd_nl_validate_listeners - sanity-check the listener list from userland
+ * @info: netlink metadata and command arguments
+ *
+ * Walk every NFSD_A_SERVER_SOCK_ADDR attribute and confirm that each entry
+ * is well-formed: it parses against the policy, carries both an address and
+ * a transport name, and the address is long enough for its family. Doing
+ * this up front lets the callers below assume every entry is valid and
+ * guarantees we make no changes when the request is malformed.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if every entry is valid, or a negative errno otherwise.
+ */
+static int nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(struct genl_info *info)
+{
+ const struct nlattr *attr;
+ int rem;
+
+ nlmsg_for_each_attr_type(attr, NFSD_A_SERVER_SOCK_ADDR, info->nlhdr,
+ GENL_HDRLEN, rem) {
+ struct nlattr *tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_MAX + 1];
+ struct sockaddr *sa;
+ int err;
+
+ err = nla_parse_nested(tb, NFSD_A_SOCK_MAX, attr,
+ nfsd_sock_nl_policy, info->extack);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ if (!tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR] || !tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ sa = nla_data(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]);
+ if (nla_len(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]) < sizeof(sa->sa_family))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (sa->sa_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ if (nla_len(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]) <
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (nla_len(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]) <
+ sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/**
* nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit - set the nfs running sockets
* @skb: reply buffer
@@ -1989,6 +2043,15 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
bool delete = false;
int err, rem;
+ /*
+ * Validate the entire listener list before making any changes, so a
+ * malformed request fails cleanly without creating a serv or touching
+ * the existing listeners.
+ */
+ err = nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(info);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
mutex_lock(&nfsd_mutex);
err = nfsd_create_serv(net);
@@ -2015,16 +2078,11 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
const char *xcl_name;
struct sockaddr *sa;
+ /* validated up front in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners() */
if (nla_parse_nested(tb, NFSD_A_SOCK_MAX, attr,
nfsd_sock_nl_policy, info->extack) < 0)
continue;
- if (!tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR] || !tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME])
- continue;
-
- if (nla_len(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]) < sizeof(*sa))
- continue;
-
xcl_name = nla_data(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME]);
sa = nla_data(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]);
@@ -2076,16 +2134,11 @@ int nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
struct sockaddr *sa;
int ret;
+ /* validated up front in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners() */
if (nla_parse_nested(tb, NFSD_A_SOCK_MAX, attr,
nfsd_sock_nl_policy, info->extack) < 0)
continue;
- if (!tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR] || !tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME])
- continue;
-
- if (nla_len(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]) < sizeof(*sa))
- continue;
-
xcl_name = nla_data(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_TRANSPORT_NAME]);
sa = nla_data(tb[NFSD_A_SOCK_ADDR]);
next reply other threads:[~2026-09-03 13:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-03 13:11 gregkh [this message]
2026-09-05 2:26 ` [PATCH 6.12.y 1/2] netlink: introduce type-checking attribute iteration for nlmsg Sasha Levin
2026-09-05 2:26 ` [PATCH 6.12.y 2/2] nfsd: validate sockaddr length per family in listener_set Sasha Levin
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