From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-80755: selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 10:26:52 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026090340-CVE-2026-80755-07ed@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
selinux: reject a permission value exceeding the class permission count
perm_read() bounds a permission value by SEL_VEC_MAX but never by the
nprim of the owning class or common, which is taken verbatim from the
policy image. security_get_permissions() then writes perms[value - 1]
into an nprim-sized kcalloc() array, so a class declaring fewer
permissions than its largest permission value drives an out-of-bounds
heap write. The top-level symbol tables are validated this way; the
nested per-class permission table is not.
Reject a permission whose value exceeds nprim, which is already set when
perm_read() runs. Well-formed policies are unaffected.
[PM: tweak comment for line length]
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-80755 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 2.6.23 with commit 55fcf09b3fe4325c9395ebbb0322a547a157ebc7 and fixed in 6.12.108 with commit 6c2ab7c4549f4f2305848df834e784651dbf1676
Issue introduced in 2.6.23 with commit 55fcf09b3fe4325c9395ebbb0322a547a157ebc7 and fixed in 6.18.49 with commit dfc59a062c386d3d4415ecdab781065a645f33cc
Issue introduced in 2.6.23 with commit 55fcf09b3fe4325c9395ebbb0322a547a157ebc7 and fixed in 7.1.13 with commit a7f3d4f22d920dc3c7d75f02ece0f7bf2c58437e
Issue introduced in 2.6.23 with commit 55fcf09b3fe4325c9395ebbb0322a547a157ebc7 and fixed in 7.2 with commit d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-80755
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c2ab7c4549f4f2305848df834e784651dbf1676
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfc59a062c386d3d4415ecdab781065a645f33cc
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7f3d4f22d920dc3c7d75f02ece0f7bf2c58437e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d14b5d0e97fccd27974fedc03b903408872907fd
reply other threads:[~2026-09-03 8:27 UTC|newest]
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