From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-80853: KVM: SEV: Allocate full pages for {DE,EN}CRYPT ops on SNP-enabled hosts
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 17:53:20 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026090401-CVE-2026-80853-093d@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Allocate full pages for {DE,EN}CRYPT ops on SNP-enabled hosts
When {de,en}crypting memory of an SEV or SEV-ES guest on an SNP-enabled
host via a temporary buffer, allocate a full 4KiB page for the buffer to
ensure the page containing the buffer is wholly owned by KVM, i.e. won't
be concurrently allocated and accessed by other kernel code while KVM is
using the buffer to {de,en}crypt memory. On SNP-enabled platforms, when
sending SEV/SEV-ES commands that trigger firmware writes to memory, the
to-be-written page(s) must be (temporarily) assigned to Firmware (as
required by the SNP architecture, to guard against using such commands as
gadgets to attack SNP guests). See snp_map_cmd_buf_desc() and friends.
Unfortunately, transferring ownership of a page to Firmware makes the page
inaccessible to software, and thus writes generate RMP #PF violations. If
KVM uses a sub-page allocation for its temporary buffer, some other actor
in the kernel can allocate and use the other portions of the page, and thus
trigger unexpected (and seemingly spurious) RMP #PF violations due to
software attempting to access a Firmware-owned page.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff906ae30f0300
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x80000003) - RMP violation
PGD 6b1b80d067 P4D 6b1b80d067 PUD 100231e2063 PMD 10055a88063 PTE 80000100630f0163
SEV-SNP: PFN 0x100630f0 unassigned, dumping non-zero entries in 2M PFN region: [0x10063000 - 0x10063200]
Oops: Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP
CPU: 70 UID: 0 PID: 10658 Comm: svw_WaiterThrea Tainted: G U W O 7.1.0-smp--c22293789940-seanjc-next #1 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.86.0-102 01/25/2026
RIP: 0010:memset+0xf/0x20
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x2a4/0x710
do_getxattr+0x4e/0x130
path_getxattrat+0x125/0x1b0
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x480
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f3a22cb6daa
</TASK>
Modules linked in: kvm_amd kvm irqbypass vfat fat ccp k10temp sha3 libsha3 i2c_piix4 gq(O) cdc_acm xhci_pci xhci_hcd
gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x03
CR2: ffff906ae30f0300
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:memset+0xf/0x20
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: 0x39e00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
gsmi: Log Shutdown Reason 0x02
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-80853 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 7.2 with commit 4c735bf1bc22fd6ee66ab4bffe1d7599c3964781 and fixed in 7.2.3 with commit 97f6402f5950ca3450541287c4b3664f3acda976
Issue introduced in 7.2 with commit 4c735bf1bc22fd6ee66ab4bffe1d7599c3964781 and fixed in 7.3-rc1 with commit a33c40b93ccf5177e042253807d40e0b92e7f206
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-80853
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97f6402f5950ca3450541287c4b3664f3acda976
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a33c40b93ccf5177e042253807d40e0b92e7f206
reply other threads:[~2026-09-04 15:57 UTC|newest]
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