From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2026-80776: futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash resize
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 17:11:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026090403-CVE-2026-80776-d5ad@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Fix race in futex_pivot_pending() during private hash resize
A task performing a custom private hash resize can remain blocked in
uninterruptible sleep indefinitely. The hung-task detector reports:
INFO: task futex-resizer:314 blocked for more than 10 seconds.
task:futex-resizer state:D stack:14824 pid:314 tgid:312 ppid:311
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x521/0xf30
schedule+0x22/0xa0
futex_hash_allocate+0x3db/0x490
__do_sys_prctl+0x6f5/0xbd0
do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x530
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Kernel panic - not syncing: hung_task: blocked tasks
futex_pivot_pending() allows the resize request to continue when
either no replacement hash is pending (hash_new == NULL) or the current
hash reference count has reached zero.
After the final-reference wake, another futex task can complete the
pivot between the two observations:
T1 T2
futex_hash_allocate()
wait_var_event(mm, ...)
futex_pivot_pending(mm)
hash_new != NULL
futex_hash()
futex_ref_get(old) -> false
futex_pivot_hash(mm)
hash_new = NULL
__futex_pivot_hash(mm, new)
rcu_assign_pointer(hash, new)
fph = rcu_dereference(hash) /* new */
futex_ref_is_dead(fph) -> false
schedule()
The pivot changes the state from hash_new != NULL with a dead current
hash to hash_new == NULL with a live current hash. Because
futex_pivot_pending() reads hash_new and hash without serialization,
the resize task can observe hash_new in the pre-pivot state and hash in
the post-pivot state, causing futex_pivot_pending() to return false even
though the pivot has completed. The task then goes to sleep after the
wakeup has already been consumed.
Serialize state reads in futex_pivot_pending() using futex_mm_phash::lock.
This guarantees that futex_pivot_pending() observes hash_new and hash
atomically, eliminating the race condition.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2026-80776 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 6.16 with commit bd54df5ea7cadac520e346d5f0fe5d58e635b6ba and fixed in 6.18.46 with commit 4a7e941ca29a608c6244cbd028d3599ecaef7207
Issue introduced in 6.16 with commit bd54df5ea7cadac520e346d5f0fe5d58e635b6ba and fixed in 7.1.11 with commit 19b4be0717fa83265d66aea836b7022d898422cf
Issue introduced in 6.16 with commit bd54df5ea7cadac520e346d5f0fe5d58e635b6ba and fixed in 7.2 with commit 8e7ff730dd96519a333d1570edf1c3fabb6d3629
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2026-80776
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
kernel/futex/core.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a7e941ca29a608c6244cbd028d3599ecaef7207
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19b4be0717fa83265d66aea836b7022d898422cf
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e7ff730dd96519a333d1570edf1c3fabb6d3629
reply other threads:[~2026-09-04 15:14 UTC|newest]
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